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ABSTRACT
Governments have two apparently conflicting roles to play: promoter of economic
development and protector of environmental quality. Economic development interests tend to
have priority on most government agenda in developing countries, creating obstacles to the
implementation of environmental protection policies. This trend can be reversed by
introducing environmental protection concems into the mainstream development agenda by
decentralizing environmental policy implementation to development-oriented agencies.
Government agencies often fail to implement environmental policies mainly because
they lack political support, they have insufficient financial resources, they have not developed
adequate institutional capacity, and they tend to overlook the importance of cooperation at the
local level. However, the Bahia State government in Northeast Brazil was able to overcome
all four of these obstacles in establishing environmentally protected areas (APAs) by
introducing them into the mainstream development agenda, which was chiefly oriented
toward tourism development. At the state level, a large number of APAs were created,
primarily as the result of the decentralization of administrative authority among several state
agencies, including development-oriented agencies linked to tourism development. This
decentralization generated an apparently unintentional system of incentives for state agencies
to implement APAs. The increased inter-agency competition for political control of protected
areas improved the institutional capacity of each agency, and generated funds and political
support at the state and local levels for APA implementation, overcoming the four obstacles.
State agencies' actions were supervised by an independent oversight body, the state
environmental council (CEPRAM), which had the power to interfere in the establishment of
APAs and block development projects related to them.
At the local level, seven case studies show that the involvement of state development
agencies, and the local expectation of economic benefits from tourism, were important factors
in preventing the usual local resistance to the establishment of APAs. In this context, three
points determined the intensity of local political, financial, and institutional support for
enforcing APA guidelines. First, APAs created as means of curbing already existent
environmental problems caused by tourism or urban development mustered more local
support than APAs created as environmental safeguards for public infrastructure projects.
Second, APAs contained within a single municipality received more local support than APAs
involving multiple municipalities. Third, the involvement of local actors at the early stages of
the APA creation fostered local support for enforcement. From the lessons at the story at the
state level, additional incentives to local institutions by a central authority linked to a
politically independent system of checks-and-balances might improve implementation at the
local level.
The decentralization of environmental policy implementation to a range of
development agencies can be an alternative to mainstreaming environmental concerns in the
development agenda and achieving environmental protection goals. However, to make
decentralization work, as my study in Bahia showed, central authorities should offer
institutional incentives to decentralized agencies to ensure increased attention to
environmental protection objectives in the development process; and at the same time, an
independent body with oversight authority for both developmental and environmental actions
should be in place to prevent development agencies from neglecting environmental concerns.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
This thesis is about implementation of environmental policy in developing countries.
It tries to understand the main institutional obstacles to effective implementation and possible
ways to overcome them. At the core of this research is a debate about the role of government.
One key question concerns the role of government in trying to foster both economic
development and environmental protection. Environmental problems in developing countries
stem from both economic development and the lack of it. The modem, affluent segment of
developing countries consumes large amounts of energy and natural resources and produces
waste at a rate similar to that of developed countries. As countries achieve rapid economic
growth, these problems tend to intensify. In contrast, widespread poverty causes other kinds
of environmental problems, such as deforestation due to unsustainable slash-and-burn
agriculture.
Thus environmental protection and economic development are linked, but not linearly.
More economic development does not necessarily mean more environmental impacts of all
kinds, and less economic development does not necessarily mean that there will be no
environmental impact. In this context, government has a dual mandate. On the one hand,
governments are in charge of designing policies to spur economic development. On the other
hand, government is responsible for protecting the environment in most countries, and the
way they foster economic development can help or hurt. Nowadays, any development action
has an environmental impact, and vice-versa, and these roles often conflict. This thesis
attempts to analyze the conditions under which these mandates can be compatible.
In developing countries, rapid economic development is often the highest government
priority. Pressured by low incomes, governments create different kinds of policies to foster
economic growth. As a result, development-oriented agencies tend to be politically
influential and powerful. They usually receive large amounts of funding to perform their
tasks compared with non-development agencies. Environmental agencies and issues, in
contrast, often obtain little funding because they are not a political priority, or because they
involve highly politicized actions, such as expropriating land or restricting development. The
puzzle in this research is to understand under what conditions and under what institutional
arrangement governments tend to prioritize environmental concerns in their development
agenda.
Another question is which institutional arrangement governments can use to
implement environmental policies effectively. In the past, policies pursued under highly
centralized governments often resulted in failures. Decentralization showed promise as a way
to increase governments' efficiency and accountability. However, the literature has tended to
look at how to decentralize government, instead of examining whether decentralized
governments implement policies effectively. This research focuses on how environmental
policies are implemented in a decentralized manner, through decentralization at the same
governmental level and devolution to lower governmental levels.
1.1) The Case Study
As in many parts of the developing world, local and state governments in Northeastern
Brazil' - the most economically disadvantaged section of the country (see Appendix 1) - are
looking to spur rapid economic development. Since the end of the 1980s, this region has
adopted tourism as one of its top economic development strategies. Federal, state, and local
governments have invested several million dollars in tourism infrastructure and expect this
investment to be matched by considerable investment from the private sector. Governments
in Bahia, the largest of Northeast's nine states (Figure 1.1), invested heavily in tourism-
related projects in the 1990s (Bahia State Government, n.d.).
Tourists come to the Bahian coast searching for scenic beaches and dunes and tropical
settings framed by coconut trees and typical villages. Together with the region's cultural
richness, coastal destinations are some of the most important tourist attractions in Bahia. On
the other hand, tourism has exerted a series of negative impacts on the natural environment.
These are likely to hinder tourist activity itself and hurt the region's economy if they are not
managed well. Therefore, to be successful, tourism-related activity in a region like the
Bahian coast depends on preservation of the area's natural resources. Local and state
governments in Bahia have responded to internal and external pressures to increase
environmental protection while encouraging tourism to expand. To fulfill this dual mandate,
the state government of Bahia created a significant number of environmentally protected
areas (APAs 2) in the 1 990s-one type of protected area. Between 1992 and 1998, the number
of APAs increased by 1,200 percent, and their area multiplied by 130 (CRA, 1998).
From now on, I refer to Northeast Brazil as Northeast solely.
2 APA =Area de Protegio Ambiental, in Portuguese. The term APA (environmentally protected area, or Area
de Protegio Ambiental) was created in law 6,902 in 1981, and also included in the legislative National
Environmental Policy of 1981 (see Appendix 5 for the APA legislation). The National Environmental Council
defines APAs as "areas destined to preserve the environmental quality and natural resources in a certain region
in order to improve the quality of life of the local population and to protect regional ecosystems" (resolution
number 10, 1988, first article). An APA has a special zoning system that defines areas for preservation, tourism
development, and other activities. The objective of APAs is to avoid the uncontrolled development of tourism
and other economic activities. The zoning is supposedly planned with input from local communities and
governments.
Basic Data on Bahia State
Population: 12,276,000 inhabitants (1994)
Capital: Salvador (2,056,013 inhabitants in 1991)
Area: 561,026 km2 (216,613 square miles)
Number of municipalities: 415
Coast: 1,180 km
Sources: Bahia State Government (1997) and Banco do Nordeste (1996).
FIGURE 1.1 - THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST AND BAHIA (SUDENE, 1999)
APAs transfer certain development rights from private landowners and municipal
governments to a group of actors composed of state and municipal governments as well as
members of the local civil society, according to plans coordinated by state agencies. APAs
permit the state government and civil society to interfere in matters usually handled by
municipal governments, which are responsible for land-use planning. However, unlike areas
under stricter conservation guidelines, such as state and national parks, no land expropriation
is necessary to create an APA. This means that the financial burden of buying land is
avoided, as are possible conflicts with private landowners.
Especially in the 1990s, the creation of APAs became very common. One push for the
creation of such areas was the environmental protection demands of federal and multilateral
banks (such as the Bank of the Northeast3 and the Inter-American Development Bank). For
state agencies to obtain large loans from these banks for investment in infrastructure for
tourism, the agencies had to comply with environmental requirements . 4 Local governments,
developers, and landowners eager to attract private tourism-related investment did not oppose
the loss of some of their unfettered development rights, as they saw APAs as protecting their
investments. Environmental groups also increasingly influenced public policymaking around
the same time, because of the country's democratization process.
In this study, I examine the creation of APAs and the extent to which the government
of Bahia was able to overcome the political, institutional, and financial obstacles to
establishing and managing them. My research questions include:
(i) How and why did governments in Bahia adopt APAs as a tool for
environmental management?
(ii) What institutional conditions led to the successful creation of APAs at
the state level?
(iii) What local conditions led to enforcement of APA guidelines at the
local level?
This study used a combination of quantitative data and qualitative data drawn from
semi-structured interviews with government officials at the state and local level, members of
local populations, members of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academics, and
developers (see Appendix 2 for more details on the methodology and structure of the data
collection). As it turned out, I needed to make sense of two stories that take place at different
levels. The first is a story that unfolds at the state level. I pieced together most of this story
by talking to officials in the state capital, Salvador. This story explains how different policy
actors interacted to overcome the usual barriers to establishing protected areas. The second
story is set at the local level. I use seven in-depth case studies of APAs on the Bahian coast to
understand how and why local actors responded to proposals to create protected areas in their
vicinity, and to assess whether and why local actors provided institutional, financial, and
institutional resources for enforcing APA guidelines. These cases complement the story at
the state level, and help explain under what conditions APA guidelines were enforced.
1.2) Arguments in Brief
Tourism has become an important economic activity in many parts of the world
(WTO, 1991). Improvements in transportation and increasing incomes and vacation time have
allowed more people to travel more often to more distant places (Tyler, 1989). Today, most
3 Bank of the Northeast (Banco do Nordeste) is a government development bank that finances public- and
private-sector development projects in the Brazilian Northeast and northern regions of the states of Minas Gerais
and Espirito Santo. The bank's headquarters are in Fortaleza (Ceara State), but it maintains branches all over the
region.
4 Most of the financing comes from Prodetur, a plan to develop tourism in the Northeast of Brazil through
investments totaling over US$ 1.6 billion in the next 10 years. This plan is coordinated by Banco do Nordeste
and state governments with loans from the InterAmerican Development Bank.
parts of the world can be readily reached. One important feature of modem tourism is the
growing number of tourists looking to enjoy the wonderment of nature. Indeed, nature-based
tourism has become quite popular (Boo, 1991). This kind of tourism offers an appealing form
of economic activity, especially for developing countries rich in environmental resources.
However, the quick disappearance of the natural environment owing to unrestrained
development - some of which is due to tourism itself - poses a threat to the sustainability of
such activity in places that have just begun to enjoy its benefits.
Government-managed protected areas have therefore emerged as one of the main
types of tourist destinations. Besides promoting them as tourist attractions, many
governments have relied on protected areas to control land development and preserve rare
fauna and flora. In some developing countries, however, public agencies have had difficulty
establishing and managing significant numbers of protected areas. This is partly because they
lack many of the financial, institutional, and political resources needed to create and maintain
them and fend off powerful development interests. Still, some governments have been able to
create and manage protected areas.
This study examines why and how some governments have supported protected-area
policies and have been able to overcome the political, institutional, and financial obstacles to
establishing and maintaining them. I am particularly interested in understanding how the rise
of the environmental movement and growing international interest in nature-based tourism
can stimulate the creation and effective management of protected areas in developing
countries.
In this thesis, I develop an analytical framework for understanding the obstacles to
establishing protected areas (see Chapter 3). Based on the literature of protected-area policy
and management, I identify four main obstacles to the creation and management of protected
areas: lack of political support, lack of financial resources, lack of institutional capacity, and
lack of cooperation from local actors. In my case study in Bahia, Brazil, I use this analytical
framework to understand, at both state and local levels, why and to what extent governments
were capable of overcoming these obstacles to create and manage a considerable number of
protected areas. This research adds to the scarce literature on protected areas in developing
countries. That literature mostly provides normative recommendations or descriptive
analyses (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996; McNeely, 1993) of protected areas. Few publications are
based on empirical research to understand how protected areas are established and managed
in the field.
Decentralization of decision making turns out to be key to both stories. Had Bahia state
government not allocated responsibility for creating and administering APAs to a variety of
state and local agencies, it would not have been possible to create such a large number of
APAs. Instead of centralizing power in the hands of a single state environmental agency
(CRA), the government allowed other state agencies to initiate APAs on their own -
especially the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur) and Company for the
Development of the Metropolitan Region (Companhia de Desenvolvimento da Regiio
Metropolitana - Conder).
Overall, the effects of decentralization were fourfold, tackling the four obstacles to
establishing protected areas examined in the analytical framework in Chapter 3. First,
political support for creating APAs grew as development agencies promoted APA policy
instead of blocking it. Second, state-level decentralization attracted more funds for
environmental protection from alternative sources. For example, Sectur allocated part of its
tourism development budget for APA activities under its administration. Third, the
involvement of several agencies sparked a competition to create and establish the institutional
structure to administer APAs, since in so doing the agencies could enhance their political
power and financial resources. Fourth, the participation of development agencies in this
endeavor eased the resistance of local governments to state interference in land-use planning,
constitutionally interpreted as a responsibility of local governments. Local governments were
eager to attract investment in infrastructure, and the involvement of development agencies in
APAs raised local expectations of state financial support.
In the story at the local level, state agencies counted on local institutions to participate
in enforcing APA guidelines. However, such local support produced different outcomes in
the different case studies. Of my seven case studies, one (Guaibim APA) offered the best
example of a local structure for ensuring the enforcement of APA guidelines. This APA was
created to control the impacts of a proposed tourist resort. State officials were flexible and
agreed to negotiate the conditions of the development project. Instead of simply denying the
construction permit to developers, state officials negotiated project changes to ensure that the
project complied with environmental goals. This negotiation convinced developers and local
actors to support APA guidelines.
State and municipal officials then used the APA to enforce the negotiated agreement
and protect the larger area. In Guaibim, local actors who were involved in the policy process
from its early stages perceived themselves as benefiting from APA creation. Municipal
authorities supported the creation and the enforcement of APA guidelines through municipal
laws and enforcement structures because they expected resources from the state and helped
elaborate the land-use rules. The fact that only one municipality was involved, together with
the relative small size of the APA (2,000 ha) and number of landholders, facilitated the strong
support of local actors in enforcing APA guidelines.
From the analysis of my seven case studies, three factors emerged to explain local
participation in enforcing APA guidelines: the objectives of the APAs, the number of
municipalities involved, and the early involvement of local actors. First, APAs created in
areas already under tourism development pressure generated more local support for
enforcement than APAs created to head off the impacts of development projects. Second,
APAs involving only one municipality were likely to gain more local support for
enforcement. The involvement of several municipalities in one APA made it difficult for
state agencies to coordinate their efforts to build local capacity for APA enforcement.
Finally, the early involvement of local actors in establishing APAs helped inform them about
the benefits of protected areas, thus fostering local political and institutional support for
enforcement.
In summary, to become a governmental priority in developing countries, strategies for
environmental protection must be reconciled with economic development. Institutions in
charge of development should be able to undertake initiatives in environmental protection.
Innovative institutional arrangements must be in place to balance the sometimes-conflicting
objectives of development and environmental protection. Decentralization seems to be an
alternative form of institutional arrangement. However, decentralization should not be
conceived as simply a hand-over of responsibility and power to decentralized organizations.
Central institutions must play a crucial role before, during, and after the decentralization
process.
Two factors were important in explaining why decentralization at the state level
enabled Bahia to achieve a certain degree of success in establishing APAs. First, although
apparently unintentional, decentralization created a system of institutional incentives
motivating development agencies to establish APAs. Protected areas were compatible with
their development agenda based on nature-based tourism. Second, a system of checks and
balances provided oversight for the whole process of development and environmental
protection. Both APAs and development projects needed the approval not only of the state
environmental agency (CRA) but also of the state environmental council (CEPRAM), one-
third of whose members were from environmental groups. These two factors were missing to
some extent from the efforts of local actors to enforce APA guidelines.
1.3) Layout of the Following Chapters
Chapter 2 examines the relevant literature to understand the role of government in
implementing environmental policies in developing countries. It starts with a debate
concerning the dual mandate of governments: economic development and environmental
protection. The chapter then introduces debates in the literature concerning institutional
arrangements that enable governments to work more effectively. Finally, the main obstacles
to implementing environmental policies in developing countries are identified.
Chapter 3 focuses on one of the main environmental management tools that
governments can use to minimize the impacts of tourism development: protected areas. I
describe the history of the different kinds of protected areas around the world. I also
summarize the primary costs and benefits of establishing protected areas and how they are
divided among stakeholders. Later, I identify the four main obstacles to implementing
protected-area policy, particularly in developing countries. I then develop an analytical
framework based on these four obstacles to apply to the Bahian case studies.
Chapter 4 sets out the general background for understanding the situation in Bahia. It
describes the evolution of environmental legislation and governmental institutions in Brazil
and Bahia, especially over the last four decades. This chapter analyzes the different kinds of
protected areas that have been created in Brazil. I explain how and why environmentally
protected areas (APAs) have been established in Bahia, detailing the process of their creation
and showing the increase in their number and surface area in the 1990s.
The next two chapters, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, analyze the stories of the establishment of
environmentally protected areas (APAs) in Bahia based on the analytical framework
developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 examines the story of APAs at the state level. It looks
how the state of Bahia was able to establish a significant number of APAs in areas with
tourism potential in the 1990s by decentralizing APA policy to several state agencies. The
involvement of various state agencies prompted them to increase their institutional capacity to
handle this responsibility, and attracted funding and political support to both state and local
levels. Chapter 6 studies the story of APAs at the local level. It describes in detail the seven
local case studies and analyzes the role of different stakeholders in each case, including state
government, local governments, NGOs, and the local population. I analyze these cases,
particularly the Guaibim APA case, to draw lessons for effective implementation of APAs at
the local level. Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarize these results and frame more generally my
contributions to planning and policy implementation.
CHAPTER 2 - IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2.1.) The dual mandate of governments
Governments have a dual mandate in steering development. On the one hand, the low
incomes and high poverty levels in many developing countries make economic development
an important government objective. Government responsibilities include attracting private
investment and spurring economic growth. Powerful ministries and agencies play a key role
in determining interventions that shape economic development, including providing
infrastructure, economic incentives, laws and the tax system. And creating policies,
programs, and projects to pursue those priorities. On the other hand, governments are also
responsible for environmental policy. One or several governmental agencies are expected to
perform several actions in this arena, such as enacting and enforcing environmental laws,
providing economic incentives for environmental initiatives, and controlling urban and land
use planning.
These two government mandates - economic development and environmental
protection - can be perceived as conflicting. Economic development can cause environmental
degradation, and environmental protection can restrict economic development. Government
agencies that oversee the two mandates, supported by allies in the private and non-
governmental sector, can disagree over government action and clash in their attempts to gain
political and institutional support.
Despite the increasing political support environmental issues have gained since the
United Nations conference on the environment in Stockholm in 1972, the governments of
many developing countries still perceive environmental protection as an obstacle to economic
development. For example, in his study of several Caribbean countries, Gamman (1995)
found in many cases that governments overturned environmental initiatives to support
development projects. Influential private interests could convince government officials to
approve their projects despite concerns raised by environmental groups outside and inside the
government.
What's more, while development agencies tend to maintain strong political
connections and receive significant institutional and financial resources, environmental
agencies often have few resources and little political clout. This is the case in several Eastern
European countries. During the communist era environmental agencies had little influence in
party politics and their officials could not promote many environmental initiatives (Klarer &
Francis, 1997). Even with the collapse of communist regimes, environmental agencies
remain in a fragile institutional position compared with development agencies. Economic
recovery and attaining parity with Western Europe are the priorities.
The idea that governments could play a major role in environmental protection took
hold in the 1960s and 1970s with growing pressure from environmental groups, first in
industrialized countries and then in the developing world. At that time, economic
development appeared to be one of the main villains of environmental quality. Theories
promoting zero economic growth and highlighting the incompatibility of economic
development and environmental protection were common. Facing public outcry,
governments introduced new environmental laws and policies and created specialized
agencies to implement them. These agencies, which often acted by policing and penalizing
environmental offenders, were frequently blamed for blocking economic development and
interfering with privacy and private property rights.
However, in the 1980s the concept of sustainable development challenged the idea
that environmental protection and economic development were incompatible. This concept
holds that economic development and environmental protection go hand in hand, and
governmental and private development actors began to think about how to integrate both
objectives. Since then, numerous policies, procedures, and projects have focused on
sustainable development. However, although today it is difficult for countries, regions, and
localities to consider any development action without also considering its environmental
consequences, and vice-versa, the fields continue to exist independently (Brandon & Brandon,
1992). Government bureaucracies typically assign these responsibilities to different agencies
or departments. As a result, environmental and developmental agencies interact in
government policies, programs, and projects only when procedural steps are established, such
as a requirement that an environmental agency analyze the impact of or approve development
projects. Even when discourses are in tune, as in the case of sustainable development,
agencies can disagree on everything from the nature and design of interventions to who
implements them. Compatibility between development and environmental goals continues to
be mostly a theoretical dream.
Economic theory postulates that one way to make environmental and developmental
objectives compatible is to put a price on environmental goods and quality (Anderson & Leal,
1992). Environmental value could then be aggregated with other economic values, and
optimal economic solutions would maximize the total monetary value. This approach implies
that environmental goods are protected only when individuals and organizations - that is, the
marketplace - value them. One extension of this idea is the Kuznet curve, which plots the
connection between changes in environmental quality and income. In the early stages of
development, countries and regions increase their income while degrading the environment.
As income reaches a certain level, environmental quality begins to improve as people place a
higher value on it and have more income to devote to preserving it. For developing countries,
the only way to attain high environmental quality is to become rich enough to afford
environmental "goods" (Beckerman, 1992). The only role for governments in this context
would be to value the cost of environmental degradation (Uhlig, 1992), to ensure that the
market worked perfectly.
However, this approach suggests several limitations, even apart from the imperfect
competition and distribution of information commonly ascribed to neoclassical economics.
First, though environmental economics has evolved, it is difficult to place a value on
environmental goods. Second, although some environmental problems such as certain kinds
of water and air pollution can be reversed, many losses such as extinct species are
irreversible. The Kuznet curve does not suggest solutions for the latter. Third, the
development path is not the same in all localities; some regions may not have to degrade the
environment at all to reach economic prosperity. Finally, the economic approach does not
account for the fact that the benefits and losses of environmental degradation and economic
development are not distributed evenly, generating conflicts. Thus, governments have more
roles to play by steering development.
2.2.) Organizing the State: Centralization versus Decentralization
The distribution of government responsibilities and resources fundamentally shapes
the interaction between development and environmental policy. Decentralization has been at
the core of the development and governance debates in developing countries since the 1970s.
These debates have focused on which levels of government should be involved in
development, as well as to what extent. Recent estimates show that decentralization is
occurring in over 80 percent of developing and former communist countries (Manor, 1999).
A growing academic literature focuses on the political economy of decentralization (Manor,
1999; Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983; Bennet, 1990).
The growing interest in decentralized government policymaking and administration
results from four main factors (Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). First, extremely centralized
development projects organized by huge and inefficient government bureaucracies in the
1950s and 1960s produced disappointing outcomes, sometimes even aggravating the
problems they were supposed to tackle and creating social and environmental distress
(Lutzenberger, 1985). Second, growth-with-equity development strategies of the 1970s called
for popular participation in the development process. Third, expanding government services
in an increasingly complex society were difficult to administer in a centralized manner.
Finally, calls from international organizations as well as local civil society for greater
democratization, accountability, and transparency in the 1980s and 1990s helped put
decentralization at the core of the development debate.
A growing body of literature produced the theoretical rationale supporting
decentralization. Proponents generated a long list of reasons why governments in developing
countries should decentralize (Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli & Cheema, 1983). The main
arguments can be summarized by two points. First, decentralization boosts government
responsiveness to the needs and desires of citizens. Second, decentralization improves
government efficiency and efficacy. Responding to social and political pressure,
decentralized governments find ways to offer more efficient services.
The literature describes various ways for decentralizing governmental responsibilities.
The most common approaches are deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization
(Rondinelli, 1981).5 Deconcentration implies the transfer of tasks in a government agency
from central offices (generally located in the capital) to offices located closer to the served
population. These local offices are not politically independent or accountable to the local
population but depend on the central government for budgets, instructions, and decision
5 This division is not consensual and uniform. For example, some authors do not consider privatization a form
of decentralization (Manor, 1999).
making. Delegation, in contrast, involves decentralizing tasks from the central government to
other public organizations such as special function agencies or public corporations.
Devolution entails the complete transfer of decisions regarding certain public responsibilities
from a central government to a lower level government. Devolution for many authors
captures the real spirit of decentralization, which is the transfer of authority to public
institutions closer to the population (Parry, 1997). Finally, privatization, considered one form
of decentralization by some authors, transfers certain public services from public to private
organizations (Manor, 1999).
Decentralization has become a buzzword in development discourse - one that rhymes
with democracy and efficiency. However, despite good intentions, these benefits often fail to
materialize (Parry, 1997; Ayee, 1994). Instead of generating more participatory local
government, decentralization can simply allow local elites to control services and resources,
creating a local autocracy. Instead of becoming more efficient through the use of local
knowledge, services decline in quality owing to a lack of local institutional and technical
capacity to perform the new tasks.
To produce the benefits that theory predicts, decentralization must do more than
transfer authority and responsibility from one institution to another. The new institutions must
develop the professional capacity, financial resources, and political support to deliver the
services effectively. National politicians and bureaucrats, afraid of losing power, can sabotage
decentralization. Moreover, some authors suggest that central governments must play
fundamental roles even when they decentralize power (Tendler, 1997). These roles range
from developing the institutional capacity of local governments to monitoring and evaluating
decentralized activities. Central governments must also prepare for this new role. Thus
decentralization requires capacity building and political negotiation at all levels of
government (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986).
In developing countries, government policies tend to be viewed as highly centralized
(Manor, 1999; Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983; Bennet, 1990; Morell & Poznanski, 1985). One
agency or department is responsible for implementing a given policy and becomes jealous if
other agencies interfere with its turf. Excessive centralization has been blamed for many
policy failures in the past, and decentralization is viewed as a possible solution to these
problems, as different agencies would be assigned complementary parts of a more complex
task. In the case of a tourism development project within an environmentally protected area,
for example, an agriculture agency would spearhead reforestation, a tourism agency would
attract private investment, an environmental agency would monitor resource use, a local
municipality would develop a land-use master plan, and a transportation agency would build
roads. However, in practice lack of coordination can doom such efforts, especially when
agencies have different objectives and institutional capacities.
2.3) Implementing Public Policies
Many people view policymaking as a matter of passing legislation, making plans, and
distributing responsibilities. However, reality has taught a different story. Policies, programs,
and projects often fail to be implemented as planned or exert unexpected impacts. The
catastrophic consequences of massive development in the Brazilian Amazon in the 1970s are
examples of this mismatch between policy conception and implementation (Moran, 1982;
Lutzenberger, 1985).
Because scholars have often viewed implementation as secondary to policymaking,
the political science literature often focuses on legislative and administrative processes: how
issues arrive on the political agenda, how laws are approved, and how agencies are created. A
scholarly breakthrough occurred in 1973 with the release of Implementation, by Pressman and
Wildavsky. That book analyzed how a U.S. program for helping minorities economically, led
by the newly established Economic Development Administration (EDA), failed utterly,
despite great expectations and much effort in Washington. In writing their book, the authors
were surprised to discover a scarcity of serious academic attention to policy implementation,
though they had heard so much about it. Pressman and Wildavsky's work awakened scholars
to the promising but neglected field of implementation. The ensuing decade saw the
publication of many works on both theory and practice (e.g.; Rein & Rabinovitz, 1977;
Bardach, 1977; Berman, 1978; Elmore; 1979). Debates over implementation became part of
the scholarly agenda. However, nearly three decades since the publication of Pressman and
Wildavsky's influential work, disagreement remains over the basic definition of
implementation, as well as the techniques for studying and modeling it (Najam, 1995).
Defining implementation is not an easy task. Scholars have used several definitions,
from concise and simple to more elaborate ones. Rein and Rabinovitz (1977) define the
"politics of implementation"--how policies change as they move from administrative
guidelines into practice--as: "1) a declaration of government preferences, 2) mediated by a
number of actors who 3) create a circular process characterized by reciprocal power relations
and negotiations." Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) present implementation as the "events and
activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public policy directives, which include
both the effort to administer and the substantive impact on people and events." The study of
implementation "requires understanding that apparently simple sequences of events depend on
complex chains of reciprocal interactions" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).
Some authors divide the implementation literature into generations (Goggin et al.,
1990; Najam, 1995). Goggin et al. point to research in the 1970s that called attention to the
need for an implementation research agenda. Although first-generation research
demonstrated the complexities of implementation, studies were accused of being case-
specific, lacking theoretical grounding, overlooking cumulative knowledge, and emphasizing
pessimistic views (Goggin et al., 1990). The second generation tried to build theories on a
larger number of case studies and develop models to explain variables and causality in
implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Edwards III, 1980; Van Meter & Van Horn,
1975). However, none of the models were able to validate propositions from earlier
frameworks or replicate them in different cases. The third generation tried to combine
theoretical and empirical work to identify the key variables explaining why implementation
works in some cases and fails in others (Goggin et al., 1990; Najam, 1995; Grindle, 1980).
This approach continues today, with new approaches focusing on "success" cases in
developing countries (Grindle, 1998; Tendler, 1997).
Implementation has generated various hot debates and schools of thought. One of the
most interesting concerns the top-down versus bottom-up approaches to implementing policy.
Adherents of the former approach regard implementation as beginning with an authoritative
decision, and assume that the process can be controlled from the top (Mazmanian & Sabatier,
1983; Van Peter and Van Horn, 1975). Countering this rationale, some scholars developed a
bottom-up approach, in which street-level bureaucrats and the affected population greatly
influence policy implementation (Elmore, 1979; Lipsky, 1978; Kaufman, 1973). Some of this
research suggests that bottom-up influence not only occurs but is desirable because it adapts
policies to local needs (Palumbo & Harder, 1981). These ideas coincided with the early boom
in the decentralization literature (Rondinelli, 1981). Top-downers counterattacked,
maintaining that bottom-uppers overemphasized the influence of local forces, and that they
failed to consider how best to implement policy (Sabatier, 1986). As the top-down versus
bottom-up debate evolved, thinking converged: scholars realized that they needed to
understand both influences (Hanf, 1982).
Although some authors claim that their models based on developed countries are valid
in any context (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975), discussion of policy implementation have
taken a different tack in developing countries. (This discussion has occasionally been
influenced by the debate in developed countries, and vice-versa - see Grindle, 1980). The
discussion regarding developing countries has tended to be separate because of the
assumption - never tested - that the implementation process and local conditions are
substantially different than in developed countries. The literature on developing countries
differs in three ways (Najam, 1995). First, it has been more case based and less dependent on
models because of the greater diversity in social, cultural and political contexts in these
countries. Second, the case approach grounds this literature more firmly in the bottom-up
approach. Finally, developing countries supposedly face more financial, technical, political,
and cultural obstacles to implementing policy; these countries tend to have "strong societies
and weak states" (Migdal, 1988, quoted by Najam, 1995).
Emphasis on implementation in developing countries has shifted from "nothing-
works" case studies to "success cases" or best practices (Tendler, 1997; Grindle, 1998). The
latter try to understand why a policy works even in a context that is seemingly unfavorable to
success. These cases facilitate the understanding and design of policy policies in the same
region or country, or in countries with similar social and political contexts (Tendler, 1997).
2.4) Implementing Environmental Policy in Developing Countries
The view of many developing countries regarding environmental protection changed
significantly between the UN conference on sustainable development held in Stockholm in
1972 and the Earth Summit held in Rio in 1992. In 1972, a group of developing countries
stated that they would not sacrifice their economic development to protect the environment.
In 1992, those countries came with a more progressive agenda, and many signed
environmental treaties, leaving some developed countries (including the United States) on the
defensive. However, implementation of environmental treaties such as those signed at Rio is
left to individual countries, which must translate them into policies, program, and projects to
obtain results at national, regional, and local levels. At the point where intention becomes
action several problems arise, making implementation a strenuous task; more often than not
environmental policies fail in developing countries. Shortages of technical capacity and
scientific understanding may be common, but the complexity of the political economy in
which the problem must be solved seems to exert an even more fundamental effect (Desai,
1992).
Environmental problems in developing countries stem from two fundamental sources.
On the one hand, problems result when a nation grows economically and embraces more
affluent (or "modem") lifestyles. In those situations industrializing countries produce waste
and use natural resources at almost the same pace as industrialized countries. On the other
hand, environmental problems are rooted in the poverty that affects large segments of the
population. Peasants use slash-and-bum agriculture in an unsustainable way for survival,
causing deforestation (Pichon, 1992; Oliveira, 1996). Pastures are overgrazed, expanding
desertification. A lack of economic growth - and distribution of this growth - can perpetuate
or aggravate some of these problems (Desai, 1992; World Bank, 1992).
The academic literature documents numerous failures in implementing environmental
policies in some developing countries, such as in India (Vyas & Reddy, 1998; Reich &
Bowonder, 1998), China (Ross, 1992; Jan, 1995), Eastern European countries (Hardi, 1992;
Klarer & Francis, 1997), and Ecuador (Pichon, 1992). Common explanations for policy
failure range from the classical Malthusian paradigm regarding rapid population growth to
widespread corruption in political systems (Shams, 1994). Although these explanations may
often be true, they do not suggest practical solutions to problems in implementing
environmental policies in developing countries. To be useful to policymakers, analyses must
identify the main factors that impede successful implementation and suggest how these
obstacles could be overcome.
Toward that end, understanding the political economy in which the implementation
process occurs is crucial. As Pressman and Wildavsky recognized, implementation - and
especially environmental policy - encompasses the governmental and non-governmental
sector as well as interorganizational links (1973). Thus, scholars have begun to analyze how
organizations work together to successfully implement environmental policy in developing
countries (Brinkerhoff, 1996; Lopes et al., 1996; Lemos, 1998). This literature provides
practical recommendations to policymakers in developing countries.
The literature on environmental policy has identified several obstacles to policy
implementation. One branch of the literature, mostly by economists, argues that distorted
markets are the cause of most environmental problems, or that market mechanisms can prove
significant in tackling environmental problems, even in developing countries (Panayotou,
1993; Anderson & Leal, 1992; Pearce &Turner, 1990). However, although market
mechanisms may have a role in encouraging environmental protection, this author doubts that
governments that fail to implement other kinds of policies would succeed in creating the
needed market institutions and mechanisms. Most implementation problems are institutional.
These problems range from lack of political support at different levels of governments to lack
of financial resources to lack of institutional capacity.
First, environmental policies fail during implementation because environmental issues
do not evoke enough political support from government or civil society at the central level,
the local level, or both. Political support is essential in pressuring government agencies to
enforce environmental legislation and counter the forces opposing environmental standards
(such as groups of industrialists and farmers). The lack of political support for environmental
enforcement is due primarily to the urgent need for economic development. Widespread
poverty and low incomes prompt governments to promote rapid industrialization and
agricultural production that often causes environmental harm, as in India and China (Vyas &
Reddy, 1998; Ross, 1992). In other countries, such as Indonesia, economic activities based
on natural resources (mainly forestry and mining) are important sources of hard currency,
convincing governments to promote or allow rapid exploitation, especially during economic
crises (Boardman & Shaw, 1995). Environmental concerns, which often conflict with these
kinds of economic activities, have no place on the agenda.
Moreover, environmental agencies, when they exist, are often politically weak and
cannot oppose economic development interests. At the same time, civil society does not press
governments and private actors to uphold environmental standards. Groups in civil society
such as environmentalists and neighborhood associations were fundamental to the
"environmental revolution" in developed countries, but they still are nonexistent or lack
political clout in many developing countries. Action by civil society is also hampered by
political regimes, such as in China (Ross, 1995; Jan, 1992), or simply lack of interest on the
part of most of the population (Vyas & Reddy, 1998; USAID, 1979).
However, with the democratization of many developing countries in the 1980s and
1990s, community and environmental groups have increasingly been in the vanguard pressing
for better environmental standards and enforcement. Sometimes non-governmental groups
ally with progressive government and private actors to push for change. For example, in the
region of Cubatao in Brazil, one of the most polluted places in the world in the 1970s (called
Death Valley), community groups, allied with officials in the state environmental agency,
compelled polluting industries to comply environmental regulations (Lemos, 1998).
Second, the main obstacle to implementing environmental policies, especially for poor
governments in a country, region, or municipality, may be funding. "The commitment of
these countries [Eastern and Southern African countries] to sustainable environmental
management is beset more by their lack of resources than by a lack of knowledge about the
environment or lack of political will to promote sustainable development" (Salih, 1999).
Government in developing countries may sometimes prioritize certain environment issues and
obtain technical assistance to create elaborate plans, but may not have the financial resources
to implement them in a sustainable manner. Although international donors sometimes
provide funding, this financing usually covers a limited period of time and requires matching
funds from governments, which are hard to obtain.
Finally, institutional capacity can be another obstacle to policy implementation.
Besides the aforementioned lack of human resources, expertise, and equipment, institutional
complexity can prove to be a major limitation. For example, some authors argue that decision
making on environmental issues is too centralized and should be decentralized to local
institutions (Desai, 1991). However, conflicts or lack of communication among agencies or
levels of government complicate this process (Oliveira & Ogata, 1998; Brinkerhoff, 1996;
Vyas & Reddy, 1998). Others blame failure to implement policy on inadequate state-society
relations and internal state organization, such as in Greece (Stevis, 1992). For Gamman
(1995), the misunderstanding of the role of local culture by policymakers is one of the factors
that can explain non-implementation of environmental policies in some Caribbean countries.
Powerful ministries and pressing policies - perhaps as a result of a crisis - often divert
resources from weak ministries or unpressing policies through official (budget discussions) or
unofficial (behind the scenes political bargaining) means.
These obstacles (political, financial and institutional) provide a framework for
understanding policy implementation in developing countries. Investigating the institutional
arrangements that can overcome such obstacles is the object of this research. For example,
decentralization of policy implementation was the fundamental institutional arrangement that
generated a large number of environmentally protected areas (APAs) in Bahia. The
conditions under which this decentralization occurred placed protected areas in the
mainstream development agenda of the state. As we will see in the next chapters,
decentralization created an institutional synergy that brought political, financial and
institutional support for APA policy at the state and local level.
CHAPTER 3 - CREATING PROTECTED AREAS
This chapter discusses the establishment of protected areas around the world. It looks
at how the concept of protected areas evolved over time, from exclusive reserves for
privileged groups to the modem conception of national parks derived from Yellowstone. The
chapter also looks at how this conception often conflicts with the interests of the people who
live within protected areas, especially in developing countries. The benefits and costs of
protected areas are discussed, including how tourism has become an incentive to creating
protected areas. This chapter then examines the four obstacles that can explain the failure of
efforts to establish protected areas in many situations: lack of political support, lack of
funding, lack of institutional capacity, and lack of support at the local level. From these four
obstacles, I construct the analytical framework for the case studies used in this research, at
both the state (central) level in Chapter 5 and at the local level in Chapter 6.
3.1) The History of Protected Areas
A protected area can be defined as "an area dedicated primarily to the protection and
enjoyment of natural or cultural heritage, to maintenance of biodiversity, and/or to
maintenance of ecological life-support services" (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996, quoting IUCN,
1991). For centuries, nations have created protected areas for different reasons, such as
recreation, religion, and animal preservation. The first documented versions of protected
areas appeared in China and India (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). As early as the twelfth century
BC, Chinese rulers issued a decree for preserving a certain forest. In 252 BC, an Indian
emperor circulated an edict protecting animals and forests. Pre-Colombian Mexico and
African kingdoms also created different kinds of protected areas. Aztecs maintained
zoological parks and botanical gardens. Rwandan rulers set aside certain areas where only
part of the population had hunting rights.
In western cultures, a comprehensive approach to creating protected areas appeared in
the Middle Ages. At that time, the populations of game animals were declining in many
locations throughout Europe owing to growing population density, a greater number of
hunters, and more efficient hunting methods. Nobles started worrying about the scarcity of
prey. In 1084, King William I of England prepared an inventory of the natural resources of
his country, including forests and fishing and hunting reserves (MacKinnon et al., 1986). The
first game reserve documented in the western world was established in Venice in the eighth
century, when the local government set aside a natural refuge for boars and deer. The idea
spread to many parts of the continent, including the United Kingdom, France, and Central
Europe.
In the nineteenth century, industrialization and urban and agricultural expansion
caused many environmental problems including water pollution and erosion. Natural areas
where the growing population could seek recreation became scarce in the main urban centers.
Wilderness advocates demanded the preservation of natural spaces for many reasons,
including the preservation of watersheds, recreation, and human contact with nature. The
American philosopher Henry Thoreau argued that wilderness was fundamental to the success
of individuals and societies (Runte, 1997). In the United States, several efforts were made to
create urban parks for providing leisure to urban dwellers, such as Central Park in New York
and Boston Common. Around the same time, the federal government also granted a ten-
square-mile piece of land to the state of California for creating Yosemite Valley State Park.
This was the first legal preservation for public use of a wild scenic and recreational area
(Nash, 1978).
The turning point in the modern concept of environmentally protected areas was the
establishment of the 3,000-square-mile Yellowstone National Park in the United States in
1872 (Dubasak, 1990). The first national park in the world, Yellowstone established a large-
scale wilderness reserve in the public interest (Nash, 1978). Before Yellowstone, large
protected areas had been created mostly for the enjoyment of elites - nobles and individuals
from certain classes. The creation of these private areas protected their abundance and
aesthetic beauty from incursion by the majority of the population. Guardians were used to
enforce trespassing rules. Trespassers could receive severe punishment, including the death
penalty (Nash, 1978). Yellowstone and Yosemite changed this concept, showing that public
institutions could create large-scale protected areas for the purpose of preserving natural
resources in the public domain. Another important milestone was the creation of Adirondack
Park in New York, first as a forest preserve in 1885 and then as state park in 1892. In
contrast to national parks, Adirondack State Park encompassed mostly private land. In this
case the state government's reason for creating the park was the protection of watersheds that
provided the public water supply for New York. This was achieved by restraining private
development in a large area.
For over a century the spirit motivating Yellowstone has inspired the creation of
protected areas for recreational, scenic, and economic values throughout the United States and
many other countries, including Brazil (Padua, 1987). The Yellowstone Park Act provided a
model for these efforts. That spirit was resurrected by the UN Conference in Stockholm in
1972 and the tremendous growth of the environmental movement starting in the 1960s, first in
developed nations and later in developing countries (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). As a result,
protected areas grew significantly in the last three decades. During the 1970s, the number of
such areas increased by 46 percent and their area by over 80 percent (Harrison et al., 1984).
Many of these areas are in developing nations (MacKinnon et al., 1986). By 1992,
approximately 6,900 protected areas had been established in over 130 countries, covering an
area equivalent to 5 percent of the earth's territory (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996, p.2 9).
3.2) Categories of Protected Areas
The modern concept of protected areas has evolved for more than a century, and
justifications for establishing protected areas have multiplied. From Yellowstone's principle
of conserving wilderness for public recreation, rationales have expanded to include preserving
biodiversity, pursuing scientific research, reproducing fauna and flora, maintaining cultural
values, developing tourism, using resources sustainably, and even land-use planning. In this
evolution, protected areas have assumed different forms to accommodate different objectives
and managerial structures. Although national parks are the most common kind of protected
area in the world (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996), many other categories of protected areas have
also become common.
According to the World Conservation Union (IUCN), protected areas can be divided
into six categories (IUCN, 1990 and Table 3.1). The first category, strict nature reserves,
limit human visitation to scientific purposes. In general, these reserves include sensitive
ecosystems with rare or endangered species that cannot withstand even minimal disturbances.
The second category, national parks, are designed to reserve natural areas encompassing
important ecosystems for recreation. Human activities are limited to certain areas and
intensities. Natural monuments protect significant geological, biological, cultural, or
aesthetic areas. Habitat management areas encompass endangered fauna and flora and
include sites important for the reproduction and migration of species. Human presence is
restricted to researchers and environmental restoration personnel. Protected landscape and
seascape sites are conceived to prevent significant changes in places with important aesthetic
values. The last category, managed resource protected areas, allows the sustainable use of
natural ecosystems according to community needs. This range of categories gives
governments flexibility in responding to the political, economic, social, and environmental
conditions at stake.
Table 3.1 - Categories of Protected Areas
Category of Protected Area Main objective of management
I - Strict Nature Reserve or Wilderness For science and wilderness protection
Area
II - National Park For ecosystem protection and recreation
III - Natural Monument For preservation of specific natural feature
of inherent rarity, aesthetic or cultural
significance
IV - Habitat or Species Management Area For conservation through management
intervention to preserve threatened species
V - Protected Landscape or Seascape Sites For landscape/seascape conservation and
recreation
VI - Managed Resource Protected Area For sustainable use of natural ecosystems
according to community needs
Source: Adapted from Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996, pp. 40-41.
3.3) Costs and Benefits of Protected Areas
The establishment of protected areas implies costs and benefits for society. These can
be distributed locally, regionally, or globally, and exert impacts over the short, medium, and
long term. For example, a protected area can provide food for the local population, offer
recreation for urban dwellers, and preserve genetic diversity. However, the costs and benefits
of establishing protected areas are not distributed evenly among the parties involved.
Creating protected areas often provokes conflicts over the uses of natural and cultural
resources among different stakeholders.
Humans can benefit from conserving their natural environment, which supplies
several kinds of services (Munashinge, 1996; Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996; MacKinnon et al.,
1986). The environment provides products that humans consume directly, including fish,
fruit, and game animals. These products can be used by locals or commercialized. Many
indigenous groups still subsist completely on forest products, and rural residents often depend
on the products they gather from surrounding natural environments. Other local populations
collect and sell natural products to acquire cash. Some do that in sustainable ways -
including traditional fishing communities and rubber tappers - and others in unsustainable
ways - such as big logging companies in tropical zones.
The environment can also absorb and transform some of the byproducts of human
activity, such as sewage and carbon dioxide. For example, forests soak up a significant
fraction of the greenhouse gases that human activities generate. Nature also maintains
numerous life-support systems, such as watersheds supplying urban areas. The natural
environment helps control local natural disasters; floods, landslides, and siltation can be
mitigated by environmental protection. Human-induced changes in regional and global
environments, meanwhile, could destabilize sea currents and climate, causing droughts and
floods that could undermine human activities.
The environment also contains an uncountable pool of genes whose characteristics are
still poorly assessed, perhaps containing medical or nutritional properties. Also, humans use
the natural environment for recreation; a growing number of people practice ecotourism in
their leisure time. Recreation can create economic activities that generate jobs and income.
Despite these benefits, several costs are implied in the establishment of any
environmentally protected area - costs that are usually shared by governments and the local
population. First, preliminary studies, including scientific assessments and negotiations with
local governments and people, are needed to determine the viability and importance of the
proposed area. Second, once the area is created, it will need a management plan. This work
can be performed totally or partially by the institution in charge of the area or by hired
consultants. If this process involves local participation, organizing the participatory process
will impose added costs. In the case of environmentally protected areas (APAs) in Bahia,
these costs vary from US$ 40,000 to $250,000 for each APA, depending on the characteristics
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of the area.
Third, many protected areas include private lands, and governments must expropriate
the areas and compensate private landowners. The costs of doing so can be considerable,
especially if large portions of the protected areas are private. For instance, nearly all of the
Monte Pascoal National Park in Bahia was under private ownership when it was created in the
1960s (WWF, 1994). The costs of compensation can escalate if landowners fight in court for
more funds. Governments in developing countries often struggle to find the financial
6 Information obtained from public officials in Bahia.
resources to pay landowners, and many international donors to environmental projects like the
World Bank do not provide funds for land acquisition (WWF, 1994).
Once a protected area is established, environmental restoration, monitoring, and
enforcement require additional funds. Part-time or full-time personnel, private firms, and
NGOs must be hired to operate and maintain protected areas. Enforcement officials need to be
adequately equipped with vehicles (with fuel) and communication equipment, and
surveillance flights, computers, and satellite imagery are sometimes required for periodic
surveys.
Indirect costs are also associated with the creation of protected areas. Governments
lose taxes formerly imposed on the land, and on economic activities that would otherwise
have occurred in the protected area. Governments must also sometimes compensate
neighboring landowners for the damage to their properties caused by wild animals from the
protected area. Finally, there are the opportunity costs of locking up land and natural
resources - the gains foregone from harvesting and selling resources and pursuing other
economic activities such as agriculture or urban development.
3.4) Tourism and Protected Areas
One of the main reasons for creating a large number of protected areas is to provide
recreation for local populations and tourists (UNEP & WTO, 1992). The establishment of
many protected areas is an attempt to attract tourists while protecting the environment from
substantial change stemming from other activities as well as from tourism itself. Revenues
from tourism can significantly contribute to maintenance of protected areas and encourage
individuals and organizations to preserve the environment from which they profit.
Different kinds of tourism depend on different kinds of preservation and
environments. Some protected areas are established to preserve fauna and flora, and visitors
are generally allowed only in certain zones and kept at a certain distance from the animals.
This is the case of some natural parks in Kenya. Other protected areas are established for
game hunting, as are many game reserves in Africa. In these cases, the goal is to maintain
animal populations at minimum levels. Still other areas are created primarily to preserve
certain landscapes or geological formations, as in the case of Yellowstone. Finally, entire
rural environments can also become protected areas. In England, several protected areas were
established to preserve the cultural and natural environment of rural communities. Some of
these areas contain more than 250,000 inhabitants (Nash, 1978). Many visitors come to enjoy
this bucolic environment that was quickly disappearing.
Protected areas can provide recreation for a large number of people and generate
considerable revenue. For example, the US national parks are the largest tourist-attraction
system in the world (Baker, 1990, quoted by UNEP & WTO, 1992); more than 270 million
people visited these parks in 1989. US state parks are even more popular, with over 500
million visitors in the same year. In Kenya, tourism based on protected areas is the main
source of foreign currency, bringing US$ 400 million into the country in 1989 (UNEP &
WTO, 1992). Part of the revenue from tourism is often reinvested operating and maintaining
protected areas. For many developing countries that lack financial resources, income from
tourism is the only means and justification for protecting the environment by establishing
protected areas.
Recently, other factors related to tourism have stimulated the establishment of
protected areas. Governments have created protected areas to attract private and public
investments in tourism. Protected areas guarantee private investors that disorderly
development will not occur next to their projects. The Bahia State Tourism Secretariat has
advertised and emphasized this aspect in its brochure for private investors (Bahia State
Government, n.d.). This also occurs when projects require financing from multilateral donors.
In Bahia, the environmentally protected areas of Santo Antonio and Itacare were created as
environmental safeguards to approve a project of road construction financed by multilateral
organizations. Local governments have also established protected areas to attract investment
from higher levels of government. Protected areas can signify that the local government is
committed to controlling the impacts of tourism. Many municipalities in Bahia have tried to
create protected areas to attract state tourism projects.7 Finally, protected areas have been
advertised to attract tourists, particularly ecotourists. For instance, the municipality of
Jandaira has published and distributed several brochures describing its main tourism
attraction, the Mangue Seco APA (Prefeitura Municipal de Jandaira, n.d.).
However, even though tourism can attract funds for establishing and maintaining
protected areas, it can also exert negative economic, environmental, and social impacts on
protected areas. These impacts stem from construction of infrastructure, overuse of natural
resources, and other activities that affect natural resources, fauna, flora, the landscape, and
local culture. Thus, a balance must be struck between tourism and socio-environmental
conditions. Overcrowding or misuse of protected areas can pose a major threat to effective
environmental management. Many protected areas have already suffered negative impacts.
In Nepal, Annapurna and Sagarmatha national parks have been impacted heavily by tourism.
The harvesting of wood for building and heating lodges, deterioration of vegetation by
trekking, and the accumulation of large volumes of uncollected solid waste are some of the
consequences of the growing tourism industry. The number of tourists in Nepal, mostly
trekkers, increased from under 10,000 in 1965 to over 240,000 in 1987 (Boo, 1990). Even
some apparently low-impact activities such as birdwatching can have significant effects on
the environment if they are not controlled. For example, large numbers of birdwatchers
changed bird behavior in Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge in Florida (Burger &
Gochfeld, 1998).
3.5) Explaining Failed Efforts to Establish Protected Areas
With growing information about the potential benefits of protected areas and pressure
from environmentalists, the number of such areas rose significantly during the last three
decades, especially in developing countries (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). However,
academics, policymakers, and environmentalists agree that the need to expand the number of
protected areas even further is urgent - as is the need to improve their management structures
7 Information collected from interviews with local government members.
(declaration of the last World Congress on National Parks and Protected Areas, in McNeely,
1993, pp. 13-16). While some governments in the developing world, such as Costa Rica,
have pursued aggressive policies for establishing and maintaining protected areas effectively,
many other countries have lagged in these efforts (Barzetti, 1993). Indeed, for every
profitable and successful protected area, there may be hundreds that are not successful (Boo,
1990). Promoting, establishing, and implementing environmentally protected areas is not
often a top priority in regions where poverty alleviation, rapid economic development, and
resolution of internal and external conflicts are urgent needs. In these places, to succeed,
protected areas must be proven solutions to those needs instead of one more problem to be
solved.
Although the benefits of protected areas are enormous, several challenges to creating
and implementing them must be confronted. First, protected areas are rarely perceived as an
urgent need, and thus do not attract much political support. Second, once political obstacles
to creating protected areas are overcome, governments often lack the funds to establish and
manage them. Most environmentally protected areas in Latin America, for example, exist
only on paper (Barzetti, 1993). Third, even when funding is not a problem, many government
bureaucracies lack the institutional capacity to ensure effective implementation. For instance,
even though national and international sources of funding were available, institutional
"incapacity" was blamed for failures in implementing protected-area policies at the federal
level in Brazil (WWF, 1994). Fourth and finally, local populations and governments often
resist the establishment of protected areas because they see them as interfering in local
matters, and a burden more than a benefit. The following sections will discuss these four
obstacles in detail.
3.5.1) Lack of Political Support
Protected areas need to generate substantial political support. Governmental and non-
governmental environmental groups trying to establish such areas have long faced strong
opposition from private development interests and/or local populations, who see those areas
as threats to economic activity, or as a government interference in private property (Nash,
1978). On the other hand, governments themselves often regard the creation of protected
areas as a troublesome issue that should be avoided unless strong political or public pressure
supports such an effort. Protected areas generally entail expropriation of private land,
cessation of some economic activities (such as logging and construction), development
restrictions, and interference with local matters. Such activities can generate controversy and
opposition from strong political constituencies and lobbyists, including farmers, developers,
property rights groups, and logging interests. Although these groups often do not constitute a
local majority, they have financial resources and political contacts and can mobilize to inflict
substantial political damage. In some dictatorships, especially in developing countries, these
groups control the government and can silence environmental interests. Moreover,
governments must assign and justify the institutional and financial resources to create and
implement a protected-area policy from a limited budget (often in deficit). This situation has
been aggravated in the last decade with growing international pressure on governments to cut
their activities, deficits, and taxes.
Many of the political conflicts provoked by protected areas relate to the fact that
different interests compete over the use of natural resources and land. Indeed, some authors
point out that early national parks were created only because their land was not suitable for
other uses, or there was no conflicting interests at stake (Nash, 1978; Pouliquen-Young,
1997). National parks such as the Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and Yellowstone were created in
areas marginal for exploitation. No large park was created in highly productive agricultural
regions, such as Illinois or Iowa (Nash, 1978). Similarly, in Brazil, all large national parks
(with areas over 500,000 hectares) are in the Amazon region (WWF, 1994), mostly in remote
areas where land has few competing uses and the creation of national parks is unlikely to
cause conflicts.
At that point large natural areas were abundant, but few people saw the need to set
aside areas for environmental preservation. Environmental movements did not have the same
political power they have today. In the United States, for example, the concepts of national
parks and environmentalism were contrary to many powerful nineteenth-century ideas
regarding territorial expansion, conquest of nature, and exploitation of natural resources.
In industrialized countries, environmental movements grew to become an important
political force propelling creation of protected areas and other environmental initiatives.
However, especially in developing countries, the notion of environmental protection has
seemed antagonistic to the need for rapid economic development to alleviate widespread
poverty. At the UN Stockholm conference in 1972, the Brazilian government, together with
other developing nations, positioned itself radically against the environmental agenda. That
agenda was seen as a maneuver of the industrialized countries to impede Third World nations
from developing, and external interference in domestic matters (Loureiro & Pacheco, 1995).
Thus, environmentalism was not, and still is not in many countries, an important political
force mobilizing support for protected areas. Some progress in developing countries
regarding protected areas was initiated by committed public officials or important
personalities sympathetic to environmental causes. In Brazil, for example, an influential
public administrator suggested creating the first national parks, and a public bureaucrat
created a new class of protected areas that could be established without interference from pro-
timber interests (Padua, 1987; Nogueira Neto, 1992). In Costa Rica, the government
successfully adopted ecotourism as an economic alternative early on (Boo, 1990).
With the democratization of various developing countries, especially in Latin
America, many environmental movements have emerged and begun trying to mobilize the
population and influence political decision making. Public and government interest in
environmental matters therefore seems to have grown (Boo, 1990). However, many
environmental groups in developing countries act only locally and do not have strong
institutional and financial capacities. Although sometimes these groups are numerous, they
do not have the cohesion of other organized interest groups (especially those monitoring
economic development) that promote their political agenda in the legislature and executive
branch. Environmental interests within the government similarly often have little political
power, so they are underfunded. They also lack the important political contacts of pro-
development groups. For example, the head of an environmental agency is often a scientist
without many political contacts or the experience to promote the agency's interests.
Organizing these environmental constituencies and strengthening their ability to influence
political decisions are essential if the number and size of protected areas are to grow,
according to specialists and advocates worldwide (McNeely, 1993).
The lack of political support for protected areas is often attributed to deficient
communication concerning the importance of such areas (McNeely, 1993). The economic
and social benefits of protected areas are numerous (Boo, 1990; Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996;
Munasinghe & McNeely, 1996; Wells, 1997), but environmental interests sometimes lack the
skills and resources to spread the word through environmental education, political lobbying,
and use of mass media. For example, the success of the U.S. National Park Service in
building broad support for national parks was credited to the service's first director (Nash,
1978). An expert in public relations, this director placed articles about the parks in national
magazines and brought key politicians to tour the protected areas. These activities enhanced
public concern over protected areas and built broad political support for them within the
federal government and Congress.
The recent rise of ecotourism has enabled policymakers and the public to perceive the
benefits of protected areas, as tourism is a tangible direct benefit. This facilitates
communication with and support from a broader constituency for protected areas. In Bahia,
the state government mustered the support of many pro-development actors to protected areas
by extensively advertising its ecotourism attributes (Bahia State Government, n.d.).
The distribution of responsibility for protected areas within governments is also
important in securing political and institutional support (MacKinnon et al., 1986). Placing
protected areas within the jurisdiction of an underfunded and politically weak agency, such as
the environment ministry in many developing countries, can undermine support. Some
authors suggest that protected areas should be placed under the control of powerful revenue-
generating agencies such as agriculture and forestry (MacKinnon et al., 1986). However, if
environmental objectives clash with the primary goals of these development agencies, they
could simply support the latter, neglecting environmentally protected areas (Oliveira & Ogata,
1998).
Another issue in assigning government responsibility is whether all protected areas
should be under the control of one agency. Such an approach could improve institutional
coordination and assign full responsibility for successes or failures to that agency. That
approach would also unify pro-protection political activity, as the agency could be the bastion
fighting for protected areas within government. External actors would know which officials
to pressure to stimulate government action regarding protected areas. However, concentrating
protected areas in one agency could also create a backlash. The agency could be viewed as
the "environmental police," generating conflicts with and political isolation from other
government bureaucracies and leaders. This agency could also be poorly managed, preventing
significant action on protected areas. Although some authors support the placement of the
agency in one politically strong and revenue generating ministry or department (MacKinnon
et al., 1986), strong ministries or departments in developing countries may also be under
budgetary constraints and give protected areas low priority. Protected-area policy may also
clash with the developmental priorities of the powerful ministry, such as expansion of
agricultural or timber production.
Decentralization of responsibility for protected areas among several agencies could
produce a governmental coalition supporting environmentally protected areas. These
agencies could work together to gain approval for their projects. However, decentralization
could also spur competition and grievances among the agencies, spurring them to block each
other's projects. Decentralization could also open a political vacuum in which each agency
hands responsibility to others and no agency assumes any real responsibility for protected
areas (Oliveira & Ogata, 1998).
There is no consensus or much empirical evidence on the best way to establish
responsibility for protected areas within governmental institutions. Governments have
adopted different approaches to assigning such responsibilities. In the United States, the
federal government disperses responsibility for protected areas among several agencies in
different departments, mainly Interior, Agriculture, and Defense (US Department of Interior,
1975). In some countries, such as Uganda and Tanzania, protected areas assume a parastatal
form that gives them more political independence from government (MacKinnon et al., 1986).
In Brazil, since the 1980s, the federal government has concentrated responsibility for all
federally protected areas in one agency, the Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA -
Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renoviveis). At the state
level, assignment of protected area responsibilities has varied. For example, in Bahia, they
are dispersed among several state agencies in different secretariats.
3.5.2) The Lack of Funding for Protected Areas
One of the maj or problems facing protected areas in developing countries is a lack of
funding (McNeely, 1993). In many countries, public institutions have limited financial
resources even for the most basic public services, such as education and water supply. Some
government services depend on external aid just to survive at a minimal level. Even in
medium-income countries such as Brazil, some states and municipalities operate under
precarious conditions and provide almost no public services. Environmental protection is
rarely a priority in their political agendas. Moreover, in the last decade proponents of
"neoliberalism" have argued that to compete in a global economy, governments must reduce
their deficits and shrink their operations. To improve environmental management and
establish new protected areas, public agencies often have to hire new people, invest in training
and equipment, and expand their operating and maintenance capacity, but funds are scarce
and hiring public employees is difficult in this climate.
Under such conditions, where can governments find the financial resources to
maintain and expand protected areas? Many possible sources of funding for protected areas
do exist. Those sources include government budgets, park entrance fees, taxes on products
such as tobacco and alcohol, private and nonprofit groups, and international agencies (such as
the UN Global Environmental Facility and the US Agency for International Development).
These private, nonprofit, and international sources often fund specific projects, but the funds
are also often sporadic and temporary. A common source of financing for protected areas are
trust funds managed by a governmental or quasi-governmental institution. However, external
sources generally make only a limited contribution to these funds, which governments must
match with substantial resources, including personnel, material, services, and cash
(MacKinnon et al., 1986). Thus, the bulk of sustainable funding for protected areas usually
comes from internal sources, mainly entrance fees and government budgets, as in the case of
Brazil.
Many protected areas generate substantial income from visitors. Some of these areas
are profitable, with the surplus used to support other less profitable areas. In Rwanda, park
entrances in the Parc National des Volcans earned approximately US$ 1 million per year
before the civil war. In Ecuador, the Galapagos National Park generates US$ 700,000 per
year in direct revenues (WTO & UNEP, 1992). In United States, cost recovery from users
ranges from under 10 percent for the national park system to more than 100 percent for New
Hampshire state parks (LaPage, 1996). In South Africa, government cut funds for
maintaining protected areas, but operations contributed almost half the areas' funding in 1995
(Wells, 1996). Federal and provincial governments in Canada collect US$ 1.7 billion
annually in taxes from wildlife-related tourism, but spend only about US$ 300 million on
those programs.
In some developing countries, the recovery rate from investments in wildlife
conservation is more than 5 to 1 (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). However, there are many cases
where tourism revenues do not fulfill expectations and the protected-area system collapses
from underfunding. In Benin, Africa, the revenues from tourism were much lower than that
expected - too low to provide adequate funding for the park system and income for the local
population (Sayer, 1981, quoted by Boo, 1990). Several protected areas do not attract many
visitors because they do not have important attractions or are located in remote areas with
poor infrastructure. Therefore, in many developing countries, protected areas are not properly
managed because there is no funding from entrance fees and governments cannot afford to
support them.
In many countries, government budgets continue to finance the creation and
management of protected areas either totally or partially (Mackinnon et al., 1986). Even
where protected areas successfully raise capital from visitors, as does the U.S. National Park
Service, government budgets must complement the funds for proper management (Nash,
1978). Agencies in charge of protected areas must fight for portions of the budget within a
department or government. Those agencies must be technically convincing and politically
skillful in their arguments to persuade budgetary administrators of the need for funding.
Sometimes the relationship between costs and benefits of a protected-area system is not clear.
Although preserving natural resources generates many social benefits, these are often indirect
and non-monetary, and spread over society and over time. They are difficult to account
formally. Environmental agencies do not receive any real cash for those benefits.
Another challenge is that many of the costs of creating and implementing protected
areas must be paid up front or in the short-term. Environmental agencies must hire and pay
employees, buy land and material, and pay bills. Even though entrance and other fees can
make some protected areas profitable, governments often lack the funds for up-front
investments needed to establish protected areas.
In short, the cost-benefit analysis often used in governmental decision making
overlooks many benefits, even though techniques for evaluating those benefits have improved
in the last two decades. And it is difficult to promote intangible benefits within governments
that are short of cash for investment and operating costs.
3.5.3) The Lack of Institutional Capacity
Political support and funding are essential for the establishment of protected areas. A
comprehensive protected-area policy requires the endorsement of a strong political
constituency to insert it into the government agenda and overcome opposing forces. It also
needs funding for planning and implementation. However, even with political support and
funds, protected area policies can fail because governments have weak or no institutional
capacity to carry out policy objectives. Agencies in charge of protected areas may lack or
misuse personnel, training programs, and materials. In Madagascar, lack of institutional
capacity of the agencies in charge of protected areas has been one of the main obstacles to
improving them (Hannah et al., 1998). In Brazil, the Federal Environmental Agency
(IBAMA) has attracted several national and international sources of funding for protected
areas, but it has not had the institutional capacity to implement a comprehensive policy
(WWF, 1994). One of the reasons for this is the misallocation of personnel. IBAMA had
7,000 employees, but only 6 percent (437 employees) work on protected areas in mid-1990s.
As a result, IBAMA has lagged in instituting many programs involving protected areas. For
instance, the National Fund for the Environment (FNMA, Fundo Nacional do Meio
Ambiente) was created in 1989 and assigned US$ 22 million for environmental protection
between 1992 and 1996, owing to a loan from the International Development Bank.
However, only US$ 1.8 million had been used by the end of 1993 because of institutional
deadlocks.
To implement protected-area policies, government organizations need to perform
several activities, including proposing and planning protected areas, developing management
plans, and gaining approval from legal and political authorities (MacKinnon et al., 1986;
UNEP & WTO, 1992). These activities require a certain institutional capacity on the part of
organizations in charge of protected areas. This institutional capacity may include qualified
personnel (full- or part-time employees and consultants), infrastructure, appropriate
equipment, and services. With this capacity in place, government organizations can perform
studies, conduct field trips, negotiate with other actors, analyze consulting reports, respond to
political demands, and publish material. If an adequate institutional capacity is not in place,
organizations have to build a structure to implement protected-area policy. In the process of
building their capacity, organizations may buy equipment and services, hire or move staff,
contract with consultants, and invest in short-term or continuous training.
Protected-area policies should rest on an organizational structure that has, or can build,
the institutional capacity to perform the implementation task properly. As we saw in a
previous section, governments can place all protected areas under one governmental or
parastatal organization. This can concentrate, instead of dispersing, efforts to acquire the
skills, personnel, and resources for effective protected-area management. This can also avoid
rivalries and lack of coordination among different agencies (MacKinnon et al., 1986).
However, overlapping the same governmental function among several agencies can generate
synergistic effects (Landau, 1969). When more than one agency is working on the same
problem, the chances that one of them will actually do the work increase. Also, agencies can
cooperate to complement their institutional capacity. For example, one agency might have
more expertise in biological surveys, offering this capacity to other agencies; another might
have officials more experienced in physical planning who can supplement the lack of this
expertise in other agencies.
Individual agencies may also strive to improve their institutional capacity to gain
leverage for protected-area projects. By working more efficiently and effectively, agencies
can demand or create more projects and gain political prestige.
Several possible organizational arrangements could ensure adequate institutional
capacity for implementing protected-area policies. From the literature, it appears that there is
not enough evidence to suggest one right model. Effective implementation of such policies
seems to depend on several factors. Those factors include initial institutional capacity in the
government, funding alternatives, the relationship among participating agencies, the existence
and attitude of non-governmental actors, and opportunities for improving institutional
capacity.
3.5.4) The Lack of Cooperation and Coordination at the Local Level
The successful establishment of protected areas depends on the support of local
governments and communities (Boo, 1990; MacKinnon et al., 1986; Ceballos-Lascurain,
1996; UNEP & WTO, 1992). If locals perceive protected areas as an interference in local
matters or a burden, they can become uncooperative and make fulfilling protection objectives
almost impossible (MacKinnon et al., 1986). However, locals can also play a key role in
implementing protected-area objectives if they view them as beneficial in the short and long
term (Albers & Grinspoon, 1997). Locals can provide important information for developing
the management plan, and complement institutional capacity by helping publicize and enforce
protected-area guidelines.
In many countries, local governments or communities determine land-use rules and
legislation. When an upper-level government (such as the state or federal government)
establishes protected areas, it is restricting land use. Such a move could conflict with local
interests and the politicians who promote them. Although upper-level legislation regarding
protected areas generally overrules local legislation, local governments are important in
generating support for protected areas, as they know key members of their communities.
They can help inform the local population, and they are often knowledgeable about the main
threats and problems at the local level.
To complement upper-level governmental action, local officials can pass their own
legislation legitimizing protected areas, and provide some institutional capacity to implement
protected-area guidelines. However, governmental levels may dispute jurisdiction over land
use or environmentally protected areas, and such disputes can compromise their
implementation. For example, in South Africa, efforts to establish protected areas in some
regions have failed because of conflicts between provincial wildlife conservation agencies
and the national park board (Wells, 1996).
When the modem conservation movement began at the end of the nineteenth century,
the notion of a "protected area" implied the complete removal of humans. These areas would
be "islands" where nature would be left alone, separate from human activities except for those
entailed in appreciating it. As the American conservation advocate John Muir said in 1890,
"Our wild mountains should be saved from all sorts of commercialism and marks of man's
work" (Nash, 1978). Protected areas were designed as a modem idealization of what nature
should be, untouchable by humans (Diegues, 1994).
As the conservation movement expanded to developing countries, many protected
areas were created regardless of the existence of local people. Often these people had lived in
the region for generations, sometimes before formal states were established. Lines for parks
or reserves were drawn without considering the fact that people lived in those areas or used
them for cultural, religious, or subsistence activities, such as hunting, fishing, and collecting
fruits and firewood (Rawat, 1997). In some cases, local populations were forced out. In
many parts of Africa, police enforced protected areas at the expense of local people during the
colonial era, and even after it had ended (Wells, 1996). In Brazil, indigenous people who had
been living in the Monte Pascoal National Park before the Portuguese arrived in Brazil in
1500 were expelled and prohibited from entering the new park, confined to a reservation next
to it.
In the last four decades, as many developing countries have expanded their protected
areas, such moves have provoked local conflicts (Tisdell, 1995; Fiallo & Jacobson, 1995).
Local communities have often borne great losses when protected areas have been established,
and have gained almost no benefits (Wells, 1996). Policymakers, park managers, and
academics have begun to realize that local people should benefit from protected areas and are
fundamental to their design and implementation (MacKinnon et al., 1986; McNeely, 1992;
Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996; Albers & Grinspoon, 1997).
Local communities often use the natural resources that are the target of preservation.
With the creation of protected areas, communities generally have to give up use of those
resources either totally or partially. If the area attracts tourists, communities have to share
their natural resources and communal space (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). Thus, many
communities may be uneasy or hostile to the idea of protected areas. To support them,
communities need to feel that they are benefiting because their natural resources are protected
from poachers, or because they communities gain from tourism activities.
Officials implementing protected areas can compensate communities through several
mechanisms. They include paying for land claims, sharing revenues from park entrance fees,
employing local people, purchasing local goods, encouraging local participation in tourism
enterprises, and offering development assistance to local projects (Wells, 1996).
Development projects compensate local populations for the opportunity costs of
foregone activities in protected areas. Such projects can involve building roads, enhancing
the water supply, providing sewage treatment, and constructing schools and hospitals. These
projects also often improve the infrastructure for tourism activities, from which communities
benefit indirectly as well. Local governments also gain politically from these projects, as
politicians can claim credit for delivering them.
Of course, such projects can increase development pressures on protected areas and
facilitate access to illegally harvested products such as timber and wild animals.
Development projects such as roads can also spur activities that can threaten protected areas,
including agriculture, cattle raising, and new development. Thus, development efforts should
rest on a detailed analysis of their benefits to local people and tourism, as well as their threats
to conservation.
The possibility of benefiting economically and culturally from tourism can encourage
local populations to support local areas. With the growing market for ecotourism (Boo,
1990), locals can earn income from tourism. Possibilities range from establishing their own
businesses, to becoming guides, to selling their products, to working for new tourism
business. Some countries, like Costa Rica, have successfully established several ecotourism
projects with substantial support from the local population (Boo, 1990). However, many
ecotourism projects fail, frustrating the local population (Sayer, 1981). Locals sometimes
invest a significant part of their savings, or even loans, in failed tourism enterprises. Also,
tourism activities often mostly benefit outsiders, leaving the local population with only
marginal jobs (Wilkinson, 1992).
Communication and training are major components of raising support for protected
areas at the local level (MacKinnon et al., 1986, McNeely, 1993). Local populations can
develop negative attitudes toward protected areas when they are not well informed about them
(Fiallo & Jacobson, 1995). Locals should be aware of restrictions on protected areas, but
most importantly, they should clearly associate environmental conservation with income
opportunities. This can be achieved through public hearings, door-to-door contacts, local
media, and environmental education in local schools.
To help locals benefit from tourism, they should receive training in tourism activities
and information and financing in establishing their own businesses (Wells, 1996). Training
and information can spur environmental consciousness and the establishment of local non-
governmental environmental groups. These groups could convince governments of the need
to create local environmental agencies to help enforce protected-area guidelines. Training
could also focus on building local institutional capacity to complement enforcement. The
agency in charge of the protected area could provide training for local governments and
NGOs in enforcing environmental rules. They could also hire them or provide equipment and
personnel to perform some or all enforcement tasks.
The process of delineating protected areas is also an important factor in avoiding
conflicts with local populations or governments (MacKinnon et al., 1986). From a
conservation standpoint, biological preservation should be a priority; various models discuss
the optimal shape of certain protected areas (Dearden, 1988). However, the limits of
protected areas should also take into account several other factors, such as tourism needs,
local government borders, local economic activities, and existing systems of land tenure.
Protected areas can include one or more local governments. Spreading a protected
area over several governmental jurisdictions can avoid conflict because only part of a certain
municipality or province is set aside for preservation. Such an approach can also encourage
several governments to share enforcement. On the other hand, the involvement of several
jurisdictions can make coordination difficult. Lack of communication, training difficulties,
and local rivalries can compromise the success of the implementation task.
The flexibility and will to negotiate the use of natural resources and land with local
landowners and communities are also significant factors. Sometimes negotiating less strict
environmental rules with local actors can attract local support, but such support can also come
at the cost of a smaller protected area and lower level of conservation (Albers & Grinspoon,
1997).
Protected-area authorities and locals could jointly define environmental guidelines and
reach a formal or informal agreement balancing local and preservation interests. Locals could
be allowed to harvest certain products from the protected area, such as fish or fruits. For
example, local villagers supported the Sariska Tiger Reserve in India and Maputo Elephant
Reserve in Mozambique, even though wild animals caused losses on their properties, because
they were allowed to gather fodder, fuelwood and other resources from these reserves
(Sekhar, 1998; De Boer & Baquete, 1998). Landowners or communities could also be
allowed to develop part of their land if they preserve the rest. Flexibility in land use and
environmental rules can alleviate restrictions on locals, but the degree of flexibility and
negotiation of those rules should depend on the kind of protected area, the initial local
situation, and the willingness of locals to comply with agreements.
Analysis of the role of local actors in establishing and managing protected area is
complex. Moreover, pursuing effective local participation is not easy. Extensive experience
in several countries demonstrates that active local participation in developing countries is rare
and difficult to achieve (Wells, 1996). Varying social, economic, institutional, and
environmental situations makes it difficult for one region to learn from the experiences of
another. Widespread poverty in developing countries is a challenge and may impose high
demands on preservation. A balance between conservation, development, and human needs
should be the goal of many protected areas in developing countries.
Overall, these four challenges - lack of political support, lack of funding, lack of
institutional capacity, and lack of support at the local level - supply the framework for
analyzing the case studies in Bahia presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In Chapter 5, the
story at the state level, I discuss how decentralization of protected-area policy to several state
agencies overcame each of the four obstacles at the state level. In Chapter 6, I rely on seven
local case studies to determine how local governments and non-governmental groups
overcame political, institutional, and financial obstacles to support enforcement of protected-
area guidelines.
3.6) Tourism as a Force for Establishing Protected Areas
The natural environment has emerged as a competitive asset that brings tourists and
investment to many regions of the world, generating economic development. However, the
impacts of tourism development can destroy the same environment and undermine further
investment. Indeed, poor environmental management can ultimately destroy tourism itself
(see Appendix 3 for an overview of the impacts of tourism).
Concern about the important role of the environment in supporting economic activity
is not new. In the tourism field, these concerns started to appear in the 1970s when the
environmental and social impacts of tourism on certain regions became more evident (Hunter
and Green, 1995). Places like Acapulco in Mexico, the French Riviera, and Mallorca and
Torremolinos in Spain faced environmental problems related to tourism (Bosselman, 1978,
Llinis, 1996 and Pollard and Rodriguez, 1993).
Governments play two central roles in developing tourism. Public funds can be used
to construct the necessary infrastructure and promote tourism. Government agencies in
charge of environmental and land-use regulation must also control the social and
environmental impacts of tourism (see Appendix 4 for an analysis of the role of government
in protecting the environment from the impacts of tourism). These two public roles may seem
contradictory, but they do not need to be, in principle.
Governments often first concentrate their efforts on promoting tourism and then later,
when environmental conditions deteriorate to levels that threaten tourist activity, try to
mitigate tourism's impacts (Mathielson & Wall, 1996). However, since the mid-1980s,
environmental quality has been deemed essential to the growth of tourism, and several
governments have recognized the importance of this activity for economic development.
Consumers as well as local and external actors have pressured governments to change their
development approach. Thus, many governments are introducing tools for environmental
planning and management to prevent environmental degradation and declines in tourism.
These two government roles-development promoter and environmental protector -
seemed to inevitably conflict in developing countries. On the one hand, critics singled out
government investment as one of the main causes of environmental degradation in many
developing countries.8 On the other hand, key leaders of developing countries claimed that
they did not want to sacrifice economic development for environmental protection, and that
they did not have enough resources to invest in environmental quality.9
8 For instance, the deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon in the 1960s and 1970s was mostly provoked by
government investments in infrastructure and agrarian colonization projects (Moran, 1983; Mahar, 1989;
Oliveira, 1996). The federal government and multilateral financial institutions, like the World Bank, are blamed
as the main stimulators of this environmental "tragedy." Another famous case is the huge environmental and
social impacts of the Sardar Sarovar Project in the Narmada River, India (Fisher, 1995; Morse, 1992; Baviskar,
1995).
9 The well-known discourse of some developing countries in Stockholm (1972) and Rio (1992): "the
industrialized nations destroyed their environment to be rich, so why can't we do the same?" (Viola, 1992;
Loureiro & Pacheco, 1995).
However, the environmental agenda of many governments in developing countries
seems to be changing. Tourism has the potential to become an important economic activity in
many countries, and good environmental quality is essential to attracting a significant slice of
the tourism market, especially ecotourism (Boo, 1990). Ecotourism is defined as "traveling to
relatively undisturbed or uncontaminated natural areas with the specific objective of studying,
admiring and enjoying the scenery and its wild plants and animals, as well as any existing
cultural manifestation" (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1988). In economic terms, ecotourism is a non-
consumptive use of natural resources that increases their economic value. Developing regions
that still have well-preserved natural areas can generally pursue ecotourism as an alternative
form of economic development (Alderman, 1994). This economic motivation improves the
political and financial viability of environmental conservation initiatives.
Tourism has helped motivate environmental preservation in several developing
countries. In Ecuador, the number of tourists had steadily grown since the 1970s (Boo, 1990).
Most of these tourists came to enjoy Ecuador's cultural and natural attractions. Fifty-two
percent of tourists responding to an airport survey pointed to visitation of protected areas as
the most important reason to come to Ecuador, especially Galapagos National Park, a
UNESCO World Heritage Site (Boo, 1990). Revenue from entrance fees from Galapagos had
helped fund the creation and maintenance of other protected areas. The Ecuadorian
government, through the Ecuadorian Park Service, had worked on a new national preservation
strategy based on the creation of protected areas in 1990 (Boo, 1990).
Costa Rica is another example of how nature-based tourism can generate revenues and
increase the economic and political viability of environmental protection. More than 50
percent of Costa Rica's tourists practiced ecotourism by visiting a protected area, according to
an airport survey (Boo, 1990). Tourism has became one of the nation's most important
economic activities. In 1988, tourism revenues totaled US$ 165 million, and constituted the
third-largest export activity (Chant, 1992, p. 91). In 1993, tourism became the country's top
foreign exchange earner (Honey, 1999). Although some critics argue that Costa Rica's
tourism is not much different from conventional tourism (McLaren, 1998), since the 1980s
Costa Rica has become an internationally recognized nature-based tourism destination (Chant,
1992). Promoted initially by private tour operators, nature-based tourism was embraced by
the national government as a high priority. Environmental protection became a buzzword,
and environmentalism became part of the country's consciousness. Plans were promoted and
laws were passed to give incentives to environmental protection and tourism promotion.
Today, at least 25 percent of Costa Rican territory is under some form of environmental
protection (Honey, 1999).
It seems that tourism can create some of the positive conditions for spurring protected-
area policies. In the last two decades, tourism has emerged as a driving force behind the
establishment of protected areas in many developing countries. The need for environmental
conservation as an asset in developing tourism activities is a powerful idea. Many
governments have created protected areas as a result of pressures related to tourism
development.
The establishment and implementation of protected areas present several obstacles at
the government level, such as political obstruction, lack of funding, insufficient institutional
capacity, and resistance at the local level. These obstacles are especially difficult to overcome
in developing countries, where environmental protection is not often a top priority. Because
most of the responsibility for establishing protected areas rests with governments, the
effectiveness and efficiency of any protected-area policy depend on the importance
governments assign to protected areas, and on their ability to create and maintain them.
Social, environmental, and political conditions greatly influence the outcome of protected-
area policies. Moreover, the way governments devise their organizational structure to
implement and oversee protected areas seems fundamental to shaping the results.
The next three chapters cover the case of environmentally protected areas in the state
of Bahia, Brazil. The state government's determination to promote tourism as a priority of
the economic development agenda was fundamental in explaining the creation and
implementation of many protected areas, especially in zones with tourism potential. Several
state agencies that worked in tourism and infrastructure development became involved with
protected areas. Thus, the association of protected areas with the potential benefits of
tourism, and the organizational arrangement for dealing with protected areas, are crucial to
understanding why many of the political, institutional, and financial obstacles to establishing
protected areas were overcome in Bahia.
CHAPTER 4 -UNDERSTANDING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
ENVIRONMENTALLY PROTECTED AREAS (APAS, AREAS DE PROTE AO
AMBIENTAL) IN BRAZIL AND BAHIA
Over the last 30 years, the landscape of the Brazilian State of Bahia has undergone
rapid transformation, especially along the coast. Huge industrial clusters such as Camagari
and Aratu have grown up. Agricultural activities have also expanded along the coastal strip.
Logging has advanced toward the few remaining areas of the Atlantic Forest, especially in the
southern part of the state. Coastal cities have boomed in a disorderly fashion. Tourism has
spread rapidly around several towns such as Porto Seguro and Ilh6us. More recently,
following infrastructure improvements, the frontier for tourism development has advanced to
the northern coast.
Many of these activities have taken place without proper environmental planning,
causing problems such as air and water pollution, deforestation, and destruction of officially
protected ecosystems,10 such as the Atlantic Forest in southern Bahia. This forest is thought
to have the world's highest tree biodiversity (Conservation International, 1995)." Because
the southern part of the state has one of the fastest-growing tourism and forestry industries in
Brazil, the Atlantic Forest has largely disappeared over the last few decades (see Figure 4.1,
and SEI, 1995). Moreover, many traditional communities - which house some of the poorest
and most powerless people in the region - have been transformed both physically and
culturally.
10 Many coastal ecosystems, such as dunes and mangroves, are officially protected under the Brazilian federal
constitution. However, due to the lack of proper enforcement mechanisms, developers and squatters have
occupied and destroyed part of these ecosystems.
" In 1993, Brazilian scientists and researchers of the New York Botanical Garden announced that they had found
the highest tree biodiversity in the world during a field research in Southern Bahia. More than 450 species of
trees were found in one hectare (Conservation International, 1995).
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FIGURE 4.1 - CHANGE IN ATLANTIC FOREST IN SOUTHERN BAHIA BETWEEN 1945 AND 1990
(THE AREA IN BLACK WAS ATLANTIC FOREST. SOURCE: ANALISE & DADOS, 1994, P.108)
At the outset, unrestrained development along the coast was not viewed as a problem
since it was occurring in isolated areas. More recently, however, the tourism model of
development has spread to larger areas, and tourism has gained support as an attractive
regional economic development stimulus. Governmental agencies and some parts of civil
society in Bahia have realized that weak environmental management is a potential threat to
the long-term viability of tourism along Bahia's rich coast," as well as to other areas with
tourism potential. If uncontrolled development continued, the natural environment and
traditional coastal communities would be seriously affected, and consequently the potential
for tourism could be undermined.
Since the nation's democratization in 1985, actors in civil society, such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and community organizations, have increasingly
pressured governmental authorities to take greater responsibility for protecting environmental
resources and the well-being of coastal communities. For example, in the coastal village of
Balbino in the state of Ceara, developers burned houses and threatened villagers with death to
force them from their land, which was partially covered by mangroves. With the support of
NGOs, communities highlighted these issues in the mainstream media and pressured local and
state authorities to take action to protect local people and award them title to the land. In the
end, state government legalized local land titles and created an environmentally protected area
(APA) in the region to avoid land speculation. In Bahia, local inhabitants in Abaete APA
have denounced a construction project that violates APA guidelines and are trying to stop it in
" Bahia has the longest littoral in Brazil with approximately 1.2 thousand kilometers. Most of it is formed by
mangrove and beautiful beaches with large potential for tourism.
court, even though developers have a municipal construction permit (A Tarde, 1997a; A
Tarde, 1997b; A Tarde, 1998a; Ministbrio Pnblico Federal, 1997).
The mere identification of a problem is rarely sufficient to spur determined state
action. There have been several obstacles to an expanded state government role in
environmental protection, especially the creation of conservation units. First, zoning and
other land-use controls are interpreted in the Brazilian Constitution as municipal
responsibilities. Therefore, the state has limited power to intervene. Second, traditional
approaches to protecting sensitive environmental areas usually involve the expropriation of
land. This would be extremely costly for the entire area involved in Bahia and probably well
beyond the resources the state has available for environmental protection.
Third, in the past, the few preserved areas in the state were mostly national parks
under the jurisdiction of IBAMA, 13 a federal institution, over which the state had very little
influence. IBAMA has suffered from serious institutional problems, such as lack of funding
and personnel, for the last ten years. Thus, a sharp increase in the area and number of
federally protected areas was unlikely. Fourth, the state environmental agency (CRA) alone
could not do much to carry out a widespread policy of creating protected areas because it
lacked the funds, the technical and institutional capacity, and the political capital. Therefore a
new approach was necessary to bring the state into the process of protecting the environment
in areas with tourism potential. As we will see, the creation of APAs and the involvement of
various agencies have proved to be an alternative in overcoming some of the problems
mentioned above.
4.1) Jurisdiction on Environmental Matters in Brazil and Bahia
The federal Constitution of 1988 states that state and federal governments have the
authority to legislate environmental matters. 14 The federal government establishes legislation
stating general guidelines. The National Environmental Council (CONAMA) 15 specifies more
detailed policy guidelines for implementing federal legislation. States create specific
legislation according to their needs, but must always follow federal guidelines.
Although the federal constitution does not mention that municipalities can also
legislate on environmental matters, it does not stipulate the contrary. The federal constitution
authorizes municipalities to enact legislation to achieve local interests, and these interests
have been interpreted to include environmental resource protection (Oliveira & Ogata,
1998).16 However, environmental legislation at lower jurisdictional levels cannot contradict
3 IBAMA = Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renovaveis (Federal Environmental
Agency). IBAMA is the federal agency in charge of the protected areas under federal jurisdiction.
14 Article 26, Brazilian Federal Constitution (1988) (Brazil, 1996).
"5 CONAMA (Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente) defines national environmental policies through a series
of resolutions that are based on federal laws or decrees (for example, CONAMA specifies the limits allowed for
air and water pollutants). It is formed by members of the federal government, NGOs and labor and business
representatives from the different parts of the country.
6 The Article 30, Brazilian Federal Constitution (1988), states that municipalities can:
I - Legislate over any matter of local interest;
II - Supplement federal and state legislation if necessary.
legislation passed at higher levels; that is, municipal legislation cannot be less stringent than
state legislation, and state legislation cannot be less stringent than federal legislation.
Regarding land-use rules, the federal constitution declares that municipalities should
promote controlled land occupation through planning, land-use control, land subdivisions, and
urban land development rules. The state and federal governments do not directly regulate
land use, but they can intervene in land use rules when environmental protection is involved,
such as in the case of environmentally protected areas in Bahia.
4.2) Evolution of Brazilian Environmental Institutions
During the 1970s, 17 Brazilian and international environmental groups started to protest
Brazil's failure to respond to some of its environmental problems, such as the deforestation of
the Amazon, the widespread industrial pollution in Cubatio (State of Sio Paulo), and the
agreement between Brazil and Germany to build a series of nuclear reactors. After the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, the Brazilian federal
government decided to create the Special Secretariat for the Environment18 in 1973. Many
states, such as Sio Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, also decided to create their own environmental
agencies. However, the staff of these national and state agencies was very limited in the
beginning, and there was no comprehensive legislation or institutional structure to deal with
most environmental problems (Loureiro and Pacheco, 1995).
In the 1980s, the legal and institutional structure for environmental policy and
management was strengthened by the first comprehensive national environmental legislation:
the National Environmental Policy in 1981. Also in the 1980s, the Ministry of Urban
Development and the Environment was created (in 1985), and the National Environmental
Council (CONAMA) 19 was consolidated. In 1988, the environment received a special chapter
in the new Brazilian Constitution. At the state level, the 1980s were also crucial. States and
municipalities generated their own environmental legislation, and environmental agencies and
councils were established or enhanced.
At the federal level, the ministry in charge of environmental affairs evolved into the
Ministry of the Environment, Water Resources, and the Legal Amazon. Today, as states and
municipalities have assumed responsibility for most aspects of environment policy, federal
activity involves establishing some additional national environmental legislation and
implementation guidelines, and providing states with funds to pursue environmental policies
and projects. However, the federal government still exercises much control over some
renewable resources (such as fisheries and national forests), and administers federal
conservation units 2 0 through the Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA).
17 During this time Brazil was under a military dictatorship (it lasted between 1964 and 1985).
18 Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente (SEMA) under the Ministry of Interior.
19 Conselho Nacional do Meio Ambiente (CONAMA) is directly linked to the Presidential Cabinet.
20 According to the terminology used by the Brazilian governmental institutions, the term Conservation Unit
means any kind of protected area (including, National and State Parks, ecological station, APA etc.). The ternm
Environmentally Protected Area (APA in Portuguese) is utilized to indicate one specific kind of Conservation
Unit only (the one analyzed in my research).
In the non-governmental arena, total institutional capacity has also expanded. Since
the country's democratization, following the military dictatorship from 1964 and 1985, the
number of NGOs in Brazil has grown significantly (Bernardes & Nanne, 1994), especially
environmental NGOs (Viola, 1992). Following this pattern, the number of environmental
NGOs in Bahia has increased impressively in the last two decades (see Table 4.1 and Figure
4.2), especially when compared with other states in the Northeast (see Table 4.2). Between
1985 and 1992, the number of NGOs grew from 5 to 40.
Many of these groups were created with specific objectives, such as defending a
certain ecosystem or protesting against an environmental problem or disaster. For example,
the Pro-Tamar Foundation was created to protect marine turtles, which were threatened
almost to extinction by rapid occupation of the seashore.2 1 The Movement for the Defense of
Sao Francisco River (MDSF) was established to mobilize the local population regarding
environmental problems, such as pollution and sedimentation. Most of these NGOs act
regionally or locally. Only few have links to NGOs in other states or countries. However,
NGOs in Bahia are important in environmental decision making. Some of them (such as
Gamba, Germen and Ascae) regularly denounce environmental degradation and actively
participate in the decisions of the state environmental council (CEPRAM).
Table 4.1 - Number of environmental NGOs in Bahia
Year Total Number of NGOs
1980 0
1981 2
1982 4
1983 4
1984 5
1985 7
1986 9
1987 11
1988 14
1989 21
1990 27
1991 35
1992 40
Source: Mater Natura - Instituto de Estudos Ambientais (1996).
2 It has government support through links with the Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA) and the Brazilian
state oil company (Petrobras). Pro-Tamar Foundation has successfully expanded its activities over the years.
Today, it acts in several coastal states.
22 Besides Pro-Tamar Foundation, I have identified only two NGOs that operate statewide (Gamba and Germen)
through my field research. Out of these two, Gamba has wider contacts outside the state and participates in
national environmental forums (for instance. Gamba is part of the NGO national network to defend the
preservation of the Atlantic Forest).
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FIGURE 4.2 - TOTAL NUMBER OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN BAHIA OVER TIME
Table 4.2 - Number of environmental NGOs in the states of the Brazilian Northeast
State Number of NGOs per one
million inhabitants
Bahia 3.9
R. G. Norte 2.9
Pernambuco 1.7
Paraiba 1.3
Alagoas 1.2
Maranhao 1
Ceara 0.9
Sergipe 0
Source: Mater Natura - Instituto de Estudos Ambientais (1996), Almanaque Abril (1995).
In Bahia, policy guidelines to implement state legislation are specified by the State
Environmental Council (CEPRAM).2 3 CEPRAM has functioned since 1972 and is the first
state environmental council created in Brazil. It is in charge of the main decisions concerning
environmental policy at the state level (see Table 4.3 for the main responsibilities of
CEPRAM). One-third of its members are from governmental agencies, one-third are
representatives of entrepreneurs and workers, and one-third are representatives of
environmental NGOs (see 1998 composition at Table 4.4). Certain kinds of development
projects over a certain size have to be approved by CEPRAM to gain a state development
permit. CEPRAM members convene once a month to screen important development projects
and discuss the introduction of environmental policies based on state laws and decrees.
Recently modernized, with the public given access to its processes, CEPRAM has analyzed
an increasing number of projects and polices (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3 for the number of
projects analyzed by CEPRAM). The public agency in charge of implementing
environmental policies is the Center for Environmental Resources (CRA), which is under the
State Secretariat of Planing, Science and Technology (SEPLANTEC - Secretaria de
Planejamento, Ciencia e Tecnologia).
23 CEPRAM = Conselho Estadual de Meio Ambiente (State Environmental Council).
Table 4.3 - Responsibilities of the State Environmental Council (CEPRAM)
"The State Environmental Council (CEPRAM), as the highest institution in the state
environmental system, has the following responsibilities:
I - Elaborate the state environmental policy,
II - Approve projects of the state public institution that affect the conservation, defense
or quality of the environment,
III - Exert preventive and corrective coercive powers necessary to the conservation,
defense or quality improvement of the environment,
IV - Approve licenses for locating, implementing and operating projects with potential
environmental impacts,
V - Demand studies to analyze specific situations of possible environmental
degradation,
VI - Advise on scientific and technological state policy,
VII - Demand denounces of potential environmental degradation from identifiable
sources,
VII - Determine the maximum standards for pollutants statewide."
Source: State Law Regulation 3.858, Article 10, November 3, 1980. (Governo da
Bahia, 1997)
Table 4.4 - The fifteen representatives of the State Environmental Council (CEPRAM)
Public Agencies:
e Secretary of Planning, Science and Technology (SEPLANTEC)
e Secretary of Water Resources, Sanitation and Housing
* Secretary of Agriculture, Irrigation and Agrarian Reform
" Secretary of Industry, Commerce and Tourism
* Secretary of Health
Five Environmental Non-governmental Organizations elected in the General NGO
Assembly
Members of Unions:
* Representative of Bahia Federation of Industries (FIEB)
* Representative of the Industry Labor Union (FTIBA)
* Representative of Bahia Agriculture Federation (FAEBA)
e Representative of the Agriculture Labor Union (FETAG)
* Representative of professional association (e.g., Engineering and Architecture State
Council)
Table 4.5 - Number ofprocesses analyzed by CEPRAM over time
Year Number of Processes
Analyzed
1994 94
1995 118
1996 154
1997 236
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Source: Centro de Recursos Ambientais, n.d.
FIGURE 4.3 - NUMBER OF PROCESSES ANALYZED BY CEPRAM OVER TIME
Since the beginning of the 1 990s, another group of public actors has expanded its role
in environmental protection: public prosecutors (similar to U.S. district attorneys). According
to the Constitution, public prosecutors "should promote inquiries and public processes in
order to protect the environment and other public or collective interests." 4 In Bahia, the state
court system created a department of public prosecutors specializing in environmental law.
These prosecutors have initiated several cases against individuals, companies, and state and
municipal agencies, sometimes contesting development permits and environmental
management in APAs.
The institutional structure for establishing Brazilian environmental policy is
undergoing transition. Most of the states (including Bahia) hold most of the responsibility for
environmental protection. As some municipalities create additional institutional and legal
capacity to cope with certain environmental matters, states transfer responsibilities to them
24 Article 129, Incision III, Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 (Brazil, 1996).
(for example, responsibility for noise control has been transferred to a few municipalities in
Bahia, mainly the largest cities). However, most of the municipalities in Bahia have little or
no institutional or legal apparatus for environmental protection. Some environmental
responsibilities have also shifted to other state agencies (e.g., some conservation units are
under the State Agriculture Secretariat).
Because of all these institutional transitions, public accountability for environmental
protection can be often weak in Brazil (Ames & Keck, 1997). Sometimes no public agency
claims responsibility for certain environmental problems (Oliveira and Ogata, 1998). Other
times more than one public agency is involved in an environmental matter, so responsibilities
overlap. Although municipalities control land use according to the federal constitution, many
municipalities have no institutional apparatus to implement land-use controls. In Bahia, of
more than 400 municipalities, only Salvador has prepared a master plan.25 Furthermore,
federal and state governments issue environmental legislation specifying land-use rules that
municipalities are supposed to follow, such as coastal management plans. However, many
municipalities have different land-use regulations or lack the institutional apparatus to
implement these upper-level regulations, so they rarely implement them.
In a recent case brought by public prosecutors in Bahia, the construction company
MRM started a development project in the Abaete APA in Salvador with authorization from
the municipal government. However, this project would have broken several APA land-use
rules. The municipality had granted permission for the project without consulting state
authorities. As result, public prosecutors are suing MRM and the municipal government (A.
Tarde, 1997; and Ministbrio Pn'blico Federal, 1997).
4.3) Conservation Units
The nineteenth-century U.S. concept of national parks motivated influential
personalities to suggest similar kind of policies in Brazil (Padua, 1987). In 1876, Andre
Rebougas, a well-known engineer and public administrator, proposed creating two national
parks: one surrounding the Sete Quedas waterfall,2 6 and another on the Bananal fluvial
island.2 7 Rebougas's proposals did not receive much political support. However, the idea of
preserving natural resources through protected areas resurfaced in the mid-1930s with debates
over the first forest code. This code, approved in 1934, defined three kinds of protected areas:
national parks, national forests, and protected forests. 28
In 1937, the first national park was created: the Itatiaia National Park, a forested
mountain chain used as a vacation refuge for many well-to-do citizens from Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, then the Brazilian capital. The objective underlying creation of these parks
was preservation of unique natural areas with scenic and scientific value (WWF, 1994,
quoting the Brazilian Constitution of 1937).
25 This was the case until 1999, according to interviews with public officials in Conder.
26 This area was inundated in the 1970s by the creation of the dam for Itaipu Hydropower Unit.
27 Bananal is the largest fluvial island in the world. Today, it is protected under the Araguaia National Park
created in 1980.
" These three kinds of areas could also be created by state or municipal governments.
The federal government created several more protected areas until the establishment
of a new forest code in 1965 (Table 4.6). This code divided protected areas into two groups.
No resources could be exploited in the first group (National Parks and Biological Reserve29).
In the second group, protected areas would be used for economic or social objectives
(National Forests). The new code also defined areas under permanent preservation, which
included several categories of ecosystems such as land abutting water bodies and steep terrain
(Governo do Estado da Bahia, 1998).
The next significant legislative change occurred in 1981, when a law established two
other kinds of protected areas: ecological stations30 and environmentally protected areas
(APAs). From that point on, distinctions among so many kinds of protected areas began to
blur, as presidential decrees created four other categories of protected areas from 1984 to
1990: ecological reserves, areas of relevant ecological interest, extractivist reserves, and
private reserves. However, the number of protected areas grew significantly, to 142 by 1991
(Table 4.7).
The new categories were created mostly by bureaucrats in the Brazilian Institute of
Forest Development (IBDF), an obscure federal agency. Sometimes these officials created a
new kind of protected area to account for the characteristics of a type of region not yet
covered. Rivalries among different federal bureaucracies also stimulated the creation of new
categories. For example, an ecological station was not very different from a biological or
ecological reserve. However, the former category was created because officials in the Federal
Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA) wanted to establish their own protected areas
without interference from the other federal environmental bureaucracy, the Brazilian Institute
of Forest Development (IBDF), which SEMA considered pro-timber interests. By
establishing a new category, SEMA could prevent over 3.2 million hectares of primary forests
from falling into the hands of timber companies (Nogueira Neto, 1992).
Environmental NGOs participated in the National Environmental Council
(CONAMA) when it was established in 1981, but their influence was limited while Brazil
was under military dictatorship (until 1985), as political dissent during that period was
uncommon and punishable.
In 1987, the National Environmental Council (CONAMA) made an attempt to
streamline the classification system of publicly protected areas by defining ten categories.31
CONAMA and government agencies discussed these categories before submitting the
National System of Conservation Units (SNUC) for approval by the National Congress in
1992. Debates over these formal categories for protected areas (or conservation units, as
SNUC calls them) have lasted several years, but SNUC is expected to gain approval in 2000.
2 Biological reserves are areas of strict entrance, used mainly for protecting certain fauna and flora.
30 Biological stations were created to protect samples of certain ecosystems for ecological studies.
31 These categories are Ecological Stations, Ecological Reserves, Environmentally Protected Areas (APAS),
National, State and Municipal Parks, Biological Reserves, National, State and Municipal Forests, Natural
Monuments, Botanic Gardens, Zoos and Forest Gardens (WWF, 1994).
Table 4.6 - Kinds ofprotected areas in the forest legislation of 1934
Kind of Definition Number Number Number
Protect Area created from created created
1934 to 1960 from 1960 from 1934
to 1965 to 1965
National Park Public land (or, if
private, the land 06 10 16
should be
expropriated). No
development is
allowed.
National Forest reserves on 02 01 20
Forest public lands held for
future exploitation.
Protected Reserves on private 15 05 03
Forest land that can be
exploited only with
government
permission.
Source: WWF (1994)
Table 4.7 - Number ofprotected areas in Brazil (1991)
Category of Protected Area Number (1991)
National Park 34
Biological Reserve 23
Ecological Stations 21
Ecological Reserves 06
Environmentally Protected Areas 16
National Forests 38
Extractivist Reserves 04
Source: WWF (1994)
The federal constitution suggests that "public institutions" can set aside conservation
areas. All three levels of government (federal, state, and municipal) can designate parts of
their territories as "conservation units." The National System of Conservation Units (SNUC),
still under debate, defines the following conservation units:
- biological reserves
- national, state, and municipal parks
- natural monuments
wildlife refuges
- reserves of natural resources
- fauna reserves
- environmentally protected areas (APAs)
- national, state, and municipal forests
- extractive reserves
These categories accomplish different objectives (see Table 4.8), and each has its own
rules regarding land use, property rights, administration, and environmental management
structure. For example, in some conservation units, such as national and state parks, almost
no development is allowed, and private land should be expropriated and landowners
compensated. In other categories, such as environmentally protected areas (APAs),
expropriation is not necessary and certain kinds of development are allowed. Because of their
flexibility regarding land use and property rights, APAs have become one of the most popular
conservation units (Corte, 1995).
Table 4.8- Kinds of Conservation Units in Brazil and their objectives
Objectives Ecological National Natural Wildlife Reserve of Fauna APA National Reserve
Reserve Parks Monument Refuge Natural Reserve Forest for
Resources Extracti
vism
Preserve 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 2
biological
diversity
Preserve/ 1 1 3 2 2 3 2 3 2
restore samples
of ecosystems
Protected 1 1 3 3 3
endangered or
endemic species
Preserve fauna 3 1 2 3 2 2
and flora
Manage fauna 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 1
and flora
resources
Protect 1
landscape
Protect water 2 2 3 3 2 3 1 1 2
resources
Allow scientific 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
research
Allow 2 1 1 3 2 2
environmental
education
Propitiate 1 1 3 2 1 2
recreation
Contribute for 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
environmental
monitoring
Allow 3 1 1 1 1
sustainable use
of resources
Stimulate 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 1
regional
development
Serve as buffer 2 1 2 3
zone
Preserve
resources for
the future
1 = primary objective, 2 secondary objective, 3 = wherever is possible
Sources: Governo da Bahia (1998) and WWF (1994).
4.4) Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs)
The term APA (environmentally protected area, or Area de Prote9o Ambiental in
Portuguese) was created by law number 6,902 in 1981. The term is also included in the 1981
legislation establishing national environmental policy. The National Environmental Council
defines APAs as "areas destined to preserve the environmental quality and natural resources
in a certain region in order to improve the quality of life of the local population and to protect
regional ecosystems" (resolution number 10, 1988). An APA is administered under a zoning
system that specifies areas for different uses, such as preservation, tourism development, and
urban settlement. Zoning is supposedly created based on input from local communities,
NGOs, and local governments. Restrictions on a variety of development projects, such as
certain industries and urbanization projects, are also included in APA guidelines ( see
Appendix 5).
In ideal terms, the creation of a state APA would transfer certain development rights
in one region from private landowners and municipal governments to a management council
under a plan coordinated by one or more state agencies. Such a council would be composed
of state and municipal governments and members of the local civil society. APAs permit a
broader involvement of the state government, local community groups, and civil society in
land-use rules, usually controlled by municipal governments. Moreover, contrary to the
situation in areas of strict preservation, such as state or national parks, no land expropriation
is actually necessary to create an APA, thus reducing the costs associated with buying land as
well as possible conflicts with private landowners.
4.5) Rules for Establishing APAs in Bahia
Establishment of environmentally protected areas (APAs) in Bahia entails a series of
stages (see Figure 4.4). First, a state or municipal government institution proposes creation of
an APA. This proposal usually includes only general guidelines regarding the protected area,
such as geographical limits and the reasons for creating the APA. The latter could include,
for example, protecting a fragile ecosystem or controlling the environmental impacts of one or
more development projects.
Second, the proposal is screened by the state environmental agency (CRA). CRA
officials analyze the feasibility of creating an APA in terms of the importance of the
ecosystems involved and their state of preservation. CRA officials can informally negotiate
APA limits with the proposing institution. Once CRA approves these guidelines, the state
government issues a decree officially creating the APA (see Appendix 6 for an example).
This decree is then screened by the state legislature (no decree has been rejected by any state
legislature so far).32 Later developments concerning the APA need the approval of the APA
administrator and CEPRAM in some cases.
3 In the last three terms (since 1990), the party coalition in power has elected the majority of the state assembly,
as well as the large majority of the members of local governments.
One government institution (state or
municipal) proposes the creation of an
APA
Proposal rejected
NO
The State Environmental Agency (CRA)
screens the proposal for approval
Ok
The state/municipal government
submits a proposal for state/municipal
legislature to make the APA guidelines
a decree or law
Ok
The institution that proposed the
creation of the APA has to elaborate an
APA management plan
The State Environmental Agency (CRA)
screens the management plan
Ok4
The management plan is sent to the
State Environmental Council (CEPRAM)
for approval
SOk
The institution that proposed the APA
implements the plan at local level and
defines the APA management council
formed by members of the government
and civil society
NO
FIGURE 4.4 - STAGES IN ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTALLY PROTECTED AREA (APA)
The management council can review
the management plan after few years
I
After an APA is created by state legislation, state agencies, with the involvement of
local governments and populations, must coordinate preparation of a management plan, which
must be approved by the state environmental council (CEPRAM). Management plans usually
consist of three elements. First is an economic-ecological assessment, which includes an
evaluation of the environmental and social features of the protected region. Second is a
zoning and environmental protection plan, and third is a structure for implementing,
monitoring, and enforcing the APA environmental guidelines. Subsequent developments in
the APA must follow the zoning rules and environmental guidelines.
The economic-ecological assessment describes the economic, social, and
environmental characteristics of the region that is the target of the proposed APA. All
ecosystems and their state of preservation are studied in detail, and the main species of fauna
and flora identified. This assessment also includes an economic and social evaluation of the
region within and around the APA encompassing local population groups, the main patterns
of land development (urban and rural) and their trends, and their effects on ecosystem
conservation.
The second element of the management plan uses information from the economic-
ecological assessment to specify zoning rules regulating land use in the different APA zones.
Restrictions on the kind, size, and density of development, and the infrastructure necessary for
overseeing the development, vary in each zone. For example, the Tinhare-Boipeba APA
contains 17 kinds of zones (see Table 4.9). These include, for example, a strict preservation
zone, where no development is allowed and human access is limited, a zone for controlled
urbanization, and a zone reserved for low-density tourism.
Table 4.9 -17 Kinds of Zones in Tinhare-Boipeba APA
Zone Name Description Kind of Uses Permitted Restrictions
Ecosystem
Corresponds to preservation Mangroves, esruaries, - Controlled visitation for - Any human activity that
ZPR areas defined in the federal coral reefs, dunes, nature spotting implies significant impact on
Zone for and state legislation lakes, lagoons, waster - Authorized Research 
the ecosystem
Zonec springs, alluvial - Controlled fishing and - Traffic of vehiclesStrict
Prsrainforests, caves, food gathering by local - Illumination of turtlePreservation swamps, turtle traditional communities hatching spots
(ZONA DEhatching areas, - Environmental restoration
PROTEQAO eroded areas and
RIGOROSA) areas with risk of
landslides
Corresponds to specific areas - Areas containing - Authorized Scientific - No human presence except
ZPV that are important for wildlife hatching or Research for research and maintenance
Zone for preservation. In the case of reproduction spots for
Wildlife Tinhare-Boipeba APA they wildlife
Protection are: - Areas with dense
- Island of Manguinhos and Ombrophile forest(ZON DE Parrot Island, especially - Preserved Dune
PROTEQAO because they are hatching Vegetation
DA VInDA areas for sea birds - Reefs
SILVESTRE) - Areas of Dense Ombrophile
Forest in Mata Grande
(Boipeba island) and Cerca
Grande (Tinhare island)
- Areas around the dunes of
Cabacaca (Boipeba Island)
- Reefs in Boipeba island_______________
Corresponds to wetlands, - Scientific research Any activity that
Z E preserved or with some Swamps, Alluvial - Controlled trekking trails compromises the water natural
-for 
economic activity lands, areas with high - Controlled visitation flowZpea subterranean water
Managementd
(ZONA DE
MAN EJO
ESPECIAL)
Corresponds to the 60 meters - Estuaries beaches - Sight-seeing - RoadsZof land next to the beaches, and lands close-by - Leisure activities on the - traffic of Vehicles
Coastal Zone counting from the line of - Navy lands beach - Construction of permanentWidlf maximum high tide, Navy - Fishing building structures(Z on DE lands and estuaries according - Any for of land use that
ORLA MAR - to the Federal Law and State block pedestrian traffic
TI MA) Constitution.
Corresponds to dunes and hills Dunes and hills - Sight-seing - Traffic of vehicles on the
z V near the urban centers (Morro - trekking trails dunes
Zone of de Sao Paulo and Gamboa - residential land plots - Permanent construction
atowns) in the process of urban Minimum area: 1.000 m structures on terrain with
Visua BEat occupation. Ip : 0,7 declivity over 45 degrees
(ZONEAO Maximum number of stores: - Cutting down coconut treesPRITSUA 2 (except with authorization of
- Commercial Plots the APA management body)
Minimum area.: 5.000 m2  - Constructions without proper
Zp: 0,8 sanitation structure
Maximum number of stores:
(ZONADE02
Table 4.9 - 17 Kinds of Zones in Tinhare-Boipeba APA (Second Page)
Zone Name Description Kind of Uses Permitted Restrictions
Ecosystem
Corresponds to dunes and Dunes and Hills - Sight-seing - Traffic of vehicles on
ZPV (E)- trekking trails the dunes
Zone of preservation and proper - residential land plots - Permanent
Especial Visual for low density tourism Minimum area: 10.000 m construction structures
Beautydevelopment p: 0,8 
on terrain with declivity
(ZONA - Maximum number of stores: 2 
over 45 degrees
(ZONEAO Maximum density: 250 m
2 / inhab - Cutting down coconut
PROTEQA- Commercial Plots trees (except with
VISUAL Minimum area.: 20.000 m2  authorization of the
ESPECIAL) tp: 0,8 APA management
Maximum number of stores: 02 body)
Maximumn density: 250 m 2 /inhab - Constructions without
proper sanitation
structure
- All constructions
should have a
Environmental Impact
Statement
Corresponds to coastal Marine and fluvio- - residential land plots - significant change in
O areas with potential for marine terraces Minimum area: 3.000 m2  landscape, fauna or
Zone of Low- tourism development Ip: 0,8 floraMaximum number of stores: 2 - Building without
density Maximum density: 250 m2 / inhab proper sanitation
Occupation - Commercial Plots system
(ZONA DE Minimum area. : 20.000 m2
OCUPAQA Ip: 0,8
RAREFEITA) Maximum number of stores: 02
Maximum density: 250 t2 / inhab
Corresponds to the Marine and Fluvio- - Single-family residential plots. Small Development projectsz U traditional communities. marine terraces and business that conserve traditional that alter the traditional
Zone of In Tinhare-Boipeba APA, hills characteristics urban structure and
Restricted these are: Gale(o, culture
Urbaizaion Garapudt, Pedrinhas,Uraniati Cachoeirinha,
eCanavieiras, Morerm e Seo
URBAN IZAQAG Sebastido.
RESTRITA)
Corresponds areas where Forests containing -Controlledextractionofstraw DeforestationZ pV the local population straws on fluvio- - Traditional economic activities
Zone for plant extracts plants for marine terraces and - Subsistence agriculture
extractivism domestic or commercial hills - low-density Tourism development cuse. In the case of project
(ZONTA Tinhare-Boipeba APA, Minimum area. : 500.000 m
2
these are forested areas Ap: 0,9
VEGETAL) with straw in Tinhare Maximum number of stores: 02
Island Maximum density: 250 2 tinhab
Corresponds to areas Mangroves Controlled extractivismn Any activity that altersZ EI where the local the ecosystem
Zone for animal population traditionally significantly
extractivism
(ZONA
EXTRATI VA
ANIMAL)
Corresponds to areas Marine terraces and - residential land plots Construction without
designated for tourism hills Minimum area: 1.000 m
2  proper solutions for
Zone for development Ip: 0,7 sewage and solid waste
Tourism Maximum number of stores: 2 (project reviewed by
- Plots for Tourism projects the APA administrator)
Development Minimum area.: 5.000 m2
(ZONA TU- Ip: 0,7
R[STICA) _ _Maximum number of stores: 02
Table 4.9 - 17 Kinds of Zones in Tinhare-Boipeba APA (Third Page)
Zone Name Description Kind of Uses Permitted Restrictions
Ecosystem
Corresponds to areas having - Marine and - residential land plots Construction
smalldeclivity and potential for fluvio-marine Minimum area: 2LT(E) sml s.0 nwtolutnsofor
Especial Zone for low-density tourism terraces and 
Ip: 0,7
hills Maximum number of stores: 2 sewage and solidTourism TorimMaximum density: 250 mn2 / inhab. waste (project
Development - Plots for Tourism projects reviewed by the
(ZONA Minimum area.:10.000 m2  APA administrator)
TURISTICA Ip: 0,8
ESPECIAL) Maximum number of stores: 02
Maximum density: 250 m2 / inhab.
Corresponds to areas with lack - Hills - Commercial, public and residential - Environmental
Z of infrastructure and - dunes land plots legislation and land
Miimmarea: 10.0 m2  sub diis or
Zone for uncontrolled tourism - Fluvio- Minimum
Controlled development and urbanization. marine ip: 0,5 
regulation
Conrolled In the case of Tinhare-Boipeba terraces Maximum number of stores: 2 - Construction must
Urbanization APA, these are morro de Sio - Pluts fur tourism projects have solutions for
(ZONA DE Paulo, Gamboa e Velha Minimum area.: 1.200 m sewage treatment
URBANIZAQAO Boipeba. Ip: 0,6 and disposal
CONTROLADA) Maximum number of stores: 02
Corresponds to areas for urban Hills - Commercial, public and residential - Environmental
land lotslegislation and land
Z E P ( ) expansion near the villages of land plots 2lgsainadln
morro de So Paulo, Gamboa e Minimum area: 300 m
2  
subdivision
Z nfo Ub Velha Boipeba. ip : 0,5 regulation
Exp ion DE Maximum number of stores: 2 - Construction must
- Plots for tourism projects have solutions for
Minimum area.: 1.500 m2 sewage treatment
Ip: 0,6 and disposal
Maximum number of stores: 02
Corresponds to areas for urban Fluvio-marine - Commercial, public and residential - EnvironmentalZ E P(I1) expansion near the villages of terraces and land plots
Zone for Urban Morro de Sio Paulo, Gamboa hills Minimum area: 600 m subdivision
Expansion Ura and Cair6. Ip: 0,5 regulation
(ZONA DE Maximum number of stores: 2 - Construction must
ad- Plots for tourism projects have solutions for
EXPANSAO (II)) Minimum area. : 2.000 m2  sewage treatment
Ip: 0,6 and disposal
Maximum number of stores: 02
Corresponds to areas containing Marine and - Agriculture - Use of pesticides
ZE I agricultural activities and fluvio-marine - Controlled extractivism prohibited by
Zone for extractivism terraces and - Traditional economic 
activities (e.g., environmental
Fluvio-marin hills handprafting) regulations
- residential and tourism land plots - Land subdivisions
hillsities Minimum area.: 20.000 m
2
(ZONA Ip: 0,5
AGRfCOLA) Maximum number of stores: 02
Maximum density: 250 M2 / inhab.
Corresponds to areas suffering Fluvio-marine Environmental restoration Constanction untilZ RA from erosion caused by natural terraces and the restoration is
Zoneor human factors. In the case of hills finished
Znon enfor Tinhare-boipeba APA, these are
Renvrironna located at the northwest part of
Restoation Tinhare Island(ZONA OF
RECUPERAQAG
AMB IENTAL) ____________________________________
Environmental planning is coordinated by government agencies in charge of the APA.
These agencies perform all the technical work when they have the institutional capacity, and
hire consultants to complete the tasks they cannot perform. In their early stages, APAs are
administered by one of several state government agencies, but some activities may be
decentralized to regional and municipal levels as the process advances, so the latter can
assume responsibility for ongoing administration. In the later stages of the process, the state
agency in charge of administering the APA planned to create a management council formed
mostly by local interests such as landowners, municipal governments, NGOs, religious
leaders, community leaders, and workers. This council can make decisions concerning
development within the APA while observing the zoning guidelines in the management plan
approved by the state environmental council (CEPRAM). The state environmental agency
(CRA) or municipal government has responsibility for supervising land-use decisions,
enforcing the environmental guidelines for any development project, and investigating
complaints about the use of environmental resources.
For example in the case of Itacare APA in the municipalities of Itacar6 and Uruguca,
the APA administrator within the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism plans to create a
management council formed by members of government and civil society (Governo da Bahia,
1998). Some members will be permanent and others changeable, as determined by the APA
administrator. The members would include representatives of the following:
Permanent members:
- State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism
- Government of the municipality of Itacar6
- Government of the municipality of Uruguca
- State Environmental Agency (CRA)
- City Council of Itacar6
- City Council of Uruguca
Temporary members:
- State Department of Forest Development (DDF)
- State Company of Regional Development (CAR)
- State Land Institute (Interba)
- State Fishing Company (Bahiapesca)
- State Policy (PM)
Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA)
- Grama : Group for Environmental Restoration (NGO)
- IESB : Institute for Social and Environmental Studies in Southern Bahia
(NGO)
- Boto Negro Ecological Group (NGO)
- FUNBAP: Pau-Brasil Foundation (NGO)
- Commercial Association of Itacare
- Squatters' Association
- AFIR: Association of People from Itacare (NGO)
Funding for establishing the APA comes from the agency that proposes its creation.
This agency can request supplementary funding in its budget from the state treasury fund, use
its own financial resources, or find sponsors in the private or non-governmental sector.
4.6) The Outcome
In the past decade the State of Bahia in the Brazilian Northeast has aggressively
implemented a policy of creating environmentally protected areas in regions with potential for
tourism development. The number of APAs and the area covered by them have grown
significantly (Figure 4.5). In less than ten years, the number of APAs in Bahia increased by
more than 1,200 percent - from 2 APAs in 1990 to 27 APAs in 1998. The area covered by
APAs expanded 130 times, from 13,700 hectares in 1990 to 1,783,141 hectares in 1998. Most
of the established APAs are located on the coast (see Figure 4.6 for APA location and Table
4.10 for name, date of creation, and current status of all APAs).
Two main objectives led the government of Bahia to create environmentally protected
areas (APAs). The first was to preserve important, fragile ecosystems in regions undergoing
rapid development, especially tourism development on the coast. In general, APAs created
for this reason have very restrictive zoning rules, allowing only low-impact development.
Mangue Seco and Abaete APAs are examples of this kind of APA.
The second objective was to use APAs to mitigate environmental impacts of large
development projects such as roads. Many of these projects were part of the state tourism
development plan. These APAs are usually large, sometimes encompassing more than
100,000 hectares, and their zoning system is less restrictive. These areas sometimes include
several urbanized areas and territories in several municipalities. Examples of this type are
North Coast and Santo Antonio APAs.
The management of these APAs is under the control of several state agencies and
municipal governments. At the state level, the agencies in charge of coordinating the process
of creating, planning, and managing APAs until 1999 were CRA and CONDER,34 both
under the Secretariat of Planning, Science and Technology (SEPLANTEC), and Bahiatursa,35
under the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur). This decentralization of APA
policy primarily accounts for the ability of the state to create such large number of APAs, as
chapter 5 explains.
(Source: CRA, October 1998)
FIGURE 4.5 - APAs IN BAHIA STATE
3 CRA = Centro de Recursos Naturais (Center for Natural Resources). CRA is the environmental agency of the
State of Bahia in charge of enacting and enforcing environmental regulations. It is under the Secretariat of
Planning, Science and Technology (SEPLANTEC).
34 CONDER = Companhia de Desenvolvimento da Regiio Metropolitana (Company for the Development of the
Metropolitan Region). It is the state agency in charge of planning for Salvador, the state capital, and
surrounding urban areas. It is also under SEPLANTEC jurisdiction.
3 Bahiatursa = Bahia Turismo S.A.. (Bahia Tourism Authority, agency for coordination of tourism
development). Bahiatursa is in charge of tourism promotion and planning in the State of Bahia. It is linked to
the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur).
01 - Lagos e Dunas do
Abaeti
02 - Mangue Seco
03 - Costa de Itacari/
Serra Grande
04 - Guaibim
05 - Ilhas Tinhari/Boipeba
06 - Bacia do Rio de
Janeiro
07 - Marimbus/Iraquara
08 - Litoral Norte
09 - Bacia Hidrog. Joanes
10 - Caraiva/Trancoso
11 - Coroa Vermelha
12 - Rio Capivara
13 - Cachoeira de Pancada
Grande
14 - Lagoa Encantada
15 - Lagoa de Guarajuba
16 - Serra do Barbado
17 - Ponta da
Baleia/Abrolhos
18 - Gruta dos Brej5es/
Veredas do Romdo
Gramacho
19 - Vale das Cascatas
FIGURE 4.6 - LOCATION OF APAs IN BAHIA.
APAs in bold letters were selected as case studies for this
(Source: CRA, 1999).
20 - Santo Antonio
21 - Lagoa de Itaparica
22 - Dunas e Veredas do
Baixo
Medio Sao Francisco
23 - Lago de Pedra do
Cavalo
24 - Pratigi
25 - Recife das Pinau nas
26 - Lagoa CCC
27 - Serra das Candeias
28 - Itapebi
29 - Peninsula de Marau
research (see Chapter 6).
Table 4.10 - Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) in Bahia
Name of the Kind and Date of Municipalities Administrator Area Management
APA the Decree of Involved until Dec. 1998 (1,000 Plan
Creation hectares)
1. Gruta dos State Decree number Morro do Chap~u, CRA* 11.900 In Progress
Brej6es/Veredas 32.487 of 13.11.85 Sio Gabriel and Jodo
do Romio Dourado
Gramacho
2. Lagoas e State Decree number Salvador CONDER* 1.800 Existent
Dunas do 351 of 22.09.87
Abaet6
3. Lagoa State Decree number Camagari Municipality of 230 Non-existent
Guarajuba 387 of 27.02.91 Camagari
4. Bacia State Decree number Camagari, Sim6es CONDER 5.022 Non-existent
Hidrografica do 100 of 04.06.91 Filho and Lauro de
Joanes I Freitas
5. Mangue Seco State Decree number Jandaira CRA 3.395 Existent
605 of 06.11.91
6. Litoral Norte State Decree number Jandaira, Esplanada, CONDER 142.000 Existent
1.046 of 17.03.92 Conde, Entre Rios and
Mata de Sio Joio
7. Guaibim State Decree number Valenga CRA 2.000 Existent
1.164 of 11.05.92
8.Tinhar6/Boipe State Decree number Cairn CRA 43.300 Existent
ba 1.240 of 05.06.92
9. Cachoeira de Municipal Law Ituberi Municipality of 50 Non-existent
Pancada Grande number 1.494 of Ituberi
13.05.93
10. Lagoa da Municipal Law 23 of Candeias Municipality of 189 Non-existent
CCC 04.06.93 Candeias
11. Serra do State Decree number Abaira, Piati, Rio de CODETUR* 63.652 Existent
Barbado 2.183 of 07.06.93 Contas, Rio do Pires
and 8rico Cardoso
12. Coroa State Decree number Porto Seguro and CODETUR 4.100 Existent
Vermelha 2.184 of 07.06.93 Santa Cruz de
Cabrilia
13. Bacia do State Decree number Barreiras CRA 26.341 Non-existent
Rio de Janeiro 2.185 of 07.06.93
14. Costa de State Decree number Itacar6 and Uruguca CODETUR 14.925 Existent
Itacar6/ Serra 2.186 of 07.06.93
Grande
15. State Decree number Porto Seguro CODETUR 31.900 Existent
Caraiva/Trancos 2.215 of 14.06.93
0
16. State Decree number Lenq6is, Iraquara, CODETUR 125.400 Existent
Marimbus/Iraqu 2.216 of 14.06.93 Seabra, and Palmeiras
ara
17. Lagoa State Decree number Ilh6us CODETUR 125.400 Existent
Encantada 2.217 of 14.06.93
18. Ponta da State Decree number Caravelas and CODETUR 34.600 Non-existent
Baleia/Abrolhos 2.218 of 14.06.93 Alcobaga
19. Rio State Decree number Camagari, and CONDER 1.800 In Progress
Capivara 2.219 of 14.06.93 Salvador
20. Santo State Decree number Santa Cruz de CODETUR 23.000 Existent
Ant6nio 3.413 of 31.08.94 Cabrilia and
Belmonte
Table 4.10 - Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) in Bahia (Continuation)
Name of the Kind and Date of Municipalities Administrator Area Management
APA the Decree of Involved until Dec. 1998 (thousand Plan
Creation hectares)
21. Vale das Municipal Law Pau-Brasil Municipality of 5.880 Non-existent
Cascatas number 077 of Pau-Brasil
30.01.95
22. Serra das Municipal Law Jussari Municipality of 3.051 Non-existent
Candeias number 126 of Jussari
19.04.95
23. Lagoa State Decree number Xique-xique and CRA 78.450 Non-existent
Itaparica 6.546 of 18.07.97 Gentio do Ouro
24. Dunas e State Decree number Barra, Xique- CRA 1,085.000 Non-existent
Veredas do Baixo 6.547 of 18.07.97 xique, and Pilio
M6dio Sio Arcado
Francisco
25. Lago de Pedra State Decree number Conceigio de CRA 30.156 Non-existent
do Cavalo 6.548 of 18.07.97 Feira, Cachoeira,
Ant6nio Cardoso,
Santo Estevio,
Governador
Mangabeira,
Castro Alves,
Cruz das Almas,
Feira de Santana,
Muritiba, Sdo
Felix, Sio
Gongalo dos
Campos and
Cabageiras do
Paraguagu.
26. Recife das Municipal Law Vera Cruz Municipal To be Non-existent
Pinadnas number 467 of Secretariat of defined
20.10.97 Tourism and the
Environment
27. Pratigi State Decree number Itubera and Nilo CRA and To be Non-existent
7.272 of 02.04.98 Peganha BAHIATURSA* defined
Total Area of APA's 1,863,541 hectares
Source: CRA Home-Page, March 1999. (http://www.cra.ba.gov.br/)
*CRA = Centro de Recursos Naturais (Center for Natural Resources). CRA is the environmental agency of the
State of Bahia in charge of enacting and enforcing environmental regulations. It is under the Secretariat of
Planning, Science and Technology (SEPLANTEC).
CONDER = Companhia de Desenvolvimento da Regiao Metropolitana (Company for the Development of the
Metropolitan Region). It is the state agency in charge of planning for Salvador, the state capital, and
surrounding urban areas. It is also under SEPLANTEC jurisdiction.
CODETUR = Coordenagao de Desenvolvimento do Turismo (Agency for Coordination of Tourism
Development). CODETUR is in charge of tourism planning in the state of Bahia. It is part of the State
Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur).
Bahiatursa = Bahia Tourism Authority. A tourism development company controlled partially by the state
government.
CHAPTER 5 - EXPLAINING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTED
AREAS IN BAHIA: GETTING POLITICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND
FINANCIAL SUPPORT AT THE STATE LEVEL
This chapter examines the story of the creation of environmentally protected areas (APAs) at
the state level in Bahia. Initially, it describes the evolution of environmental management in
Bahia and shows how tourism influenced development agencies, especially the State
Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur) and the Company for the Development of the
Metropolitan Region (Conder), to become involved in APAs. Later, I argue that the fact that
APA policymaking and implementation was decentralized to various state agencies, instead of
being concentrated in the state environmental agency (CRA), is the primary reason why large
number of APAs were established. I explain how this arrangement overcame the political,
institutional, and financial barriers to establishing protected areas described in Chapter 3.
Decentralization aided this process for several reasons. First, because development
agencies were involved in APAs, they gained political support at the state level. These
agencies, now involved in protected-area policy, had a political interest in creating APAs
instead of blocking them. Second, financing for APAs grew because well-funded agencies
were creating APAs, and they also attracted alternative sources of funding. Third,
competition among several state agencies in administering APAs prompted them to improve
their institutional capacity by hiring new people, investing in training, and buying equipment.
The three state agencies involved in APAs also tried to improve their institutional capacity to
show that they could handle and lead this new environmental task. Finally, local actors were
less likely to oppose APAs because they associated APAs with development agencies and
projects for their areas, not with land-use restrictions by the state.
5.1) Evolution of Environmental Management in Bahia
Before the 1990s, the number and area of conservation units in Bahia were extremely
modest. Only two APAs and few ecological stations and parks existed (CRA, 1998). These
conservation units were administrated by various institutions, such as the federal
environmental agency (IBAMA), municipalities, and diverse state agencies (agriculture,
education, and culture secretariats). Few of those protected areas had even a minimal
management structure or plan.36
At that time, the state environmental agency (CRA) had little involvement with
protected areas. CRA was created in 1983 mostly to control industrial pollution, especially
from the huge Camagari petrochemical complex,37 which started operating in the late 1970s.
CRA thus had limited organizational capacity. Although development in Bahia had expanded
into fragile ecosystems, the state had done little to take a more active role in land-use
36 They remain mostly as they were before the 1990s. For example, of the 18 parks in the state, only 4 have any
management plan - and two of these are in the hands of IBAMA, the federal environmental agency (CRA,
1998).
37 Camagari petrochemical complex is a highly industrialized zone located 60 km from Salvador, Bahia's capital.
Some 50 heavy industries produce various kinds of petrochemical products.
planning or protecting ecosystems. Environmental problems related to ecosystem
degradation, such as deforestation and illegal fishing, were generally addressed by the state
branch of IBAMA, or very casually by CRA. Moreover, once CRA was put under the
Secretariat of Planning, Science and Technology (SEPLANTEC), it had limited political
autonomy and power and thus was not in a position to politically promote environmental
protection. Therefore, before the 1990s, policies for preserving ecosystems were not a
priority for institutions at the state level, and there was little political momentum for an
expansion of the state's role in this area.
The growth of tourism, and the elaboration of the state tourism plan in the beginning
of the 1990s, changed this institutional setting. As examined in Appendix 7, tourism had
expanded considerably in Bahia since 1980s, especially in the coastal regions outside
Salvador. State planners saw great potential for nature-based tourism on the unexplored parts
of the Bahian coast. The state therefore decided to invest heavily in tourism infrastructure to
spur further growth in that sector. APAs were the result of discussions among state officials
about how to control the environmental impacts of this planned growth in tourism. Two
important tourism projects were particularly key to understanding the institutional changes
that resulted in the establishment of APAs.
5.2) Two Important Tourism Projects in Bahia
Tourism has grown in Brazil's Northeast region, and in Bahia, over the past two
decades. Governments expected additional growth and planned to foster it by investing in
infrastructure (see Appendix 7 for an analysis of the tourism sector). In the late 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s, two large infrastructure development projects - the Green Line road
and the state tourism development program (Prodetur-BA)38 - were initiated. Both threatened
to harm fragile ecosystems over large areas without appropriate environmental protection
measures. Some NGOs represented on the state environmental council (CEPRAM) started to
question some aspects of those development projects, especially the construction of roads that
would provide access to pristine environments. 39
The Green Line Road
Because it chose tourism as the new development priority, the state government
decided to execute a much-discussed plan to construct a 142-km road on Bahia's northern
coast called the Green Line road. This road, built with state resources at a cost of US$ 44.6
million (Diario Oficial, 1993), would cross five municipalities and connect the state capital
(Salvador) to the state's northern border. The Green Line road was important because it
would allow the metropolitan region of Salvador to grow northward and open an extremely
beautiful coastal region for tourism development. Indeed, the Green Line Road had been a
regional priority requested by local politicians for more than 20 years (Diario Oficial, 1992).
38 Prodetur is a plan to develop tourism in the Northeast of Brazil by investing over 1.6 billion dollars in tourism
infrastructure in the next 10 years. This plan is coordinated by Banco do Nordeste and state governments with
loans from Inter-American Development Bank - IDB (Ministry of Economy, Treasury and Planning; Bank of
The Northeast (BNB) and InterAmerican Development Bank (1DB), 1992).
39 Information obtained from interviews with CRA officials.
However, this road would cross an underdeveloped coastal zone containing
ecologically important resources such as dunes, lagoons, and mangroves. Concern about the
road's impact on these fragile ecosystems rose among some public officials involved in the
project, and also among private investors and NGOs. For example, members of the Tamar
Project, an NGO that protects marine turtles, worried about the impacts of the road on turtles'
reproduction sites, since half of Brazilian marine turtles hatch on the northern Bahian coast.40
After scientific studies, as well as debates in CEPRAM and in public forums, the route was
moved 8 km inland41 (Diirio Oficial, 1992).
To gain CEPRAM's approval for the road project, the government also needed to show it
would control development after the road construction. As a solution, state officials proposed
creation of an environmentally protected area (APA) along the coast and the road called the
Northern Coast APA. The idea of creating an APA originated during a meeting among
officials from several state agencies to discuss the road project in 1991.42 The group of
government agencies in charge of the project chose the Company for the Development of the
Metropolitan Region (Conder) as the organization to coordinate the Northern Coast APA
because the metropolitan zone of Salvador had expanded northwards. Conder had some
expertise in working with land-use plans, such as in determining zoning codes, that would be
useful in elaborating the management plan. Thus the idea of creating an APA as an
environmental mitigation procedure for infrastructure projects was pioneered. Conder has
since established other APAs and become a promoter of APA policy (more details will follow
below, and in Chapter 6).
The State Tourism Development Program
The Bahian state tourism development program defined a series of infrastructure
projects designed to attract private investment (Bahia State Government, 1997).43 The
landmark under this program was the establishment of Prodetur-NE, 4 4 the regional tourism
development program for the Brazilian Northeast, created in 1991 (Ministry of Economy,
Treasury and Planning, Bank of the Northeast, and InterAmerican Development Bank, 1992).
Prodetur-NE consisted of a series of projects with financing from the Bank of the Northeast,
based on loans from the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) matched by funds from the
state government. Under Prodetur, the public sector expected to invest over US$ 1.6 billion
in tourism infrastructure and services in the Northeast by the year 2002. The Bank of the
Northeast coordinated the program, but state governments were responsible for drawing up
their own tourism plans. These plans would identify priority projects, which would be
evaluated and approved by the Bank of the Northeast under the supervision of the IDB.
Under this program, the Bank of the Northeast approved tourism infrastructure projects in
Bahia costing about US$ 337 million (see Table 5.1). By July 1999, projects totaling US$
40 Information from Tamar Project, Praia do Forte, Brazil.
41 State officials organized three public hearings on the Green Line Road in the municipalities of Jandaira,
Esplanada and Conde before finishing the project for the construction of the road.
42 Information obtained from a high rank state official at that time.
43 According to this plan, the state of Bahia has invested over 270 million dollars in tourism infrastructure
between 1991 and 1993.
44 Prodetur-NE = Tourism Development Program, Northeast (Programa de Desenvolvimento do Turismo,
Nordeste).
68.3 million had been completed, while others estimated at US$ 203.5 million were in
progress (scheduled for completion from September 1999 to September 2001).
Besides Prodetur-NE, the State of Bahia planned more public investments in areas
with tourism potential. These investments would total US$ 2 billion from 1991-2002. State
officials also expected to attract more than US$ 4 billion in private investment over the same
period (Bahiatursa, 1999). By 1998, completed public investments in tourism in Bahia
totaled US$ 723.3 million, with another US$ 832.2 million in progress. In the private sector,
completed investments totaled US$ 483.1 million between 1991 and May 1998.
In Bahia, the state plan was coordinated by Bahiatursa, a company under public-
private partnership, and implemented by the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism
(Sectur). The plan divided the state into seven "touristic zones" where projects would be
concentrated. 4 5 The tourism envisioned by state planners was based on low-density
development for up-market tourists (Bahia State Government, 1997). Environmental
preservation was part of this plan, for two main reasons. First, according to the view of
governmental authorities, without proper mechanisms for controlling land use and protecting
the environment, projects could provoke disordered development and scare off potential
investors who wanted to invest in low-density areas.46 Second, some of these projects needed
environmental safeguards to gain approval from IDB and the Bank of the Northeast, as well
as to obtain a development permit from the state environmental council (CEPRAM). 47
Sectur officials planned an environmental strategy based on the idea behind the
Northern Coast APA in the Green Line road, which they knew about from debates within the
government and from the media. They reasoned that creating APAs in areas with potential
for tourism would enable them to control land use, thus appeasing investors.48 Sectur
officials knew that becoming involved in environmental management would pose a challenge,
but they were confident that they could pull off the plan. They saw that other agencies built
their institutional capacity needed to create and manage APAs from scratch, so why couldn't
they?49 As a result, Sectur established eight APAs in the "touristic zones" targeted by
development projects. 50
45 The seven touristic zones are: Coconut Coast (the coast north of Salvador), All Saints Bay (the bay next to
Salvador), Dende Coast (the coast around the city of Valenea), Cocoa Coast (the coast around the city of tIheus),
Discovery Coast (the coastal region around the city of Porto Seguro), Whales Coast (the coast around the town
of Caravelas) and Chapada Diamantina (the region around the national park with same name).
46 According to interviews with public officials in the Secretariat of Tourism and Culture.
47 Information obtained from interviews with officials in the Bank of the Northeast.
48 From interviews with officials in Sectur.
41 Information from interviews with officials in Sectur.
5 These eight APAs are as follows: Santo Antonio, Coroa Vermelha, Caraiva/Trancoso, Serra Grande/Itacare,
Maribus/Iraquara, Serra do Barbado, Ponta da Baleia and Lagoa Encantada APAs (see Table 4.10 for more
details).
Table 5.1 - Planned tourism investments in Bahia
Kind of Project Amount (US$1,000)
Ports and Airports 12,640
Roads 177,308
Sanitation 56,980
Energy 15,771
Restoration of Historical 9,471
Buildings
Equipment and Services 46,928
Studies and Evaluations 10,000
Marketing 5,000
Human Resource Development 3,000
Total _337,100
Source: Prodetur-NE: Programa de Agio para o Desenvolvimento
(SUDENE, BNB, EMBRATUR and CTI/NE, 1992)
do Turismo no Nordeste
5.3) Creating APAs: Getting Political Support at the State Level from Pro-Development
Actors
The establishment of APAs requires a considerable amount of political support at both
the state and local level.5 1 At the state level, political support is necessary on four main fronts
(see Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4). These include the governor's cabinet, the state environmental
agency (CRA), the state environmental council (CEPRAM), and the state legislature. CRA
and CEPRAM review the technical aspects of an APA proposal and decide whether to
recommend it. The state governor issues a decree creating the APA. The state legislature
has the power to block this decree, though that has never occurred because members of the
governing coalition constitute a majority in the legislature.
Creating conservation units requires enough political clout to prompt the state
governor5 3 to deliver the decree. Before the 1990s, the state governor had little interest in
creating large conservation units. Traditional conservation units required the state to
expropriate land, which could provoke both financial and political problems; expropriation
consumes large amounts of resources, and the state must confront local politicians and
powerful Brazilian agricultural interests. Moreover, elected leaders, state public officials, and
civil society did not push the governor in this direction. Besides, the agency that would be
naturally in charge of conservation units - CRA - had no technical expertise or political
51 The analysis of local level political support will be discussed later in this chapter.
52 APAs can also be made through a law approved by the state legislature, but this has not happened yet.
5I am talking about state conservation unit. In the case of a federal conservation unit, the president needs to
issue a federal decree. In the case of municipal conservation unit, the mayor needs to deliver a municipal decree.
forces to spur a broad conservation policy. Development agencies, meanwhile, had no interest
in conservation units before the 1990s.54 In this institutional environment, few conservation
units of significant size were created at the state level before 1990,"5 and no state agency had
the specialized staff to pursue a comprehensive protected-area policy.
Any important environmental decision in Bahia - whether environmental policies or
development projects with potentially negative environmental impacts - must pass through
CEPRAM. Because representatives of environmental NGOs constituted one-third of
CEPRAM, any project in Bahia with significant environmental consequences very likely
needed their political support. These organizations had played an important role in
environmental decision making since the 1980s. The other two-thirds of CEPRAM members
were divided evenly between representatives of state agencies and both employers' and
employees' unions (see Table 4.4 for CEPRAM's composition).
Development actors and environmental forces needed each other to approve their
interests in CEPRAM. On the one hand, development agencies and developers' unions had
their seats in CEPRAM, but they did not have the majority of the members. Thus, they had to
convince some other members to approve their development projects, including
environmental NGOs and the state environmental agency. 56 On the other hand,
environmental organizations and agencies had to get the support of many development actors
to introduce or change any environmental policy or project. As a result, the environmental
agency (CRA), without political support from development actors, would likely fail to
introduce wide environmental measures that could restrain development or are too expensive
to implement, such as the creation of conservation units. However, development agencies
were more likely to succeed in approving wider environmental policies because they would
probably get the political support of environmental groups and agencies, and are less likely to
be blocked by development actors. Members of CEPRAM were supportive of the
establishment of several APAs in the state. The environmentally friendly members saw
APAs as ensuring some legal and policy structures to curb environmental degradation in the
areas of rapid tourism growth. Development members regarded APAs as a tool for attracting
future investors, as well as environmental safeguards of their development projects in order to
have them approved by CEPRAM.
The construction of the Green Line road called for the creation of the Northern Coast
APA and the elaboration of its management plan by the state urban development agency
(Conder). This plan required much effort from Conder. At that time no APA in Bahia had a
management plan, and the staff in charge of the task had to start from scratch. Furthermore,
5 Before 1990, out of non-environmental state agencies, only Conder and the State Secretariat of Agriculture
(Seagri) had created conservation units. However, those were in urban areas, such as the Zoo Getulio Vargas
and the Abaete lagoon Park and APA, all in Salvador (CRA, 1998).
" Only two conservation units over 2,000 ha were created before 1990: Gruta dos Brej6es APA (11,900 ha) and
Ecological Reserve and Park of Itaparica (CRA, 1998), but no steps were made to implement their management.
56 Several important development projects have been stalled in CEPRAM for environmental approval because of
the opposition of environmental organizations. Recently, a huge forestry project for pulp and paper industry
called Projeto Vera Cruz in the south of the state was stalled for several years in CEPRAM before it get
approved. It was approved after many changes in the project and a heated debate in CEPRAM.
Northern Coast APA is one of the largest in the state (142,000 hectares), and it was subject to
tremendous development pressure from construction of the Green Line road.
To coordinate the task of elaborating the management plan, Conder formed a group of
officials experienced in zoning and creating urban development plans but who had almost no
experience in managing ecosystems and environmental planning. This group hired
consultants from a local firm to work with Conder staff in-house on the plan. The officials
reasoned that they could learn by doing the job, thereby gaining experience that would allow
them to elaborate future APA management plans by themselves. Consultants from the United
Kingdom later joined this effort through a state contract with the English Overseas
Development Agency (ODA). The interaction between Conder staff and these consultants
resulted in one of the first APA management plans in Bahia - one that served as a reference
for future plans (more details will follow in this chapter and in Chapter 6). For example,
Conder built on this experience to elaborate plans for Abaete APA and Tinhare-Boipeba
APA.17
The State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur) had its own reasons for
supporting the creation of APAs, but under its own control. First, if APA administration were
assigned to some other agency - CRA, for example - that agency could complicate approval
of later development projects within APAs. Having APAs under its own control would allow
Sectur to be more flexible in pursuing its development interests. In a few cases this has
already happened. For example, in Santo Antonio APA, the initial zoning code was changed
to accommodate the interests of tourism investors. 58 Municipal officials and developers
negotiated the change with state authorities before approving the final zoning code.
Sectur also wanted to control APAs because no other agency had experience in
managing them, and it did not want to delay implementation and thus lose financing
opportunities. At that time the state environmental agency (CRA) had no institutional
capacity to manage protected areas, so it would be unlikely to finish the job in a timely
manner. Sectur also presented itself as an environmentally friendly agency when selling
Bahia to tourism investors; several Sectur brochures highlight ecotourism and its relation to
APAs.59 Sectur's involvement in environmental management would help it promote itself as
an environmentally friendly agency. Finally, environmental projects could attract more state
resources for implementing projects such as APAs. Handing these projects to other agencies
would mean foregoing opportunities to create in-house jobs.
Other development agencies involved in the state tourism program, including the
Secretariat of Industry and Commerce and the Secretariat of Transportation, also lent political
support to the new protected areas. Those agencies were responsible for constructing roads
and other projects, and hence eager to gain environmental safeguards for them. The
Secretariat of Planning was also involved through Conder, which is a subsidiary agency. The
" This one in cooperation with CRA.
' Information collected from interviews with local authorities in the municipality of Santa Cruz Cabralia.
59 In a informational brochure to foreign investors, Sectur emphasizes APAs as part of the reasons to invest in
nature-based tourism in Bahia (Bahia State Government, 1997).
interest of development agencies prompted state legislators to approve the APAs with little
opposition.
CRA acted as an observer in this process, monitoring the activities of the other
agencies and working on two relatively small APAs (Mangue Seco and Guaibim APAs).
Although CRA was not in charge of creating all the APAs, it took advantage of the
environmental momentum in the mid-1990s to submit applications to the governor for
approval for areas such as APAs in Bacia do Rio de Janeiro, Lagoa de Itaparica, Dunas e
Veredas do Baixo Medio Sao Francisco, and Lago de Pedra do Cavalo (see Table 4.10 for
more details). Furthermore, CRA's role would increase when the APAs' management plans
were elaborated, since CRA is by law the only agency that has the power to impose
environmental sanctions. 60 In fact, the state government passed responsibility for
administering all APAs to CRA in 1999.
5.4) Funding APAs by Involving Non-Environmental Agencies
The involvement of non-environmental agencies in APA policy helped attract extra
funding for the protected areas. State decrees had created two APAs by the early 1990s
(Abaete and Gruta dos Brejoes APAs), intended to protect environmentally important regions
under development pressure without expropriating private property. However, no attempt had
been made to develop management plans or enforce environmental guidelines. Governmental
organizations lacked much of the necessary technical expertise, and the environmental agency
had no financial resources to hire outside consultants.
Because the Green Line road was a priority of the state government, and the Northern
Coast APA was needed to appease investors, lenders, and members of CEPRAM, Conder
could raise funds for implementing it. By 1997 Conder had invested more than $US 2.2
million in managing the Northern Coast APA. That amount was less than 20 percent of
Conder's budget for projects 61 but more than 40 percent of CRA's total 1997 budget.
In 1990 the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur) also undertook a series
of studies to define projects included in the state tourism development plan within the
Tourism Development Program (Prodetur). The plan included an analysis of the potential
environmental impacts of each "touristic zone," as well as mitigation procedures to satisfy the
demands of the lending institutions and CEPRAM. State officials wanted to attract private
investors interested in low-density and up-scale coastal resorts, who did not want unplanned
development nearby. Municipal governments, however, often did not have the institutional
capacity to impose land-use rules, even though the constitution assigns them responsibility for
such rules. The solution was the creation of APAs in areas with tourism potential.
As a result of the tourism development plan, Sectur proposed the creation of eight
APAs, all approved by decree between 1993 and 1994. Sectur's accomplishments in
60 According to the state law number 3858, November 3, 1988 (Oliveira and Ogata, 1998; Governo da Bahia,
1997).
61 Conder budget for projects in 1998 was 11,710,440 (ASPLAN, 1998). This includes only funding for
projects, not including personnel, capital or other operational expenses.
elaborating the management plans for these APAs were remarkable (Table 5.3). Since 1995,
the agency had generated seven plans - more than the sum of those elaborated by all other
agencies by March 1999. Sectur's APAs contain over 388 thousands hectares - more than 66
percent of the total APA area with management plans. Sectur's efficiency in developing
management plans stemmed from the resources it gathered for environmental management
while implementing the state tourism plan. In total, Sectur invested over US$ 14 million in
APA management, not counting personnel costs (Table 5.2) - two and a half times CRA's
US$ 5.7 million total budget in 1997.
Sectur could raise funds for these management plans through annual budget requests
and through Prodetur, the state tourism plan (Banco do Nordeste, 1996a), whose
infrastructure projects were the state's guarantee to lenders, NGOs in CEPRAM, and potential
investors that the state was concerned with environmental management. For example, Sectur
prioritized elaboration of the management plan for Santo Antonio APA because the funding
organization (IDB) of a nearby road requested a complete plan before releasing the loan.62
To pursue environmental concerns and promote ecotourism, Sectur created an internal
environmental department. Some personnel with experience in environmental issues moved
to the new department, others were trained, and external consultants were also hired to
elaborate the management plans. The new department oversaw the choice of consultants and
supervised their work. Its main job was to work with local interests to ensure implementation
of the APAs.
The decentralization of APA policy was fundamental in attracting financial resources
to APAs. Sectur and Conder attracted funding for APA management plans, because they
enabled those two agencies to appease lenders, investors, and members of the state
environmental council (CEPRAM). The funds invested in APAs by Sectur and Conder was
high compared with what the state had invested in environmental management in the past. It
was very unlikely that CRA could have attracted the financial resources raised by the two
development agencies.
Table 5.2 - Funds invested in APA management by the various agencies
Government Amount invested in APA
agency management (US$ 1,000)
Conder (*) 3,271
CRA (**) 100
Sectur (***) 14,080
(*) Values for the years 1995 to 1998. Source: Tri-annual report 1995-1997 and Annual Report 1998 of Conder
(Conder, 1997; Conder, 1999).
(**) Total values for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. Source: Tri-annual Report 1997-1995, CRA (CRA, 1997).
CRA has mostly used its own personnel for APA management. The value above includes only discriminated
items in the budget.
(***) Total values between 1995 and July 1999, including planned projects. Source: Project list, State
Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur, 1999).
62 Information obtained from a Sectur official. Santo Antonio APA was created after Ponta da Baleia APA, but
the management plan of the former was made before than the later.
Table 5.3 - Management plans for the APAs in Bahia
Initial APAs with APAs without
Administrator management plan management plan *
Number Area (% of total) Number Area (% total)
Conder 3 187,000 ha (32.2%) 2 6,822 ha (0.4%)
CRA 2 5,395 ha (0.9%) 6 1,231,847 ha (96.2%)
Sectur 7 388,377 ha (66.9%) 1 34,600 ha (2.6%)
Municipalities 0 0,0 6 9,400 ha (0.8%)
Total 12 580,872 ha 15 1,282,669 ha
Source: CRA, 1999
(*) Includes management plans whose elaboration is in progress. The areas of Pratigi
APA
and Recife das Piaunas APA were not included in the calculation because they
were undefined.
5.5) Competition among Governmental Agencies Can Improve Institutional Capacity
The proposal to decentralize responsibility for creating and administering APAs
provoked competition among different state agencies. Although the state environmental
agency had a mandate to deal with environmental matters, it was not the only agency
interested in APAs, as APAs do allow some kinds of development. APAs can be viewed as
the "environmental part" of a development project, in the way that the Northern Coast APA
was the environmental mitigation measure legitimizing construction of the Green Line road.
Thus other agencies had good reason to jump into the APA business as part of a tourism-
related environmental strategy or urban development plans.
Involvement with APA administration gives government agencies considerable
leverage for requesting resources. Agencies can request state funds to implement APAs (see
Table 5.2), or attract funding from national and international organizations, as in the
agreement between Conder and the English ODA for the Northern Coast APA. Agencies
inexperienced in environmental matters found they could extend their project "portfolios" if
they developed the institutional capacity to perform the job, thereby gaining power and
political influence. For instance, Conder had acquired considerable environmental expertise
since its commitment to the Northern Coast APA. It even assisted the state environmental
agency (CRA) in elaborating the management plan for Tinhare-Boipeba APA.
Finally, by expanding into the environmental arena, development agencies could
satisfy most of the environmental requirements for their own projects, limiting interference by
the environmental agency in their jobs. Sectur had significantly engaged in environmental
management since beginning to implement the state tourism development plan, needing CRA
only to approve its plans.
To implement the new task of administrating APAs, agencies invested in training,
equipment, new personnel, and outside consulting. Conder and Sectur trained their officials
in environmental planning and management techniques internally and through external
courses, including those abroad.6 3 For example, the coordinator of the Northern Coast APA
traveled to England for a course in environmental management through the English ODA
involved in that APA. Sectur employees were trained in environmental planning and
management by consultants working on Sectur's APA management plans.
Agencies invested in equipment for doing the APA job, including office equipment for
performing technical studies and facilities and vehicles for doing fieldwork and maintaining
and enforcing APAs. Conder and Sectur had acquired computers for imaging APA areas.
Conder had invested in equipment for managing solid waste in the Northern Coast APA
(Conder, 1999). CRA, with its limited resources, had worked with Conder and the Brazilian
state oil company (Petrobras) to acquire equipment for collecting waste in the communities
and on the beaches of Mangue Seco APA.64
Agencies had hired or allocated many employees to do APA work. Different
strategies were used to increase the number of employees working on APAs: hiring new
employees, transferring some from other sectors to APA work, introducing employees from
overseas development agencies, or even requesting employees from other government
bureaucracies. 65
Conder grouped employees from different sectors to work on APA. For example, the
head of the Northern APA project transferred from a government agency newly merged with
Conder. Conder also relied on officials from the English ODA who worked on the Northern
APA project for more than three years. Sectur also combined officials from different sections
with experience in physical and environmental planning, some from a quasi-state tourism
bureaucracy, Bahiatursa.
CRA had assigned a small group to work part-time on APAs since the beginning of
the 1990s, but did not produce one plan until pressured by other agencies to do so. CRA
employees were upset to learn that other agencies would create and administer APAs - they
wanted to show that they could do so. CRA allocated several employees to work on APAs,
some part-time and some full-time, and hired 43 new employees in 1999, many of whom will
be involved with APAs.
All three agencies relied on outside consultants to overcome the technical and
institutional barriers to implementing APAs. Some of the consulting activities generated a
great deal of learning within each agency. In elaborating the management plan for the
Northern Coast APA, Conder staff learned several tasks from outside consultants working in-
house, such as how to read aerial photographs and identify ecosystem limits. As a result,
63 Information obtained from the interviews with officials in Sectur and Conder.
64 This actually was a result of an attempt of Petrobras to clean its image after an oil spill offshore, for which
Petrobras was heavily fined.
65 Because firing public employees is difficult, moving employees that are idle in one agency to another is very
common in the Brazilian bureaucracy.
developing APA management plans required less consulting. In elaborating the latest
management plan in Tinhare-Boipeba APA, Conder hired almost no outside consultants.
In interviews and field visits, I found that officials in all three agencies wanted to
show that they were doing a good job with their APAs, and that they could do as well or
better than the other organizations. In developing the management plans for Northern Coast
APA and Mangue Seco APA, both Conder and CRA claimed they were pioneers in creating
effective management plans on schedule. On several occasions, officials mentioned activities
they had or would pursue with their APAs that other agencies were not pursuing.
CRA officials highlighted their significant efforts to elaborate their first APA
management plan (Mangue Seco APA), and their ability to do a good job despite having
fewer resources for hiring outside consultants than "rich" agencies. Although CRA struggled
to finish the management plan for Mangue Seco APA because it lacked resources, the effort
showed state authorities and other agencies that it could do the job. The recent transfer of all
APAs to CRA administration in 1999 was viewed as a great victory, and with certain
frustration by officials in other organizations, who had expected to administer their APAs.
This transfer allowed CRA to justify an increase of 43 employees.
All the agencies made significant efforts to improve their institutional capacity to deal
with APAs. Competition among the three prompted them to improve their institutional
capacity, thus increasing the overall ability of state institutions to create and administer
protected areas.
5.6) Getting Local Support: APAs as Potential Investment Magnets
The association of APAs with state development agencies and the prospect of
attracting state and private investment eased the resistance of local governments to
interference in environmental and land-use matters. Development agencies also spurred the
improvement of local environmental institutions and raised environmental consciousness
among local development actors (such as landowners) while publicizing APAs and the
importance of environmental protection for tourism development.
The creation of an APA by the state interferes with local jurisdiction over land use.
Although most municipalities in Bahia did not have the institutional capacity to create or
implement a land-use management plan,66 the state had never before intervened substantially
in land-use matters. Control over land ownership and use are some of the most powerful tools
local politicians have at their disposal, as infrastructure projects gain them popularity and
political support.
Although APAs allow the state to define land-use rules, many local governments
regarded them as an opportunity to attract public or private investment, especially for tourism
development, rather than as interference in municipal matters. This view results from the
association of some APAs with the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur), and
with Conder, which provided urban infrastructure. The fact that many APAs were created in
66 Out of the 415 municipalities in Bahia only Salvador, the capital, has a municipal master plan.
areas with state infrastructure investments, such as the Green Line in Northern Coast APA
and the Ilh'us-Itacar6 road in the Itacar6 APA, also suggested that protected areas would
attract more investment.
Because of the association between environmental protection and tourism, some
municipalities that were not selected for public investment in tourism infrastructure even tried
to create their own APAs to attract such investments. As a local politician who was trying to
approve a municipal APA said, "We want investments here, so we are trying to create this
APA to show state authorities the tourism potential of our municipality." 67 Municipalities
had created five APAs on their own, but none prepared a management plan until 1999 (see
Table 5.3).
To encourage municipal support for APAs, state agencies organized public hearings to
gather information for APA management plans and explain aspects of APAs concerning land
use and environmental protection. Many of the municipalities where APAs located had
limited economic activity, and the arrival of state government officials, who rarely visit such
places, was an important event, especially when they discussed new opportunities for
economic development such as tourism. Local authorities were very cooperative with state
officials in most of these cases. 68 Local meetings organized by Sectur had sometimes
attracted hundreds of local politicians and officials, community leaders, NGO members,
landowners, and other citizens.69
Efforts to establish APAs and link environmental preservation with tourism
development prompted many municipalities to create or upgrade their institutional structure
for environmental protection. Local governments created municipal environmental agencies,
passed environmental legislation, and introduced environmental programs (see Chapter 6 for
more details). Such efforts not only indicate to state and federal agencies that the local
government was prepared to receive investments in tourism and could manage some
decentralized environmental responsibilities. They also allowed municipalities to apply for
funds for environmental protection from state, federal, nongovernmental, and international
sources.74
For example, Porto Seguro municipality, which received one of the largest slices of
public investment in tourism in the last decade (Bahia State Government, 1997), used the
funds to create an environmental agency and to plan several environmental programs (Tosato,
Maia & Braga, 1997). The head of the new agency and many of its employees were formerly
members of local environmental NGOs, which had tried to put environmental causes on the
municipal agenda. The priorities of the agency included expanding the area of Trancoso APA
67 Mayor of a town said during a visit to CRA.
68 Information obtained from officials in Sectur - the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism.
69 For example, one meeting in Itacare about Itacare APA more than 200 people were present, according to one
local government official.
7 There are several sources of environmental funding for municipal governments, such as National Fund for the
Environment (Fundo Nacional do Meio Ambiente, or FNMA) from the Federal Ministry of the Environment,
Water Resources and the Amazon (MMA), and the Program for Decentralized Implementation (Programa de
Execugio Decentralizada, or PED) from the state and federal government.
and taking over its administration. The agency had already created a municipal park in a
coral reef just off the coast, which is a popular tourist attraction. Visitation was limited to a
certain number of boats per day, and tourists had to pay a fee to board the boats. During
public hearings to discuss the state's regional tourism plan, officials from the new
environmental agency supported the efforts of local NGOs to modify certain projects, and the
changes were implemented.
Local landowners tended to be antagonistic to land-use rules that limit development,
such as APA guidelines. However, some landowners seemed to have changed their attitude
since the creation of APAs and promotion of ecotourism by state agencies, especially Sectur.
The idea that the undeveloped land could be an asset, and that tourism could be promoted
with only modest investment, converted landowners to the environmental cause.7 ' For
example, landowners supported the creation of Itacare APA, hoping that infrastructure
investments would attract tourists, and 33 of them proposed several environmental projects
(Newspaper article, n.d.). Many of these landowners had produced cacao for generations
using an ecologically friendly method (Conservation International, 1995).7 Although this
approach preserved most of the region's forests, a crop disease devastated the regional
economy in the 1980s, and ecotourism appeared to be an important economic alternative.
APA management plans served as guidelines for municipal land-use legislation.
Because municipalities had limited financial, technical, and institutional resources for
planning, very few had any comprehensive land-use plans. APA management plans included
land-use guidelines that municipalities could easily adopt, and many municipalities ratified
these regulations by law or decree. Two municipalities with land in Itacare APA, for example
- Itacare and Uruguca - approved APA regulations as local laws. Other municipalities such
as Cairu in Tinhare APA provided staff for enforcing APA guidelines, even though they did
not adopt them as municipal regulations.
State agencies trained local officials in tourism and environmental management
techniques during the ten years since elaboration of the state tourism plan. State officials or
consultants paid by the state offered courses in almost all municipalities within APAs on the
significance of protected areas and management techniques to enforce environmental
guidelines. Course participants were able to examine a particular development project to see if
it adheres to zoning guidelines, and also learn about local fauna and flora. These courses
helped municipalities understand the importance of environmental planning and management
for long-term development and raised local environmental consciousness.
The involvement of development agencies in APAs seemed to have built local support
for environmental protection. Development agencies publicized APAs, trained local officials
and citizens, and spread the idea of ecotourism. Before the 1990s, environmental matters
" For example, the planned road between Porto Seguro and Caraiva had its route changed because of concerns
about deforestation and historical preservation. In another project, the building of a water supply system, a
forestry component was added to protect the reservoir.
72 Information obtained from the interviews with landowners in Itacare APA.
7 Tree shadow is essential for growing cacao plant. This method consists of planting cacao in the middle of the
natural forest.
were addressed mostly by the environmental agency, which usually used police power and
rarely attracted state resources to municipalities. The participation of development agencies
changed local conceptions of environmental conservation. Local people began to associate
APAs with state resources and opportunities for economic development, thus easing local
resistance to state interference in local land-use matters.
5.7) Horizontal Decentralization with Checks and Balances
The involvement of development-oriented agencies in environmental policy
implementation can certainly generate institutional, financial, and political support for
environmental policies, as this research shows. However, such involvement could potentially
also generate institutional problems, as described in Chapter 3. In the case of Bahia, most of
these problems did not arise.
One such problem is that development-oriented agencies generally have specific
priorities, such as agriculture or tourism development, and environmental objectives may
conflict with them. Development-oriented agencies could simply neglect environmental
concerns in achieving their other objectives. Although this could occur in certain cases, in
Bahia development agencies needed to establish and implement protected areas as
environmental safeguards to gain approval for their development projects from state and
external actors. For example, the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur)
established many APAs as environmental safeguards for its infrastucture projects financed by
international donors. Such protected areas include Santo Antonio APA, the environmental
safeguard for a road financed by the IDB. APAs were also important elements in these
agencies' strategies to attract private investments in low-density nature-based tourism. APAs
were a guarantee to investors that the state would control chaotic development and land
subdivision. Sectur highlighted this point in several brochures for investors (Bahia State
Government, 1997). Thus, the establishment of APAs was compatible with the primary
objectives of development agencies.
A second challenge is that development projects that depend on environmental
safeguards controlled by the same agency may generate internal conflict-a case of the foxes
guarding the chicken coup. Agencies may prioritize development objectives and disregard
proper environmental standards. However, this could be avoided by allowing an outside
institution to oversee environmental guidelines and ensure their compatibility with
development projects.
In Bahia, besides the external actors (donors, the Bank of the Northeast, and the
federal government), the state environmental agency (CRA) and environmental council
(CEPRAM) acted as independent overseers. Although other agencies also administered
APAs, CRA had jurisdiction over environmental offenses, according to the Bahian
constitution. Also, all APAs and development projects with significant environmental
impacts needed the approval of CRA and CEPRAM. With environmental NGOs as one third
of its members, CEPRAM could possibly question and bar any action considered deleterious
to the environment.
Moreover, the new task of environmental protection introduced into development
agencies unprecedented environmental values and procedures, changing the way the agencies
think about and perform their development job. Forming a group of staff members to work
on environmental issues created a constituency for environmental protection in internal
debates. This contrasted with the usual mode in which development agencies argue against
external officials in charge of environmental protection. The staff working on environmental
issues within the development agencies showed great commitment to environmental values.
A number even risked their jobs and careers to defend proposed environmental guidelines in
internal debates.74 These employees conveyed their knowledge to other staff members, or
applied it to other projects implemented by the agency.75 For example, some members of
Conder's staff working on the Northern Coast APA contributed their experience in
environmental planning to urban development projects.
Third, assigning responsibility for protected areas to several agencies could dissipate
scarce institutional and financial resources for implementing them. The same resources
concentrated in one agency might generate stronger institutional capacity. This may be true
when resources come from a dedicated source, such as a new state fund for an environmental
program. But in the case of Bahia, financial and institutional resources for environmental
protection were not determined a priori, such as in the annual state budget. Public agencies
could draw on diverse sources of funding and staff for implementing their policies, thus
expanding the total financial and institutional resources devoted to APAs. Indeed, CRA alone
would not have been able to establish many APAs because the agency was unlikely to secure
the needed substantial increases in budget and staff. Conder and Sectur, in contrast, acquired
funds for APAs from their own budgets. These resources substantially expanded the funding
the state dedicated to environmental protection.
Fourth, competition among public agencies could generate feuds over public activities
and resources. Environmental projects tend to attract funding from international donors and
governments, and can bring political leverage in requesting and receiving resources.
Competing agencies could try to sabotage other agencies' environmental projects or block
them politically.
In Bahia, competition for controlling APAs was intense among the three public
agencies, but sabotage and political blockage did not occur. CRA's top bureaucrats supported
the idea of decentralizing APA administration from the beginning, as they realized they would
not have the political and financial resources to negotiate with developers and establish a
large number of APAs.76
At first, medium-level bureaucrats in different agencies did show a certain level of
mistrust regarding the technical aspects of APAs. However, this mistrust dissipated over time
as there was enough work for all the agencies, and they began to cooperate in establishing
new APAs. For example, CRA and Conder worked together to develop the management plan
74 This is based on my interviews with staff in Conder and Sectur.
75 Such as the environmental zoning learnt by Conder staff in the Northern Coast APA, now being used in their
other projects (e.g. urbanization and master plans)
76 Information obtained from former and actual high level CRA's bureaucrats.
for Tinhare-Boipeba APA. The experience Conder acquired in developing the management
plan for the huge Northern Coast APA was essential in helping CRA officials create the plan
for Boipeba APA. In addition, competition among agencies ended up expanding the overall
institutional capacity and financial resources of APAs because agencies wanted to create and
manage APAs well to gain political leverage in requesting more state funding.
Fifth, dispersion of responsibility for the same task among several agencies might
cause confusion about who should do what and when, and also undermine accountability.
One agency might expect another agency to do a job assigned to both of them; in the end, no
agency would perform the task or assume responsibility for non-performance or failure.
Institutional conflicts could result once agencies started to blame each other.
The cases in this study provide some evidence of such institutional conflicts. Conflicts
over institutional responsibility for APAs have occurred mostly among state agencies,
between the executive and judiciary branch, and between state and municipal governments
(Oliveira & Ogata, 1998). The Abaete APA illustrates these three kinds of conflicts. In a
contested development project, the municipal government issued a permit without consulting
either CRA or Conder, which must approve any project located in an APA. Those state
agencies, in turn, did not work together to enforce APA guidelines and stop the project. In
the end, a public prosecutor (similar to a US district attorney) sued both state agencies, the
municipal government, and the developer.
However, although such conflicts did occur in creating APAs and their guidelines,
these disputes are not unique to APAs or protected-area policy. In the environmental arena in
Brazil, rules and responsibilities are in transition, and conflicts among diverse public
institutions are common in Bahia and other states. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, state and
municipal governments recently blamed each other for water pollution on the beach of
Ipanema. State authorities pointed out that the pollution was caused by a leak from the sewer
system, which was managed by the municipal government. Municipal officials, in turn,
blamed officials of the state-managed water treatment facility for lacking the capacity to
process large volumes of sewage during heavy rains. There was no agreement about who was
responsible for the problem (Jornal do Brazil, 2000).
In sum, the story at the state level examined in this chapter shows how
decentralization of APA policy implementation among state environmental and development
agencies enhanced the political clout and financial and institutional resources accruing to
APAs in Bahia. Had APAs been concentrated in the hands of the environmental agency, it
might not have obtained those resources and overcome the political obstacles.
This chapter also shows that development projects related to tourism were important
in focusing development agencies on environmental management. In the next chapter, I
analyze the story of the establishment of APAs at the local level. I look at seven case studies
to determine how decentralization affected these cases, and which other factors were
important in implementing and enforcing APA guidelines at the local level.
CHAPTER 6 - INVOLVING KEY LOCAL ACTORS IN
ENFORCEMENT
This chapter examines the APA story at the local level. It looks at how APAs were
actually implemented in seven case studies, based on empirical research. I use the analytical
framework developed in Chapter 3 to analyze the stories at the local level. In this framework,
I identified lack of political, financial, and institutional support as barriers to the proper
establishment of protected areas. In the stories at the local level, I assess the level of local
support for enforcement of APA guidelines. I develop a series of indicators to evaluate to
what extent local governments and non-governmental groups provided political, financial, and
institutional support for enforcement in the seven APA case studies.
In the end, I identified three factors that help explain why some APAs received more
local support than others: the primary objective of a particular APA, the number of
municipalities involved in it, and the timing of the involvement of local actors. I argue that
the APAs created to control environmental impacts of infrastructure projects tended to receive
less local support for enforcement than the group of APAs created to control tourism
development already under way, though overseers of the former group managed to develop
and approve their management plans more quickly. Also, I indicate that APAs created in one
municipality are more manageable for the state in terms of building local institutional
capacity for enforcement. Finally, I contend that early involvement of local actors in the
process of establishing APAs often results in more local support for the enforcement of APA
guidelines (Figure 6.1).
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FIGURE 6.1 - FACTORS TENDING TO AFFECT THE ENFORCEMENT OF APA GUIDELINES
This chapter is divided into several sections. First, I analyze what policymakers and
officials in state agencies expected to occur regarding APAs. State agencies planned to build
local political support and institutional capacity in order to pass some enforcement
responsibilities to local actors, but this did not happen as state agencies anticipated. Second, I
examine the main political, institutional, and financial obstacles to participation in enforcing
APA guidelines, and shows how I assessed the enforcement structure involving both
government and non-governmental actors at the local level. Fourth, I lay out the analysis of
the seven case studies: Guaibim, Mangue Seco, Northern Coast, Tinhare-Boipeba, Itacare,
Santo Antonio, and Abaete APAs. Finally, I explain how and why the efforts to overcome the
obstacles to local support for enforcement had different outcomes in the seven case studies.
6.1) The State's Initial Expectations: Building Local Institutional Capacity
Once a state APA is created by legislation, its administrator - the state agency
specified in the decree - has to devise a management plan. This plan should be developed
with the participation of municipal governments and other local interests. State and local
level institutions are in charge of enforcing APA guidelines in the management plan.
According to the enforcement structure initially framed by state authorities, the state,
through one of its agencies, was responsible for enforcing APA guidelines and for training
local governments in enforcing APA guidelines. The state planned to later pass enforcement
on responsibilities to municipalities, retaining only a supervisory role. In the long term,
municipal governments and civil society would jointly form environmental councils to take
over part of the planning and enforcement responsibility. Moreover, municipal governments
were supposed to approve APA legislation so they can apply legal sanctions. Thus, municipal
authorities with the help of local inhabitants would participate in the supervision and
enforcement of APA guidelines. The state would get involved only in more complicated
situations.
State agencies had ambitious plans to build local institutional capacity for the
enforcement of APA guidelines. They expected to do so by fully engaging local governments
and non-government actors (communities, NGOs, landowners, business people, tourists, and
developers) in that process. Capacity building would be achieved through local involvement
in defining APA limits and management plan, courses, public hearings, publicizing material
and encouragement in performing enforcement tasks (denouncing and inspections, and legal
sanctions, in the case of local governments).
State agencies expected that potential revenues from tourism and state-funded
improvements in local infrastructure would stimulate local governments to give political,
institutional, and financial support to APAs. In the state's view, municipal governments
would approve local APA laws to back up state legislation, create municipal environmental
agencies to enforce those laws by hiring new personnel or transferring existing staff to these
agencies, and acquiring equipment. State planners also counted on local civil society
(community groups, NGOs, businesses, etc.) to create or improve non-governmental
institutions engaging in environmental activities, thereby strengthening APA enforcement
through environmental education, activism, inspections, denouncement, and small projects.
However, outcomes ended up differently from the plans on paper. Although the
creation of APAs stimulated some improvement of local environmental institutions, the
capacity of local actors to enforce APAs varied substantially among the different APAs and
over time. In some APAs, municipal governments and local inhabitants became involved in
establishing APAs beginning with early discussions. In others, locals maintained very little
involvement throughout the process. Some municipal governments improved their
institutional capacity to enforce APAs by lending political and institutional support. Others
developed almost no institutional capacity throughout the process of establishing the APAs.
Different municipalities saw varying improvements in the number, quality, and level
of engagement of their civil society groups in APA enforcement. Finally, the interaction on
implementing APA policies differed between state agencies and local actors, as well as
among state agencies themselves. Agencies and locals interacted smoothly in some cases and
roughly in others.
6.2) Political, Institutional, and Financial Support: Assessing Local Actors'
Participation in Enforcement
Local participation in enforcing APA guidelines depended upon support for local
actors. State government agencies would try to build institutional capacity and alliances with
municipal governments and non-governmental groups to strengthen local enforcement
capacities.
For the analyses in this chapter, I draw on an analytical framework based on the
analyses of the main obstacles to establishing protected areas in Chapter 3, and similar
analyses of how to overcome these obstacles at the state level in Bahia in Chapter 5. To
convince local institutions to participate in enforcing APA guidelines, state agencies had to
first encourage local political support and develop the institutional and financial capacity of
both municipal governments and non-governmental actors.
Political support at the local level would come in the form of new organizations
working on APAs, local environmental legislation, and changes in attitudes toward APAs and
environmental matters. Efforts to support APAs would not require municipal governments or
local non-governmental groups to commit sparse funds. Municipal governments would
simply have to change their public discourse, bargain with the city council to gain approval of
APA legislation, and create an environmental agency or assign new environmental
responsibilities to an existing agency (many municipalities assigned environmental matters to
the tourism or agriculture agency). In the non-governmental sector, generating political
support would mean creating new environmental NGOs that would exert political pressure on
local politicians and participate in environmental decision making. To ensure these changes,
state agencies would have to ask for political support from local allies or build new alliances,
and stir environmental consciousness through training or public campaigns over
environmental issues.
Institutional and financial support would go one step beyond mere political support.
Such support would mean that local government and non-governmental institutions would
provide staff, equipment, and facilities for enforcement, and initiate activities such as
inspections and public environmental education. These activities would involve allocating
financial or institutional resources to environmental protection. To generate these financial
resources, local governments would have to assign more funds from the municipal budget to
environmental protection,7 7 ask for more funding from state government, or establish an
agreement for provision of environmental services with a state or federal agency. 8
Municipalities would also have to transfer people and equipment from other functions to
environmental protection, or hire new part-time or full time employees. Training or purchase
of new equipment would come from the municipal budget or would be provided by the state
or federal agencies.
Non-governmental organizations would have to raise funds for participating in
environmental projects through their own sources, new private or international sources, or
government programs that provide funds for NGOs (such as FNMA - National Funds for the
Environment). NGOs could also provide services through government contracts. For
example, some NGOs provided government-sponsored environmental education in APAs.
(An NGO called Iesb offered environmental education courses in the Una reserve and Itacare
APA sponsored partially by the state.)
NGOs would use new funds to draw in institutional capacity would come from new
volunteers, employees, training, or equipment acquired with an increase in the NGO's budget
or allocated from other activities. Training could be received through some training programs
offered by state agencies to local institutions.
Thus, improvements in the financial and institutional capacity of local governments
and non-governmental groups would require transferring their own existing resources or
tapping new ones. Building this capacity would require local groups to apply for already
existent sources of funding and institutional resources (e.g., training) provided by higher level
of governments, private, or international sources.
This research examines to what extent local governments and non-governmental
groups provided political, institutional, and financial support for enforcing APA guidelines.
The role of municipal governments and local non-governmental actors in the enforcement of
APAs plan to be qualitatively assessed for each of the seven APAs. I specified three levels of
participation in enforcement based on indicators of political, financial, and institutional
support by local actors: low, medium, and high. These indicators were specified for both
77 Municipal budgets are composed by large part from transfers of funds from upper level governments, state and
federal (Souza, 1996). Many of these transfers are earmarked for programs in, for example, education and
health. Other transfers are not and can be used with relatively flexibility. Funds for environmental programs,
such as APA enforcement, would come from the allocation of any surplus from the latter transfers or from the
shift of resources for other purposes.
78 Municipal governments can sign agreements with government agencies for the provision of environmental
services in exchange for funds, equipment or institutional aid (e.g., training). These agreements could be for
specific tasks or equipment, such as the purchase of vehicles or performing environmental inspections. Also,
agreements could be sought for specific programs offered by state or federal governments. For example, the
federal government created the National Fund for the Environment (FNMA, Fundo Nacional do Meio Ambiente)
in 1989. Most of this fund was planned to be spent in environmental projects managed by NGOs or municipal
governments in municipalities with less than 120,000 inhabitants. Another example is the Projects for
Decentralized Execution (PED, Programas de Execugio Decentralizada), a federal-state program for providing
funds and institutional assistance for the execution of specific environmental projects by selected municipal
government (Ogata, Abreu & Lacerda Neta, 1995).
governments and non-governmental actors in the region covered by a certain APA (see Tables
6.1 and 6.2).
A municipal government was seen as having a low level of enforcement participation
when it evinced no interest in the APA or maintained a confrontational attitude towards
environmental protection (Table 6.1). Medium-level enforcement meant that local
governments provided some political support to APAs, for example, by maintaining a non-
confrontational attitude toward APA environmental guidelines, by approving municipal
legislation, and by creating an institution for dealing with APA and other environmental
issues. However, at this level governments provided little or no institutional capacity for
actual APA enforcement. High-level involvement implied some municipal institutional
capacity and a proactive role in enforcing APA guidelines, such as carrying out inspections,
screening projects for licensing, hiring personnel to work on APAs, and pursuing
environmental projects (such as environmental education and garbage collection).
Support for enforcement by non-governmental actors was assessed in a similar manner
(Table 6.2). If no non-governmental groups were involved in APA affairs, the area had a low
level of enforcement support. Medium-level support implied the existence of one or more
non-governmental groups involved in APAs and their participation in decisions concerning
APA at the local or state level. Finally, high-level support entailed pro-active participation in
APA enforcement, such as denouncing environmental offenses regularly and creating
environmental projects (such as environmental education programs). Table 6.4 summarizes
the results of the assessment for all seven case studies.
Table 6.1 - Level of municipal government support in APA enforcement
Level Position towards APAs Qualitative proxy
measurement
Low Confrontational attitude or no interest - no structure for enforcing APAguidelines
- existence of conflicts with state
agencies over APA
Medium Political support but not much -change in the discourse aboutinstitutional capacity environmental protection
-existence of environmental regulation
to back APA guidelines
- creation of a municipal agency to
work with environmental protection
High Political support and some institutional- -change in the discourse about
environmental protection
financial support 
-existence of environmental regulation
to back APA guidelines
- financial resources invested in APA
enforcement
- staff hired for APA guideline
enforcement
- regular inspections on APA area
-screening structure for licensing
projects that take into account APAs
Table 6.2 - Level of enforcement support from local non-governmental groups in APA
Level Position towards APAs Qualitative proxy
measurement
Low No interest or confrontational attitude - no local groups or locals
involved, in APA
Medium Some interest, but no institutional capacity - existence of local environmental
groups involved in APA
- locals participating in
environmental policy decisions
(municipal environmental
councils)
High Much interest, some institutional capacity - existence of local environmental
and existence of activities groups
- locals participating in
environmental policy decisions
(municipal environmental
councils)
- locals involved in environmental
initiatives (environmental
education, denouncing, garbage
collection, etc.)
6.3) Case Studies
To understand the functioning of APAs at the local level, seven APAs were studied.
All these APAs had management plans approved by the state environmental council
(CEPRAM). There were two criteria for choosing these 7 APAs of the existing 29. First, in
order to study the implementation process over time, I decided that the creation decrees of
selected APAs had to be at least four years old when I started my field research in September
1998. Second, these decrees had to have been implemented at least in part. These 7 APAs
were the only APAs in coastal areas that had management plans approved by CEPRAM
before September 1998. The set of 7 APAs represents a rich illustration of the environment
under which APAs had been implemented (Table 6.3), as they were administered by various
state agencies (CRA, Conder, and Sectur) and were in different geographical regions. In the
following sections, these seven case studies are analyzed in detail.
Table 6.3 : Characteristics of the seven APAs studied*
Date of Date of management plan Time in months Number of Geographical Area in
approval by the State
APA First the creation Environmental between creation Municipalities Region hectares
Name
Administrator Decree (c) Council (d) and approval (c-d) in the APA In Bahia
Guaibim CRA 05/11/92 05/18/93 12.2 1 South 2,000
Mangue CRA 11/06/91 09/23/94 34.6 1 North 3,395
Seco
Northern Conder 03/17/92 02/21/95 23.5 5 North 142,000
Coast
Tinhare CRA/ 06/05/92 06/19/98 72.5 1 South 43,300
Conder
Itacare Sectur 06/07/93 12/19/96 42.4 2 South 14,925
Santo Sectur 08/31/94 11/25/96 21.2 2 South 23,000
Antonio
Abaete Conder 09/22/87 05/22/98 128.0 1 Salvador 1,800
* Source: CRA, 1999 and CEPRAM, 1999.
6.3.1) Guaibim APA
History
Guaibim was the first APA created to mitigate and control environmental impacts of
development projects. Before Guabim, all proposed APAs intended to preserve important
ecosystems without having to expropriate land, but not to mitigate the environmental impacts
of specific projects. The idea of Guaibim APA became a reference point for many APAs
later, such as the Northern Coast APA and the eight APAs created by the State Secretariat of
Culture and Tourism (Sectur).79 In all these cases, the state created APAs as mechanisms for
land-use control and environmental preservation in areas where one or several infrastructure
projects would be likely to spur development, especially tourism projects.
The Guaibim APA was created in the face of a proposed tourism resort in 1990.
Entrepreneurs had intended to build a 300-hectare development project in an underdeveloped
coastal area in the municipality of Valenga. The project was located in a zone near fragile
ecosystems protected by national and state law, in violation of local zoning rules. Developers
needed to submit an environmental impact assessment for approval by the state environmental
council (CEPRAM). According to specialists of the state environmental agency (CRA), which
was in charge of evaluating the environmental viability of the project, 80 the plan was very
unlikely to be approved. CRA negotiated with the developers to change the project to comply
with environmental legislation. During this negotiation, which involved state and municipal
" According to a former high official in the state environmental agency (CRA).
80 According to a former high official in the state environmental agency (CRA).
officials, environmentalists, and local landowners, developers agreed to build in a different
spot and to preserve a large part of their property, including the most important conserved
ecosystems.
To make the decisions enforceable, state officials suggested the creation of an APA in
the region. This APA would include other properties and protect the rest of the region, which
contained well-preserved coastal ecosystems. This idea appealed to both environmentalists
and developers.81 Environmentalists liked the idea of an APA that would protect an
environmentally important area much larger than the proposed development area, and they
doubted that they would find any other means to influence the proposed development project.
Developers, in turn, needed their plans approved by CEPRAM, which has NGO
representatives as one-third of its members. For their part, landowners were eager to see the
value of their land appreciate with the new development, but feared that a large project would
spark unplanned development and depress the value of their properties. Thus, state and
municipal governments decided to create the Guaibim APA in May 1992.
Understanding Local Participation
Members of the municipal government have been very supportive of the APA since
the beginning of the process. The development project interested municipal officials, but they
were uneasy about the social and environmental impacts. Thus, they called the state
environmental agency and organized negotiations for the creation of the Guaibim APA. They
supported the participation of environmentalists in the discussions to avoid the possibility that
they could block the approval process in the state environmental council (CEPRAM).
No rigorous studies occurred before the discussions started. Instead, municipal
authorities attempted to determine what locals impacted by development, NGOs and state
authorities thought about the proposed project. This process helped to open negotiation
channels for later elaboration of the management plan, which defines land-use rules, and
implementation of the APA guidelines. Municipal officials, together with state officials and
consultants, managed without much conflict to elaborate the management plan and gain
approval in the state environmental council (CEPRAM) in 1993. This was the first
management plan ever approved by CEPRAM. The APA guidelines were later approved by
the city hall.
The municipal government had assumed many of the tasks of enforcing the guidelines.
The government created a municipal tourism and environment secretariat, and assigned
employees to guide APA enforcement. Municipal officials learned through CRA how to
screen development projects before sending them to CRA for approval. Municipal officials
also enlisted locals to help enforce environmental rules, calling on CRA only when problems
cannot be solved at the local level.
81 Information obtained from interviews with state environmentalists and former official in the state
environmental agency.
In elaborating the APA management plan, CRA and the municipal government invited
the local population to participate. 82 Some landholders were concerned about land-use
restrictions. Some protected areas had already been developed, especially shrimp farms, and
landowners initially worried that APA would make them close down these farms. However,
government officials guaranteed that no previously approved development would be affected
by the Guaibim APA. Although zoning restrictions were not imposed on properties with
existing development, undeveloped areas with similar characteristics would be transformed
into conservation areas.
Other landowners were concerned that a large development could spur unplanned
development in the region, depreciating their property and bringing social problems such as
squatting and high-density subdivisions. On the other hand, the same landowners were
uneasy about APA restraints, as they expected to gain from growth of tourism by selling or
developing their properties. Participants in the negotiations defined the land-use rules to
preserve important ecosystems on all properties but to allow certain developments in areas
already hosting human activities such as pastures or coconut plantations. All parties agreed
that land subdivisions should be limited.
Municipal officials also had to work closely with landowners and locals to enforce
APA guidelines. By doing so they helped publicize the APA and land-use rules; to ensure
that landowners would consult local or state authorities before initiating any development.
To many locals, the APA seemed to work in their own interests. The APA guaranteed
that the region would attract tourism investments that would increase property values, but
would also curb longstanding problems such as poaching of coconut and timber and land
squatting. Landowners had had to deal with poachers themselves, and fighting such invaders
entailed personal risk. Moreover, poachers driven off the land simply returned again and
again.
After creation of the APA, locals could count on municipal and state officials to
support them in fighting these problems. The process of publicly denouncing some cases of
poaching had brought some government officials to the region, cutting the number of
incidents, according to local landowners.83 After that, poachers feared being caught and
having to deal with government authorities. Cases of squatting had also increased in the
region, especially in fragile ecosystems such as mangroves and the Atlantic forest. The
enforcement of APA guidelines would protect landowners against squatters, again convincing
state and local authorities to restrict such invasions. Landowners tried to convince APA
administrators to restrain squatting from the beginning.
Tourism boomed in the APA and surrounding areas in the 1990s. Today there are
over 1,400 lodging beds in the region (A Tarde, 1998c). With the growth of tourism,
entrepreneurs created the Guaibim Business Association to work together to solve common
problems. The association had 17 members in 1998, many outsiders interested in developing
82 From interviews with former local and state government officials involved in the process at that time.
83 Information obtained from interviews with landowners in Guaibim area.
ecotourism locally. This association had worked in several areas, such as by offering tourism
training courses for the local workforce, helping people obtain. These courses also trained
government employees working in the region - one trained local police to work with tourists,
for example. As of 1998 more than 200 people had been trained. The association has also
held events such as a parachute tournament and exhibitions to advertise the region.
The association also concentrated its efforts on the environment. Solid waste was a
big concern, and for years members had cooperated to clean the beach regularly. Although
not much waste is produced locally, a lot of garbage from Salvador floats in on the tides.
Now, after requests from the association, the municipal government is performing this task.
The association now is working on organizing selective garbage collection to increase
recycling, and some members had started to separate solid waste in their hotels. Members
also posted signs about the importance of environmental preservation and created trails and
organized guided visits to some ecologically beautiful areas, both attracting tourists and
raising their consciousness of the need for environmental preservation.
In conjunction with the municipal government, the association had also funded
environmental education at local schools. One major concern had been illegal hunting.
Locals had traditionally hunted many animals, even some endangered species such as the
local cayman. With the growing population, some animals that were once common had
become difficult to spot. The association was trying to both raise children's consciousness
and ban hunting in the APA. To increase the impact of all these efforts, the association had
continually tried to attract new members, especially small businesses such as food trailers on
the beach.
Summing Up
In Guabim, municipal government and local actors, especially the business association
and some local inhabitants, had provided significant political and institutional support for
implementing and enforcing APA guidelines. The local government passed legislation that
supports APA enforcement and created an agency to enforce APA rules. This agency now
had the institutional capacity to screen projects, consult with the local population, and provide
equipment and personnel for cleaning up beaches. Local non-governmental actors have
contributed to enforcement by denouncing illegal activities. The local business organization
had also organized a series of environmental initiatives.
Several factors seem to explain the high support for enforcement of APA guidelines in
Guaibim. First, the early involvement of local actors in the APA proposal and design of the
management plan helped attract local political and institutional support for the newly
established APA. Because the local government was fully involved from the beginning, it
could acquire significant experience in APA affairs later used to enforce its guidelines. The
early involvement of local actors also brought the support of local landowners, because they
were well informed about the benefits of APAs and could negotiate land-use restrictions with
state and municipal officials.
Local inhabitants had also given institutional support for APA enforcement because it
curbed recurring problems such as coconut and timber poaching. Landowners benefit from
the assurance that the area would not suffer uncontrolled development and squatting, which
could depress property values. Finally, only one municipality a small number of landholders
were involved in Guaibim APA, facilitating the strong involvement of local actors in APA
discussions.
6.3.2) Itacare- Serra Grande APA
History
Itacare APA was created by state decree on June 7, 1993 (see Table 4.7 for more
details). It includes part of the territories of two municipalities: Itacare and Uruguca.84 In the
past, gaining access to the region was difficult since the roads linking it to the rest of the state
were all unpaved. Only more adventurous tourists such as surfers and backpackers visited the
region. Locals themselves experienced many problems with transportation. Bus service was
scarce, slow, and unreliable, interrupted with heavy rains. Because of the isolation, important
ecosystems in the region were still preserved, such as large parts of the Atlantic forest and
mangroves. The main economic activities were traditional fishing, subsistence agriculture,
and coconut and cacao production. Cacao was planted in a traditional way that preserved the
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vegetative coverage.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the state tourism plan proposed paving the 64.6-km
road between Itacare town and Ilheus, the main regional center and gateway for the region
(the airport is located there). There was tremendous local support for the project,86 as it
would break down the isolation of the region and bring new economic development
opportunities associated with tourism. At the same time, the State Secretariat of Culture and
Tourism (Sectur) had plans to create the Itacare APA in an attempt to restrain unplanned
development and try to preserve some environmental resources.
Sectur was designed as the initial APA administrator. It coordinated the elaboration
of the management plan, which was created by an environmental consulting company. This
plan was completed in 1996 and submitted for approval to the state environmental council
(CEPRAM). APA guidelines constituted the environmental warranty for road construction.
CEPRAM approved these guidelines in December 1996, and road construction started a few
days later. In 1997, the town councils of both municipalities (Itacare and Uruguca) passed
laws ratifying the APA guidelines.
Local Support for the APA
The two municipal governments participated in the creation of the APA and in the
road construction. In the beginning of the 1990s, during studies for the state tourism plan,
8 The main urban center of Itacare, which is on the coast, is in the APA.
85 This system is called "Cabruca" plantation. It has been done traditionally for decades (V&S Engenheiros
Consultores S/C, 1995).
86 Information obtained during the interviews with municipal officials and community leaders in Itacare.
Itacare municipality asked the state to make the Itacare-Ilheus road a priority (Prefeitura
Municipal de Itacar6, n.d.). Tourism had started to grow in the region, and local politicians
and entrepreneurs lobbied state government for infrastructure projects. Even before Itacare
APA was discussed at the state level, members of the Itacare town council submitted a
proposal for including the whole municipality in an APA (Camara Municipal de Itacar6,
1991).87 This proposal convinced the state government to endorse the creation of an APA in
the region.
Itacare APA came with the support of local government and landowners, especially
new owners who expected their land to increase in value with private investment in tourism.
They expected that the preserved environment in their land was their main asset to sell their
properties to tourism investors. Many locals also supported APA because they linked APA to
tourism development, which meant economic opportunities (V&S Engenheiros Consultores,
1995).
Since the creation of the APA, Sectur held several events to promote the APA and
inform locals about its meaning. Some of these events were public hearings designed to
gather information for the management plan. Audiences for these events were large and
diverse, including members of local NGOs, landowners, and entrepreneurs. Some events
related to tourism development, such as training courses and a conference on tourism
development along the southern coast of Bahia. The focus of a large number of these courses
and meetings was on environmental protection and ecotourism.
These events on tourism and the environment seemed to have stimulated regional
government environmental institutions. The events promoted by Sectur included many
officials from environmental agencies and environmentalists in the region. During the
meetings, these officials had not only an opportunity to speak to an audience of important
local leaders but also to exchange ideas and information among themselves.88 The state and
federal environmental agencies (CRA and IBAMA), which maintained local offices in Ilheus
region, increased their number of employees and began to enforce environmental laws more
strictly, especially those prohibiting deforestation. 89 In the mid-l 990s, IBAMA acted against
several logging companies in the region and even closed down one of the last logging
companies in Itacare, with support from part of the local population. To support enforcement,
the state court system recently created a special environmental branch with regional public
prosecutors (A Tarde, 1998a).
Local civil society had denounced environmental crimes and organized to influence
environmental decision making and enforcement. Since the late 1980s, several NGOs were
created in the region, 90 some specifically to work in conservation areas. For example, Boto
87 Later the town council abandoned this proposal till the state had the APA guidelines, which were approved as
a municipal law in 1997.
88 Information obtained from an interview with a local official from the federal environmental agency.
89 These agencies had offices there to control other environmentally units, such as the Una federal ecological
reserve and Lagoa Encantada APA.
9 There were six environmental NGOs in the region that includes the cities of Ilheus, Itabuna and Itacare in
1995 (Mater Natura, 1996).
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Negro Movement had as its creation statement the legal and political defense of Itacare APA.
One of the NGOs, Grama from the nearby city of Itabuna, was part of the state environmental
council (CEPRAM). Grama used this vehicle to try to gain political support for regional
environmental concerns. 91
These local groups participated actively in APA hearings. Some of these groups also
expect to participate in the APA management council when it were established (V&S
Engenheiros Consultores, 1995). The groups had also engaged in several environmental
battles in the Itacare APA. For instance, protests organized by the NGO Boto Negro
Movement forced the municipal government to discard the initial site of the sewage treatment
plant, which would have been built in an area with mangroves. 92 Landowners and tourism
entrepreneurs also joined NGOs to denounce illegal logging in the APA and supported the
federal environmental agency when it closed down a mill. Landowners from a private
ecotourism reserve convinced the municipal government to change its solid waste storage
location that abutted a preserved forest area.93
Summing Up
Despite the many improvements in regional environmental management, problems
remain. Although municipal laws support Itacare APA, municipal governments had not
provided institutional support for the enforcement of APA guidelines. At the state level, after
CEPRAM approved the APA's management plan, Sectur had not given much institutional
support to enforcement, moving its efforts instead to develop management plans for other
APAs. The one remaining Sectur employee in the region focused on promoting tourism
investments, not on environmental enforcement.
New problems had started to appear. Outsiders had begun buying the most potentially
valuable land plots - those near the sea - from local landowners. These new landowners had
blocked access to their property by locals using it for subsistence agriculture and fishing.
This attitude generated a lot of conflict because locals had lived on and used the land for
generations under sharecrop contracts with former landowners. For example, there were
conflicts on the Conchas farm and in the Itacarezinho community (V&S Engenheiros
Consultores, 1995). In the interior, landless peasants invaded two farms, which were later
expropriated for agrarian reform. These settlements abut one of the main forested areas in
Itacare APA. Expansion of these two invasions or a new invasion could threaten the forested
land.
* Interview with a leader from Grama.
92 In the end, the plant moved to another area.
9 According to an interview with Sectur officials.
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6.3.3) Santo Antonio APA
History
Santo Antonio APA is located on the coast of southern Bahia in the municipalities of
Santa Cruz Cabralia and Belmonte. The APA, created by a governor's decree on August 31,
1994, includes some well-preserved Atlantic forest, mangroves, and cliffs. The main
economic activities in the region were coconut plantations, extraction of straw (for roofs and
brooms), subsistence agriculture, and fishing. More recently, tourism became an important
activity as well, with the creation of several tourism businesses. Santo Antonio APA is near
Porto Seguro (approximately 30 kilometers away), where tourism development saw a sharp
growth in in the last two decades (see Table 3.4) Tourism activities had also started to spill
over neighboring municipalities. Porto Seguro is well connected to main road trunks9 4 and
has a recently renovated international airport.
This APA was created in an attempt to control the environmental impacts of a 50-
kilometer road between the towns of Belmonte and Santa Cruz Cabralia. This road was part
of a series of infrastructure projects the state government has developed as part of the tourism
development program - Prodetur. The road would ease access from Porto Seguro to new
frontiers for tourism development next to underdeveloped beaches. The road was not part of
the early state tourism plan. As the road project was introduced in 1994, the APA was
proposed and quickly approved by decree.
The APA management plan immediately gained priority in the State Secretariat of
Culture and Tourism (Sectur) because the APA was part of the environmental safeguards
required by the InterAmerican Development Bank for releasing the loan for the road
projects. 95 Indeed, development of this plan jumped ahead of management plans from other
APAs in Sectur. For example, Ponta da Baleia APA was created by Sectur in 1993, before
the creation of Santo Antonio APA. Although the former had already been included in the
state tourism plan, its management plan lagged behind96 because no infrastructure project in
the region required environmental safeguards.
A consulting firm was in charge of generating a management plan under the
supervision of Sectur in 1995. This work lasted for more than one year. After completion,
the management plan was submitted to and approved by CEPRAM in 1997. Later, in 1998,
the town council of Santa Cruz Cabralia approved the APA's guidelines, making them a
municipal law (Prefeitura Municipal de Santa Cruz Cabralia, 1998).
Local Participation in the Enforcement of APA Guidelines
During the development of the management plan, there were a lot of discussions about
the proper zoning to be established in the region. Sectur has organized a few public meetings
to discuss the creation of the APA. Many local authorities, especially the municipal
9 Such as BR-101 road that is one of the main roads in Brazil, connecting many states through their coasts.
9 Information obtained from an official in Sectur.
' Up to October, 1998, Ponta da Baleia APA had not a management plan yet (CRA, 1998)
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government of Santa Cruz Cabralia, questioned why some local rules were not being followed
by the proposed zoning system. This municipality already had laws regarding the subdivision
of land plots and building on the urban perimeter. Some of the state-proposed zoning rules
seemed to contradict some of these laws.
The municipality convinced Sectur to change the initial zoning to increase the area in
the zone for urban expansion (see ZEP I and 11 in Table 4.9) around the town of Santo Andre,
the main urban area and tourism center in the APA. Business leaders of a planned tourism
project in the region also pressured local and state authorities to change the initial zoning. 97
Although the tourism project had already been planned and the land purchased, the initial
zoning guidelines would have prevented its construction. Locals and municipal authorities
supported the project, saying that it would bring jobs and income to the region. In the end,
Sectur negotiated some changes in the project to improve environmental standards while
revising the zoning to accommodate the project. The municipal government then enacted the
APA guidelines as municipal law.
The process of establishing APAs 98 in the municipality of Santa Cruz Cabralia
affected its environmental institutions. The municipality created a new municipal secretariat
of tourism and the environment to take charge of environmental responsibilities. Also, the
municipal secretariat of public works had been very active in discussions concerning the
APAs since it controls municipal land use. To deliberate about environmental matters, the
municipality established a municipal environmental council (CONDEMA). 99 The council had
representatives of municipal secretariats and civil society, including the two environmental
NGOs in the region (Ascae and Flora Brasil), which are some of the most active members of
the council. Ascae had also participated in the state environmental council (CEPRAM) for
many years. Over time, by participating in debates about other APAs, it had acquired much
experience in analyzing management plans and projects and negotiating agreements. Indeed,
CEPRAM appointed Ascae to be its official reporter on Santo Antonio APA.
The debates and institutional changes sparked by the creation of APAs resulted in
some municipal initiatives in environmental protection. For example, the municipality
created a municipal park for protecting a highly visited island and coral reefs called Coroa
Alta. The ecosystem was threatened by predatory tourism development. For many years,
local boats were used to take tourists to this island without proper control on the number of
visitors per day. Locals had also built several sheds on the island to sell food and drinks, all
without permits. As a result of the establishment of the park, all sheds were removed, and the
number of visitors is controlled by three municipal guards. A fee per visitor is charged to
cover operational and maintenance costs.
17 This project belongs to a large Brazilian business group called Bozano-Simonsen. It planned to invest US$
200 to 300 million dollars in a high standard tourism complex with 2 five star hotels and 300 luxury houses plus
entertainment amenities. Investors say the project will generate 1,300 jobs (Planarq, 1996).
98 Besides Santo Antonio APA, another APA, Coroa Vermelha, is located in Santa Cruz Cabralia.
99 CONDEMA = Conselho Municipal de Defesa do Meio Ambiente (Municipal Council for Defending the
Environment).
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Summing Up
Although some progress had been made in the management of Santo Antonio APA,
there were still many gaps to be covered. A large part of this APA was in the municipality of
Belmonte, which had made little effort to implement APA guidelines. There was no
municipal law backing up the APA, and the municipality had shown little interest in making
environmental protection an important part of its agenda. Most tourism development seemed
to occur in the APA area in the municipality of Santa Cruz Cabralia. 100
For its part, Santa Cruz Cabralia institutionalized Santo Antonio APA guidelines at the
municipal level, but it had not gone further. Although the municipal law legitimizing the
APA establishes that the local government would help enforce APA guidelines, no
institutional structure had been created to actually implement that those guidelines - contrary
to the case of the municipal park, which had a self-sustaining implementation structure.
At the state level, Sectur had screened only a few big projects in the region. There
was no institutional structure for performing regular visits and checking enforcement of the
guidelines. All enforcement had depended on a few cases denounced either to Sectur or to
CRA. 101 Despite the existence of an experienced NGO, Ascae, which could strengthen
enforcement, the NGO had not focused on implementing the APA management plan, but
rather on other regional projects such as preparing to celebrate the five hundredth anniversary
of Brazil in April, 2000.102
6.3.4) Dunes and Lagoons of Abaete APA
History
Abaete APA was the second APA created in Bahia. It is located in Salvador, the
capital of the state and the third-largest city in Brazil. The region is formed by dunes and
lagoons rich in fauna and flora, especially migrant birds and orchids. Also, it has immense
cultural value. African-Brazilian religions consider Abaete a sacred spot, and celebrated songs
honor the beauty of the place. 103 Thus, it is a popular visiting spot for tourists and locals.
Abaete APA was created in 1987 by a governor's decree, but it took a long time for
the APA administrator, the state urban development agency (Conder), to develop a
management plan. The state had created Abaete APA to protect an important ecosystem from
rapid urban growth in Salvador. In the past, the region of Abaete was distant from the urban
centers and surrounded mostly by fishing villages. There was no real threat to its
environmental resources. In the 1980s, the area experienced growing urban pressure, as the
100 Information obtained from interviews with government officials in both municipalities.
101 According to CRA and Sectur officials.
02 From interviews with Ascae members.
03 The most famous song to honor Abaete was composed by the famous Bahian composer Dorival Caymmi.
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nearby Camagari Petrochemical Complex was established in the 1970s and roads were built to
facilitate the development of the region.
Several developments threatened Abaete ecosystems. Middle-class high-rise
condominiums were encroaching on the dunes from the east and north side, while slum
dwellers were squatting on the south and west side. In 1980, the mayor of Salvador tried to
create a municipal park in the area but it was not completely implemented. This project
generated a lot of conflict with squatters and developers. Many people in the slums used the
lagoons for fetching water, bathing, and washing clothes, and a speculator claimed he owned
most of the area. In the end, 50 houses were torn down and some developers took the case to
court (Veja, 1980). In 1987, there was still encroachment on the dunes, when Conder stepped
in and created the APA. Since then, there have been many conflicts both with slum dwellers
and developers. State authorities or courts have often ejected inhabitants or stopped
development in the area.
At the time of the creation of Abaete APA, there had been no attempt to elaborate an
APA management plan. Because large parts of the APA were private property with high
market value, development restrictions were difficult to impose. The APA was created on
paper, but there was no management plan to determine which areas should be placed under
strict preservation. Meanwhile, development continued.
Local involvement in the APA
In 1988, an extra step was taken to protect the area: the municipal government of
Salvador established a municipal park in the core of the APA.104 Some areas were
expropriated to create the park. Still, little effort was made to implement and enforce the law.
Government agencies, both state and municipal, lacked the experience, expertise, and funds
for such tasks.
Until the mid- 1 990s none of the governments had come up with a management plan
for protecting the region. However, in 1995, after Conder had worked on the Northern Coast
APA, it began coordinating the development of the Abaete APA management plan.
Consultants were hired to lead the work. The experience acquired in elaborating the
management plan for Northern Coast APA gave Conder the credibility to handle this similar
task, as well as leverage for requesting funds for managing other APAs.
Conder and the municipal government reached an agreement regarding the
administration of the area. Conder would be the APA administrator and the guidelines it
developed for the management plan would be incorporated in the municipal park with the
approval of the municipal government. The plan was finished in 1997 and submitted for
approval to the state environmental council (CEPRAM). Conder is now in charge of
maintaining the park and enforcing protection guidelines. In 1998 alone, Conder spent almost
US$ 1 million on Abaete APA, including to improve the visitors' infrastructure and
expropriate property in areas of strict preservation (SEPLANTEC, 1998).
104 This municipal park was created by the municipal law number 32,915 of September 30, 1988. It includes
1,410 hectares out of the 1,800 hectares of the Abate APA.
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During development of the APA management plan, Conder discussed its outline with
several NGOs and community organizations. These groups provided much support,
especially those representing upper-middle-class people who live near the protected area.
These groups had denounced several environmental crimes. Developers and land speculators
with major interests in the area had mounted the only resistance to the project.
But Still Conflicts ...
There had been tremendous public effort in the last 20 years to protect and restore one
of the most fascinating places in Bahia. Local groups were supportive of the APA guidelines
and helped enforcement. However, much coordination between the state and municipal
public spheres was necessary. Despite threats from developers, public agencies had not acted
together.
For example, in September of 1997, Pedra do Sal neighborhood association
denounced irregularities in a development that had occurred in an area included in Abaete
APA. The developer, MRM, held a municipal building permit, yet was breaking several APA
guidelines and had no building authorization from the APA administrator, Conder. With the
support of public environmental prosecutors, the neighborhood association went to court to
stop the project, suing both the developers and the municipal government. The municipal
planning agency, which authorized the project, argued that the development adhered to
municipal law. However, public prosecutors argued that the development did not follow APA
guidelines, and that the municipal agency could not authorize the project without consulting
Conder (Ministerio Publico Federal, 1997).
The developers changed their strategy and tried to use their connections to gain
political support (one of the developers is a relative of a state representative). In January
1998, some members of the municipal council tried to change the zoning rules to allow the
development. However, community groups, with the support of some representatives,
mounted a public protest and stopped the change. In 1999, the project was halted, but a court
decision is still pending.10 5
6.3.5) Mangue Seco APA
History
Established 200 years ago to support trade boats, Mangue Seco remained a small
fishing village in the northern most point of Bahia's coast until 1988. The village's only
means of access was still a boat from the neighboring Sergipe state. Then came an event that
changed the fate of Mangue Seco: the largest Brazilian television channel (Globo) chose the
area to film its new soap opera based on a novel (called Tieta) written by one of Brazil's most
famous writer, Jorge Amado.
1"5 According to the district attorney in charge of the case.
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With the soap opera's success, tourists started pouring into the region to see the
beautiful scenes they experienced on TV. Rapidly, small guesthouses, restaurants, and other
tourism related businesses were opened. Many outsiders bought properties in the village to
start their own businesses or to use them as second homes. 106 Signs of environmental
degradation began to appear. Buggies for rent went everywhere in the dunes, modifying their
natural shapes and movement. Houses were built on fragile ecosystems such as mangroves or
dunes. An old problem related to overgrazing of dune vegetation - the advance of the dunes
toward the village - became critical.
Since the 1980s, a group of friends, mostly environmental specialists, was among the
few visitors to Mangue Seco. They did not come only for pleasure but also to find out more
about the environmental and social aspects of the region. Over the years, they created
personal ties with local inhabitants.
In 1986, locals and some of those specialists formed a group called "Friends of
Mangue Seco," whose objectives were to preserve the cultural and environmental assets in the
area and establish a conservation unit (CRA - Centro de Recursos Ambientais, 1994). They
created a study group and submitted a research project to the state environmental agency
(CRA) called "Combro Project." CRA gave initial support to this project, establishing a
group to perform the research. Several field research trips and meetings were organized in
Mangue Seco on subjects ranging from environmental education, to studies of local fauna and
flora, to environmental law enforcement. In the beginning, the project produced positive
results. Some research was even presented in regional and national conferences. However,
with the restructuring of the environmental agency, the project lacked funds, and the initial
group was dispersed before finalizing the research.
In 1989, after the success of the soap opera, more tourists started to come, generating
more impacts on the environment. Members of the local community and environmentalists
(including some who had participated in the Combro Project) launched a campaign to
preserve Mangue Seco. They organized several meetings and field visits and published
material (brochures and posters). Environmentalists raised the issue in the state
environmental council (CEPRAM).
In 1990, CEPRAM approved plans to study the preservation of Mangue Seco and
suggested the creation of two conservation units: an APA and a biological reserve. Funds for
establishing these units were requested from the federal government through the National
Fund for the Environment (FNMA), but they were denied. However, in the same year, CRA
proposed to CEPRAM the creation of the Mangue Seco APA based on Combro Project.
Approved by CEPRAM, Mangue Seco APA was created by a governor's decree in November
1991. In 1992, the CRA requested funds from the state treasury to finish the Combro Project
field studies. At the same time, it created a research agreement for geological and physical
studies in the APA with the Company for Researching Mineral Resources (CPRM), under the
Federal Ministry of Mines and Energy. At the end of 1993, CRA finished the studies for the
" A survey showed 31 out of 63 houses were second houses in one community (Centro de Recursos
Ambientais, 1994, p. 44).
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management plan of the Mangue Seco APA and submitted it to CEPRAM shortly after. In
1994 this management plan became the second approved by the council.
Mangue Seco was the only APA to have the same government organization in charge
of all responsibilities throughout the process of creation and implementation. Since the
beginning, CRA developed, administered, and coordinated the management plan and enforced
the environmental guidelines. The project challenged CRA in many ways.
First, the APA was the first to develop a management plan; CRA had no model to
follow. The agency had to start from scratch. Though other agencies were developing plans
at the same time, such as Conder, which was working on Northern Coast APA, they had
experience in land-use planning and the help from consultants. Second, CRA had limited
resources to hire outside consultants, so most of the work was done by its own employees.
Unlike the other two agencies, which hired outside consultants, CRA could not count on the
expertise and experience of consultants. The only outside help came from the group that
started the movement to create the APA (Friends of Mangue Seco), and from the Company
for Researching Mineral Resources (CPRM). However, with this project, CRA officials
demonstrated that they had the technical capability to develop a APA management plan,
thereby bringing more APAs under CRA control.
Getting Locals to Support the APA
Local communities were supportive of environmental initiatives in Mangue Seco.
One of the reasons was that environmental degradation had caused various problems in the
region over time. Dunes have invaded a large part of the village because cattle has removed
much of the dune vegetation, which restrains dune movement. The river had advanced
toward some areas in the village because of sedimentation caused by deforestation upstream.
These problems forced many locals to move to other villages or build houses in other plots.
Specialists estimate that 60 percent of the village area was lost owing to the advance of the
river and dunes in the last 50 years (CRA - Centro de Recursos Ambientais, 1994).
In 1987, specialists who were members of Friends of Mangue Seco started to tackle
these two problems, explaining to the population that they were caused by environmental
degradation. Together with the local population, the specialists, and later CRA officials,
planted vegetation to restrain dune movement and worked with cattle owners to keep the
animals out of the dunes. When tourism boomed after 1989 and buggies overran the dunes,
destroying planted vegetation and moving the sand even faster, CRA officials and locals
worked with buggy owners to build a buggy route through the dunes. These two initiatives
stimulated locals to support environmental preservation by enforcing the cattle and buggy
rules and calling CRA when they needed help. Besides pursuing these initiatives, locals have
denounced other environmental crimes, such as deforestation and overfishing. Locals have
also worked together to maintain the original urban landscape. In the mid-1990s, they
opposed paving some areas of the village to keep the original sandy floor.
In the mid-1990s, two other organizations became involved in managing Mangue
Seco: Conder and the Brazilian State Oil Company (Petrobras). Since Mangue Seco was part
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of the Northern Coast APA, its administrator, Conder, provided some institutional assistance.
For example, Conder had worked on solid waste collection and disposal in Mangue Seco
communities. Petrobras became involved after an oil spill from one of its ships in August
1997 (A Tarde, 1997), which drifted onto the beaches of Mangue Seco, causing protests and
outrage from environmentalists. Petrobras was fined and had to clean up the pollution. After
that, Petrobras has offered to finance a program to maintain beaches in Mangue Seco,
providing employees and equipment for cleaning. Petrobras had also funded courses in
tourism management and environmental education for local communities, organized by the
municipality (A Tarde, 1998b).
Summing Up
The isolation of Mangue Seco makes it essential that private actors, the local
government, and communities enforce environmental guidelines. CRA officials from
Salvador take more than five hours to arrive in the area, so they come infrequently. Even
officials from the municipal government headquarters in Jadaira take more than two hours to
reach Mangue Seco.
Although CRA officials devoted much effort to enforcing APA guidelines, and the
community was well-disposed to work with them, there was still a missing link in the
management process. The Jandaira municipal government, where Mangue Seco is located,
had not made much effort to help enforce environmental rules. A previous government
(1992-1996) had financial problems and was embedded in corruption.10 7 The following
government was recovering from this financial heritage and trying to build up its institutional
capacity. There was a new municipal secretary for tourism and environment who was
devoting much effort to working with CRA in Mangue Seco. However, he did not have the
resources to implement extensive projects. He tried to be a bridge to request projects for the
community, or to contact CRA in case of environmental problems.
6.3.6) Tinhare-Boipeba APA
History
Tinhare and Boipeba are two islands located in the municipality of Cairu. Before the
1980s, these islands were occupied by fishing villages and coconut plantations. The only way
to gain access to them is by boat, and there are no roads or regular vehicles on the islands.
This isolation has kept many important ecosystems such as mangroves and Atlantic forest
almost untouched by human action.
Starting in 1980s, however, tourism grew steadily in the region, especially around the
town of Morro de Sao Paulo on Tinhare Island. Tourists were attracted by the area's
tranquility and its beautiful beaches surrounded by a green landscape. With the increasing
number of tourists, the town started growing to accommodate the demand for lodging, and to
107 The mayor was involved in a series of embezzlement crimes and is accused of murdering a public prosecutor.
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house the growing number of migrant workers. Like other small municipalities in Bahia, the
local government had no institutional structure to control land use or prevent environmental
degradation. Soon environmental problems appeared, such as soil erosion due to
deforestation and littering due to inadequate solid waste management.
The growing number of environmental problems brought officials from the state
environmental agency (CRA) to the region several times. To try to control the problems, they
suggested creating an APA after getting the approval of the municipal government. CRA had
confronted a similar situation in Mangue Seco APA, where growing tourism had also
threatened the preservation of important ecosystems. CRA officials thought that they could
develop a management plan much as they had in Mangue Seco, working with few resources
and using CRA's own staff for the studies. Thus, the perimeter for the APA was determined
and the governor issued the creation decree in June 1992.
At that time, CRA was involved in developing the management plan for Mangue Seco
and Guaibim APAs. CRA's priority was to finish those plans and have them approved by the
state environmental council (CEPRAM). Other state agencies, such as Conder and Sectur,
were also creating APAs, and CRA needed to demonstrate that it could manage an APA
efficiently and play an important role in creating future APAs. The completion of the
management plan for Mangue Seco APA gave CRA the opportunity to start working on
Tinhare-Boipeba APA.
However, the latter proved to be much more complex regarding the development of
studies and surveys. It had an area more than twelve times larger than Mangue Seco APA,
and a larger and more scattered population (CRA, 1996; Conder, 1998). Faced with these
difficulties, CRA contacted Conder requesting support in performing the studies for the
management plan. Conder had acquired extensive experience developing management plans
for large areas while working on the Northern Coast APA. Conder began coordinating efforts
to elaborate the management plan for Tinhare-Boipeba. It assigned a group of employees to
work on the plan, many of whom had worked on the Northern Coast APA management plan,
and filled out the group with staff from CRA. Conder requested funds from the state treasury
and started developing the plan, which was completed in the beginning of 1998 and submitted
to CEPRAM for approval in June 1998. Thus, Conder's experience in working on a large
APA was complemented by CRA's experience working on an APA without much outside
consulting.
Once the management plan was approved, CRA was supposed to enforce the APA
guidelines, by investigating denouncements, making periodic visits, elaborating plans for
environmental restoration, and screening development projects. However, this supervision
did not occur. Instead, both agencies, CRA and Conder, tried to work on enforcing APA
guidelines without much coordination. Conder had received some denouncements, but it has
no power to penalize infractions. Although developers and the municipal government had
sent to Conder development projects to be screened, the agency had no power to do that
alone. Both activities should be performed by CRA, which was still the APA administrator.
However, because of Conder's early involvement in the management plan, it was able
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become the link between the state and local actors. CRA had recently made efforts to assume
the enforcement task and made stronger links with local people.
Local Support for Enforcing APA guidelines
The municipal government changed its involvement in providing institutional support
for the APA administrator during the process of APA establishment. In the beginning, local
politicians saw the APA as a means of getting the state to fund some services and
infrastructure projects, such as better roads, equipment for solid waste management, and
tourism promotion. However, as the years passed and state agencies did not do much in the
APA, the municipality started to take a more active role in enforcing APA guidelines. In
1997, the municipal secretariat of agriculture was expanded to include tourism and
environmental matters. The mayor of Cairu appointed an active municipal official to head
this secretariat. A native of the region who had pursued a degree in agronomy and worked in
organic agriculture, he studied the APA and its management plan and took several steps to
enforce its guidelines.
A municipal environmental council was created to oversee these actions. This council
was composed of fourteen members: seven from the municipal government and seven from
organized civil society. The municipality had also built the institutional capacity to enforce
APA guidelines and other environmental regulations.
First, it hired one full-time employee to take charge of environmental enforcement. It
also contacted the federal environmental agency (IBAMA) to request training in monitoring
overfishing and illegal dynamite fishing. Municipal officials learned how to restrain these
offenses, such as by screening the size of fishing nets and spotting offenders. After training,
the municipality agreed to assume IBAMA's responsibility for combating fishing offenses at
the local level. Municipal officials also contacted Conder and CRA to request more
information about the Tinhare-Boipeba APA. They learned how to enforce land-use
guidelines and started enforcing the zoning code as soon as it was approved by CEPRAM.
Municipal officials acquired so much information about the zoning rules that they even
questioned some inconsistencies that prevented them from enforcing APA guidelines. For
example, they realized that some land plots divided before 1990 were smaller than the limit
set by APA zoning codes, preventing effective enforcement of subdivision guidelines.
Summing Up
Several important steps were taken to establish the Tinhare-Boipeba APA and enforce
its guidelines. However, several aspects made the enforcement structure incomplete. The
APA management plan was developed long after its creation, so state and local actors lost
some of their enthusiasm for enforcement of environmental guidelines. The APA appeared to
be another law "only on paper."
Nor did the municipal government and locals fully participate in the creation of the
APA and the development of its management plan. Because of this, many APA rules
conflicted with local rules, as in the land subdivision case. What's more, the APA process did
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not entail publicizing environmental rules or engaging locals in enforcement. At the state
level, Conder and CRA did not coordinate their efforts, leading to a certain confusion and
lack of enforcement from the beginning.
Cairu municipality had devoted tremendous effort to enforcing APA guidelines, but it
had not approved them as municipal law. Such approval could legitimize APA rules and
could prevent a future municipal government from changing its attitude toward the
enforcement of APA guidelines.
Local civil society had not been involved significantly in enforcing APA guidelines.
The municipal environmental council was the only means by which civil society could
participate; there was only one environmental NGO in the APA created at the end of 1997.
The development of the management plan did not stimulate environmental consciousness
because of its delay and its lack of local participation.
6.3.7) Northern Coast APA
History
The Northern Coast APA was created as a tool for mitigating the environmental
impacts of the 142-kilometer Green Line road from Salvador to Bahia's northern border with
Sergipe state. The road project was planned in the 1970s but was not implemented until the
1990s. In 1990, as the state tried to stimulate tourism development through public investment
in infrastructure projects, the plan to build the Green Line road came into view again, and this
time was implemented (see Section 5.2 on the Green Line road in Chapter 5).
After almost one year of discussions, the course of the road was defined. The idea of
creating an APA to mitigate its impacts then appeared. This road would follow the coast at
various distances from the sea. APA limits would be the Atlantic Ocean and a border running
ten kilometers from the sea, from the beginning of the road to the state's northern limit.
The APA idea arose from formal and informal conversations among high-level state
officials during discussions of the Green Line road at the end of 1991 and the beginning of
1992. There were several debates about the best way to control the expected massive
development that would follow road construction. Instead of trying to concentrate their
efforts on environmental impact assessment, state officials focused on the important
environmental resources located along the road, and how the state could protect them without
spending a lot of resources on land expropriation.
At the same time, CRA was analyzing a tourism development project in Guaibim, a
project that resulted in the creation of the Guaibim APA. There, a developer offered to
protect the most important ecosystems on his property in order to build in other parts. CRA
had also established the Mangue Seco APA around the end of 1991, which is also influenced
by the Green Line road. But no APA had yet been implemented or had management plans;
no one had a clear idea of exactly what the APA meant.
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Despite these drawbacks, the creation of an APA as the magic solution for controlling
environmental impacts appeared in discussions of the Green Line road. First, the notion of an
APA combined the idea of protecting the environment with allowing development. This was
exactly what officials of the state tourism development agency had in mind as a tool for low-
density tourism. Second, there was no need to expropriate land, thus avoiding conflicts with
local governments and landowners. At the end of the discussions, state officials decided that
an APA would be the solution for environmental protection. After it became public, this
decision was supported even by opposition members in the state senate, and by some
environmentalists (Diirio Oficial, 1992). Thus, the governor issued a decree creating the
Northern Coast APA in March 1992.
High-level state officials decided to put the state urban development agency (Conder)
in charge of coordinating development of the APA management plan. Conder had experience
in planning infrastructure projects and the staff necessary for starting working on the plan.
Also, agency officials thought that the road would affect the expansion of Salvador
metropolitan area, and that urban planners would thus be needed to work on that, rather than
the more conservation-oriented staff of the state environmental agency (CRA).
Conder put together a team to work on the project consisting of its own employees,
national consultants, and a team from the U.K. Overseas Development Agency (ODA).
Conder established a strict schedule for completing the management plan before road
construction ended. In the same day the APA was created, the state opened the bidding
process for road construction. The road would be ready in approximately two years.
The Difficult Task of Getting Local Support in a Huge APA
The task of developing the management plan involved several complex factors. The
area was enormous - totaling 142,000 hectares (until 1999, it was the largest APA with a
management plan). The APA included parts of five municipalities108 and approximately
25,000 inhabitants (Mendonga, 1997). This population was mostly rural or scattered through
many small urban nuclei or villages, many very difficult to reach. The APA contained large
areas with important ecosystems such as dunes, lagoons, and mangroves. Many of these
ecosystems would be under extreme development pressure since most development would
take place close to beaches.
Conder had to work with all five municipal governments and local populations to
publicize the APA and collect data and input for elaborating the management plan. Some
municipalities were sympathetic to the APA idea, but not all. Some municipal governments
saw the APA as state interference in local matters, while others perceived it as an opportunity
to receive something from the state. Conder organized several hearings in different locations
and in the municipal capital towns. Although some meetings had a significant turnout and
attracted the support of municipal governments, locals had very limited input in defining the
management plan. The most interested parties were landowners and developers, who had
l08 The municipalities and the percentage of their areas included in the APA were the following: Mata de Sao
Joao (17.5 1%), Entre Rios (18.21%), Esplanada (13.98%), Conde (31.75%) and Jandaira (18.55%). Source:
Mendonga, 1997.
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acquired large plots of land in the region and expected to sell their land to tourism
investors. 109
Conder did all the fieldwork in little more than one year, finishing the first draft of the
management plan in mid-1993. This was submitted for approval by the state environmental
council (CEPRAM). After long discussions, CEPRAM approved the plan in early 1995.
The enforcement of the APA guidelines had been problematic. Because Conder or
CRA did not have local offices in the region, Conder planned to train local actors in
enforcement to complement state institutional capacity both quantitatively and qualitatively,
as local governments had more knowledge of local conditions. Some municipal governments
were receptive to this idea and gave much political support to Conder and to the APA. For
example, the municipalities of Esplanada and Conde approved the APA guidelines as
municipal law, even before CEPRAM had approved them.
However, local governments had very weak institutional capacity for enforcing APA
guidelines and very limited financial resources. None of the municipal governments had
anyone with a college degree or a qualified technician who could work on enforcing land-use
rules at the local level. Besides this, four of the five municipalities had their municipal capital
outside the APA and had difficult road access to the APA area. 10 None had any means for
buying equipment to perform field visits."'
Political support from municipal governments also differed among the municipalities
and varied over time, with changes in the governments. For example, in the municipality of
Entre Rios, the local government was very reluctant to cooperate with Conder in the
beginning, but since elections in 1996 the new government had been more supportive. In
Esplanada municipality, in contrast, the previous government was much more sympathetic to
the APA than the current government.112
Some municipal governments completely ignored APA guidelines by issuing
construction permits that violated zoning codes and avoided screening by Conder. In two
cases, the own municipal government undertook public works in the APA area without
consulting Conder (Mendonga, 1997). Because of this unsteady municipal institutional
support, Conder basically had to work alone in enforcing APA guidelines, even though it did
not have enough staff for this task. Moreover, Conder had to rely on CRA for most of the
field inspections, since CRA was the only agency that could legally enforce environmental
guidelines. Thus, field inspections depended on the availability of CRA officials. Conder
could not complement its institutional capacity with much municipal support because
municipalities did not help much in informing the agency of field conditions.
109 According to interviews with local officials and population in the region.
110 The state had plans to improve the access from the municipal capitals to the Green Line road, once it finished
the construction works in the latter.
"' Information obtained from the conversations with Conder officials.
112 Information obtained from interviews with Conder and municipal officials.
114
Support from local civil society was also very limited. First, the region had few
organized environmental groups. The only two environmental NGOs in the region were in
the southern limit of the APA and focused on very specific projects.1 13 Second, the
population was sparse and lacked education, which made it difficult to spread information and
environmental education. In some villages, the illiteracy rate was over 60 percent, according
to a recent survey (Mattedi, 1999). As a result, many locals were unaware that they were
living in a protected area or did not know the meaning of an APA, even many years after
creation of Northern Coast APA and all Conder's efforts to publicize it (Mendonga, 1997).
Conder received few complaints about environmental offenses, and those stemmed from
individual initiatives.
6.4) Analysis of the Results
The state created several environmentally protected areas (APAs) and expected to
count on local institutional support to execute the APA guidelines. Thus, the state would not
have to dramatically increase its institutional capacity for enforcement once the management
plans were approved by the state environmental council (CEPRAM). However, local actors
had rarely assumed complete enforcement responsibilities, as state authorities initially
intended. Not all municipal governments, communities, and NGOs had fully engaged in
working on APAs. Table 6.4 presents the qualitative evaluation of local engagement in
enforcement for all seven APAs, based on field research described in this chapter.
Table 6.4 - Characteristics of the seven APAs studied.
Objective of Number of Timing of Approval of Level of Level of
APA First Area APA creation Municipalities involvement APA by local involvement involvement
Name of local of
Administrator within the APA local actors legislature governments local actors
Guaibim CRA small Tourism project I Early yes high high
(discussions on
limits)
Mangue CRA small Ecosystem I Early no medium high
Seco protection against (discussions on
incipient tourism limits)
Northern CONDER big Control impacts of 5 Medium (after 2 out of 5 low-medium low
Coast a road defined limits)
Tinhare CRA/ big Ecosystem I Medium (after no high medium
CONDER protection against defined 
limits)
incipient tourism
Itacare Sectur big Control impacts of 2 Medium (after yes medium medium
a road defined limits)
Santo Sectur big Control impacts of 2 Medium (after I out of 2 low-medium medium
Antonio a road defined limits)
Abaete Conder small Ecosystem I Late (after no low high
protection against established)
urban
development
"1 These NGOs were Tamar Project, a national
that has its own private reserve.
NGO that protects marine turtles, and Fundacao Garcia D'Avila
115
There are several factors that explain the lack of local political and institutional
support for the enforcement of APA guidelines. First, many municipalities may not be
pleased with the idea of having the state introduce environmental zoning systems that were
not completely compatible with local politicians' intentions. To get municipal support, state
agencies tried to involve local actors in developing management plans, but in most of cases
local inputs were limited or largely ignored by state authorities.
Second, environmental concerns may not be a priority on many local political
agendas. Some governments may have competing political priorities, and the benefits that
APAs may bring did not attract political and institutional support for their enforcement.
Third, local governments and non-governmental groups often lacked the institutional capacity
to assume these responsibilities, including qualified personnel, even though state agencies
provided training to some municipalities.
Moreover, these factors can be affected significantly by local elections. For example,
much of the training capacity can be lost when municipal governments turnover after
elections. In addition, local political attitudes toward APAs, which restrict development and
allow state interference in local land use, can shift radically from one administration to the
next. A new municipal political administration can become more sympathetic to the APA
idea than the previous administration, and vice-versa. Thus the priority level of
environmental/APA matters on the local political agenda can shift substantially over time.
But what are the main factors that seem to influence engagement of local actors in the
enforcement of APA guidelines? Based on the analysis of the seven case studies, three
factors seem to be important: the objectives underlying APA establishment, the number of
municipalities involved in the APA, and locals' early participation in and benefits from
APAs.
6.4.1) The Objectives of APA Creation Influence Local Participation in Enforcement
There are two basic types of APAs in Bahia. The first type includes APAs that were
created to preserve important ecosystems threatened by different kinds of development, such
as urban expansion and tourism. These APAs subject most of their area to strict conservation
guidelines. APAs were used instead of parks because there is no need to expropriate private
property when an APA is created. Examples of this kind of APA are Mangue Seco, Abaete
and Tinhare APAs.
The second type corresponds to APAs that were created to mitigate the impacts of
specific infrastructure projects in underdeveloped areas with fragile ecosystems, such as
Northern Coast, Santo Antonio, Guaibim, and Itacare APAs. These projects could trigger a
high demand for development; thus APAs were tools that the state used to avoid uncontrolled
development, such as chaotic land subdivision and destruction of important ecosystems.
These APAs were planned to allow mostly low-density/low-impact development, such as
certain tourism resorts.
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APAs of the first type tend to have a higher level of local involvement than the second
type (see Table 6.4). In all three APAs of the former type, either municipal government or
local inhabitants were highly involved in implementing APA guidelines. This involvement
was a response to the increasing development pressures in the areas. In Mangue Seco,
tourism activities were booming after the region became the setting of a popular television
soap-opera, and this boom was worsening the problem of dune advancement. Locals were
afraid that this problem would threaten the village.
Tourism was also booming in Tinhare APA. An active new public official used the
APA to try to cope with chaotic land-use patterns. In Abaete, local neighborhood
associations organized themselves to try to impede an apparently illegal new development in
the APA. Uncontrolled development was putting the local environment at risk, and the
creation of APAs underscored the concerns of local inhabitants and governments. With
APAs, locals could make legitimate appeals to public institutions and media concerning
actual violations; this is different from APA creation in the case of road construction, which
poses only potential threats of uncontrolled development.
Compared with those of the first type, APAs of the second type developed their
management plans and gained approval from CEPRAM much more quickly. The average
time between the creation decree and the approval in CEPRAM was 24.8 months for APAs of
the second type, but was 78.36 months for the first type (see Table 6.3). In all second-type
APAs, development plans were about to be implemented.
For example, Guaibim APA guidelines were necessary to approve a private tourism
project of great local importance. In the other second-type APAs, a public development
project financed by external sources needed the APA to control the impact of future
development. Agencies tended to prioritize these APAs to gain approval for projects from
financial institutions (Bank of the Northeast and IDB). For instance, the Santo Antonio APA
was created by Sectur after it had created many other APAs, but the former was the first to
gain approval for its management plan from CEPRAM - a step needed to please donors who
were financing the paving of the Cabralia-Belmonte road within the APA. However, the
second type APAs had not mustered much local support for enforcement generally.
6.4.2) The Number of Municipalities Involved in an APA May Matter
Locals were likely to be more involved in enforcing APAs located in only one
municipality. In all four APAs in this situation (Guaibim, Mangue Seco, Tinhare, and
Abaete), either the local government or local inhabitants presented a high level of
involvement in APA implementation (see Table 6.4).
First, the inclusion of only one municipality made the work of state agencies simpler
regarding publicizing, training, and gaining local support through meetings and site visits.
Agencies could focus their limited institutional resources on only that municipality, instead of
dividing their attention between two or more. In APAs involving more than one municipality,
the interaction among local governments was scarce or non-existent, making coordinated
action difficult.
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Second, local groups are small and usually act only in their own community or
municipality. For instance, the inhabitants of the local village of Mangue Seco APA, the
neighborhood association in Abaete APA, and the small business association of Guaibim
APA were actively involved in APA affairs, but in their municipality only.
Third, municipalities tend to get more involved in matters that are completely under
their control. If an APA extends into more than one municipality, municipalities may not
regard it as part of their affairs. For example, the municipality of Jandaira has advertised how
it helps to protect the environment of Mangue Seco APA through pamphlets and booklets, but
this municipality has not done the same for its Northern Coast APA, which encompasses
other four municipalities.
Finally, many municipalities connected by an APA may have very little previous
contact with each other, either because of their physical isolation or a lack of common interest
in working together. For example, the five municipalities in the Northern Coast APA were
isolated from each other before the road construction and had never worked together on any
other issue. The creation of the APA brought them together for the first time. In some cases,
various municipalities working together developed rivalries. In the same Northern APA,
politicians in one municipality were upset with Conder - the state agency in charge of the
APA - because it chose the neighboring municipality as a local base for launching field visits
in the whole APA.
6.4.3) Participating Early in the Process and Benefiting from an APA
The engagement of municipal governments and civil society in enforcing APA
guidelines varied with each APA case. The action of local inhabitants in overseeing and
denouncing local environmental degradation is fundamental to implementing APA guidelines.
State governments, and sometimes municipal governments, are too far away and have limited
institutional resources. Moreover, environmentalism is almost non-existent in most APAs,
which are generally located in remote areas where education and information are scarce. In
addition, local inhabitants are themselves often responsible for violating environmental
guidelines, because of a lack of information or a lack of incentives to conserve environmental
resources.
In the two cases where local non-governmental actors were highly supportive of
enforcing APA guidelines, local inhabitants not only were informed about APA rules but also
benefited from government intervention. In these cases, local involvement was possible
because the APAs covered relatively small areas and relatively few properties. Government
officials were able to interact directly with the main actors.
In Mangue Seco APA, the main local village suffered from the advance of dunes
toward the village, which could eventually cover the whole village with sand. The creation of
the APA brought specialists from the state environmental agency (CRA) to help. They were
able to stop dune advancement by replanting a local herb to contain sand movement. During
this process, state officials distributed much environmental information among the locals.
This information included the importance of avoiding environmental degradation to maintain
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equilibrium in the dunes. Since then, locals had been attentive to cases of environmental
degradation in the APA and have called CRA when they suspect illegal development.11 4
In Guaibim APA, locals had denounced land invasions next to their properties, which
sometimes involved reclaiming mangrove or dunes. They also confronted an old problem of
coconuts and timber being stolen from their properties. Before, they had to fight by
themselves, which involved personal risks. After the APA was created, locals benefited from
municipal and state support in restraining land invasions and stealing timber and coconuts.
So they could call municipal or state authorities whenever they suspect environmental
offenses.
Guaibim APA presented the most effective structure for environmental management,
according to the evaluation in this research, and attracted the most advanced municipal and
local support. State and municipal legislation endorsed APA guidelines. The state
environmental council (CEPRAM) approved its management plan. The municipal
government had a structure to enforce APA guidelines. The state environmental agency was
rarely activated, except in extreme cases. Also, though an APA management council was not
formally constituted, local actors were informed about and supported APA enforcement.
Moreover, the municipal government cleaned beaches periodically and organizes small
restaurants along the beach in the local village. Local inhabitants supervised and denounced
illegal land occupation and timber exploitation.
Discussion of the tourism resort in Guaibim had opened a channel for negotiation
between state officials, municipal government, and non-governmental actors. The latter
played an important role in defining local zoning for the management plan, facilitating
support for enforcement of APA guidelines. State and municipal governments were also
flexible in permitting previous development, such as shrimp farming, to continue. However,
the undeveloped land under control of the shrimp farms was included in the APA. This
agreement was approved by state and municipal laws.
In sum, several factors explain the enforcement of APA guidelines. The involvement
of local actors is important, as it attracts local support to complement state institutional
capacity. Although APAs created as part of environmental measures for development
projects had more support at the state level for developing and approving their management
plans quickly, they were not usually able to bring much local involvement. Those APAs
established to protect the environment from actual development threats sparked more local
involvement.
The early involvement of local actors legitimated the APA management plan. It also
helped opening a negotiation channel with local actors for spreading information about
environmental guidelines. In addition, local actors benefited from the APA, as the new
guidelines helped curb old problems such as land invasion and illegal collection of timber.
114 Information obtained from interviews with CRA officials.
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Also, instead of simply denying a construction license to developers, state officials
negotiated project changes to ensure compliance with environmental constraints. These
negotiations encouraged developers and local actors to support APA guidelines.
Municipal support for the creation and enforcement of APAs, through municipal laws
and structures, has been vital. In principle, municipalities are responsible for land use.
Municipal institutional support for APA guidelines had been high when APA land-use rules
did not conflict with municipal interests and were legitimated by municipal laws. The
involvement of only one municipality also helps explain the high involvement of local actors,
as it gives the state flexibility to negotiate over development projects.
6.5) Prospects for Improving Enforcement and Monitoring
The state government in Bahia put a lot of effort into improving institutional capacity
at the local level in order to transfer some enforcement responsibilities to municipal
governments and other local actors. As we saw, the results of these efforts varied
substantially. Some municipalities started to play active roles in enforcement, adding to the
scarce local institutional capacity of state actors. In other municipalities, even after
tremendous effort from state agencies in training and publicizing, local actors did little to help
the state enforce APA guidelines.
The three factors mentioned in the previous sections help explain why local actors got
involved in environmental enforcement and added to the state institutional capacity.
However, much more research is needed to understand these local dynamics and engage local
governments and populations in aspects of environmental management in all APAs. The
strategy of state agencies was to devolve power to municipalities while playing a centralizing
role in training, transfer of information, funding, and mediation in more complicated
situations.
State agencies planned to gradually transfer responsibilities to local actors as each
APA management council acquired institutional capacity. However, state agencies had little
idea when municipalities were ready to assume certain responsibilities and how to determine
whether municipalities were performing their new tasks well. Nor did state agencies put in
place any plan to assess whether APAs were accomplishing their goal of protecting the
environment.
The story at the state level offers some ideas on how to devise institutional
mechanisms to monitor and control improvement of institutional capacity at the local level.
From the institutional structure at the state level, two factors played important roles
establishing APAs: a system of institutional incentives, and a central system of checks and
balances to monitor the actions of state agencies.' 15 A similar system could be built at the
local level.
I Although states agencies previewed to establish municipal environmental councils to make decisions
regarding APAs and oversee their implementation, this has never happened effectively. Only a few
municipalities created environmental councils, but by their own initiative, such as the case of Tinhare-Boipeba
APA.
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A system of local incentives to create institutional support for APAs could be
established with state encouragement. This system would constitute a system of checks and
balances to monitor the performance of local actors. For example, state agencies could hire
local institutions to perform some enforcement tasks in APAs, with state funding for
environmental enforcement. These institutions could be municipal governments or agencies,
or certified non-government organizations. The state funding could be used by local
institutions to hire new staff and buy equipment for these new tasks.
For example, state agencies would train municipal agents in using the APA zoning
system to screen projects and in checking environmental offenses. State authorities would
steadily transfer responsibilities as they judge that local agencies are prepared to implement
these new responsibilities. At first not all municipalities would be able to acquire the
institutional capacity to take over environmental tasks in Bahia. The state might have to
enforce APA guidelines for a certain period of time. This could be done by opening local
branches to oversee APAs. However, state agencies could make a continuous effort to
devolve APA enforcement to local institutions as they strengthen their institutional capacity.
After the transfer of responsibilities, state agencies could provide technical assistance
and train local staff when necessary. From this point, state agencies would also monitor local
implementors to check if they were performing the tasks according to the agreement between
state and local agencies. State agencies could require a periodical report from local agencies
on the number of inspections and the number of offenses discovered. State agencies could
perform periodic surveys among the population to check the responsiveness of local agencies
and randomly inspect new developments to oversee the performance of local agencies (see
some indicators in Table A.3). Non-compliance with previous agreements would
compromise the transfer of funding from state agencies to local agencies. In the last instance,
state agencies would withdraw funding and take over the responsibilities from local agencies.
Another form of incentives would be the direct coercion of localities that receive state
investment. State agencies would release funds for municipal projects only if guidelines had
been enforced. In the case of this research, state agencies had the opportunity to exert this
kind of pressure, but it was not used owing to pressure from important local constituencies
and the lack of time to approve and implement development projects.
Moreover, state agencies could transfer state tax revenues to municipalities based on
their surface under state APA. Some state governments in Brazil have already done this.117
The use of part of these resources to fund the enforcement of environmental guidelines by
local institutions could be established.
Finally, state agencies need to periodically evaluate APAs regarding the condition of
their environmental resources and potential new threats to environmental quality. Over time,
116 As it was done in the beginning of 1999 by CRA.
117 This transfer of taxes is called ICMS Verde. States like Parani in southern Brazil transfer part of the ICMS
taxes (an important state taxes on the movement of goods in and out the state) to municipalities with protected
areas. Although the amount transferred is not significant for the state, for many municipalities this amount
added considerably to municipal budget, especially in the sparsely populated ones (Lopes et al., 1995).
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this would serve to determine whether APAs are actually curbing environmental problems.
Monitoring systems would be necessary for each of the APAs to check changes in the
medium and long term based on social, land-use, and environmental indicators that could be a
proxy of change, as Table 6.5 suggests. Monitoring systems could be used to redefine land-
use rules in the APAs at regular intervals (such as every five years).
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Table 6.5 - APAs' indicators of the effectiveness in environmental management
Kind of Indicators Possible Sources
Indicators of APA
Effectiveness
existent area of important Surveys, state and municipal government
ecosystems in the municipalities documents, documents from non-
covered by APAs governmental organizations, remote sensing
information, secondary research and site visit
existent area developed by any kind Surveys, state and municipal government
of human activity in the documents, documents from non-
municipalities covered by APAs governmental organizations, remote sensing
information and site visit
Baseline existent area accessible for tourists Surveys, state and municipal government
Indicators in the municipalities covered by documents, documents from non-APAs governmental organizations, remote sensing
information and site visit
area of important ecosystem Surveys, state and municipal government
completely preserved in the documents, documents from non-
municipalities covered by APAs governmental organizations, remote sensing
information, secondary research and site visit
existent number of species Surveys, state and municipal government
endangered quoted by specialists in documents, documents from non-
the municipalities covered by APAs governmental organizations, remote sensing
information, secondary research and site visit
incidence of water born diseases in Surveys, state and municipal government
the municipalities covered by APAs documents and hospital inquires
number of households/businesses Surveys, census data and state and municipal
with safe water in the government documents
municipalities covered by APAs
number of households/businesses Surveys, census data and state and municipal
with sewage treatment in the government documents
municipalities covered by APAs
water quality indicators (beach, Surveys, state and municipal government
streams and ponds) documents, and information from non-
governmental organizations
population change in the census data, and state and municipal
Stress Indicators municipalities covered by APAs government documents
number of tourists per year and Surveys, state and municipal government
during the peak in the documents and private sector statistics
municipalities covered by APAs
ratio of tourists per residents in the Surveys, state and municipal government
municipalities covered by the APAs documents and private sector statistics
number of lodging facilities in the Surveys, census data, state and municipal
municipalities covered by APAs government documents and private sector
statistics
number of lodging beds in the Surveys, census data, state and municipal
municipalities covered by APAs government documents and private sector
statistics
number of Jobs in tourism in the Surveys, census data, state and municipal
municipalities covered by APAs government documents and private sector
statistics
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CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
7.1) Summary
This research has attempted to understand policy implementation in developing
countries using the case of the creation of environmentally protected areas (APAs) in the State
of Bahia, Brazil. An analytical framework was developed based on the four main obstacles to
establishing protected areas identified in practice by the literature: lack of political support,
lack of funding, lack of institutional capacity, and resistance of local actors.
My study was comprised of two stories. One focused on implementation of policy at
the state level, and the other analyzed seven case studies at the local level. At the state level,
the involvement of several state agencies in APA administration helped overcome the four
obstacles described in the analytical framework. Thus, the state government was able to
establish several protected areas in a period of approximately a decade. At the local level, a
similar analytical framework was used to understand under what conditions local actors
tended to provide institutional support to the implementation of APA guidelines.
Tourism projects triggered the involvement of key state agencies in the creation and
administration of protected areas in Bahia. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Green Line
road and the state tourism program reinforced the state's commitment to tourism as a priority
in its economic development strategy. With ecotourism in vogue, and pressures from local
and external actors, state authorities created several protected areas in places already affected
by tourism and in regions with tourist potential.
The state environmental agency (CRA), which might have been viewed as the natural
administrator of protected areas, had little institutional capacity or experience with them.
Thus, development-oriented agencies - the Company for the Development of the
Metropolitan Region (Conder) and the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur) -
had a "window of opportunity" to step in and establish protected areas on their own. Since
protected areas offered the environmental safeguards required for some tourism projects,
agencies created APAs as a way to control decisions concerning these projects. In so doing
they hoped to minimize unexpected delays caused by environmental concerns and the
bureaucratic procedures of other agencies. Protected areas also offered a chance to grab some
political turf, since with more projects in their portfolio, agencies had the leverage to acquire
additional financial and institutional resources.
My research identified the four main obstacles to implementation of protected-area
policy, all overcome in the Bahia case. As the story at the state level in Chapter 5 explains,
the decentralization of APA policy among several agencies - especially CRA, Conder, and
Sectur - generated institutional, financial, and political support for implementing this policy,
for several reasons. First, because public agencies depended on each other for approval of
both APAs and development projects, they could minimize opposition and foster mutual
support at the state level for the establishment of APAs. As a result, the number of APAs
created during the 1990s was significant.
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Second, the involvement of development agencies, which generally had more funds
available for projects, injected considerable state financing into implementation of APAs.
The amount of funding contributed by development agencies to protected areas was
considerably higher than the total the state had previously invested in environmental
protection. If APAs had been concentrated in the state environmental agency (CRA) from the
beginning, that agency would have been unlikely to raise enough funding and develop the
institutional capacity to implement all the APAs.
Third, state agencies had to increase their institutional capacity rapidly to handle the
new task of administering APAs and obtain approval for them from the state environmental
council (CEPRAM). The fact that CEPRAM had to approve development projects eased the
resistance of environmentalists to allowing such projects in protected areas. The approval
process certified development agencies' ability to work with APAs and gave them leverage in
establishing more APAs. This process generated competition among agencies for improving
their institutional capacity to bid for more APAs.
Fourth, the expectation of potential benefits from tourism and public projects
associated with APAs eased the resistance of local actors to establishing protected areas. It is
doubtful that CRA acting alone, promoting such areas solely on the need to protect the
environment, would have convinced local governments and landowners to give up some of
their development rights.
The story at the local level presented in Chapter 6, drawn from the seven case studies,
shows the difficulties and achievements of local implementation of APAs. The state planned
to withdraw to a supervisory role when municipalities and other local actors, such as NGOs
and the local population, had acquired enough institutional capacity to ensure APA
enforcement and had established APA management councils. Local actors were expected to
provide political, financial, and institutional support to APAs. However, the state expectation
that local actors would match the state's institutional capacity for enforcing APA guidelines
was not fulfilled. Few municipal governments had extra funding or qualified personnel for
enforcing APAs, and the local population and NGOs (when they existed) could provide only
limited assistance. Although state agencies did create some institutional capacity at the local
level by providing training and information, the state's expectation that a significant increase
in state institutional capacity at the local level was unnecessary was proved wrong in most of
the cases.
Local results in implementing APAs and enforcing protected-area guidelines were
mixed owing to the diversity of local conditions. Moreover, various APAs had existed for
different lengths of time, and it may be too early to thoroughly evaluate the results in some
cases. Nevertheless, this study allows us to draw some lessons for implementing
environmental policy at the local level. In general, the seven cases showed that the
involvement of development agencies, and the local expectation of economic benefits from
tourism, were important factors in preventing local resistance regarding establishment of
APAs.
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Under these conditions, the seven cases also suggest factors that explain why and how
some APAs received more local political, financial, and institutional support for enforcement.
First, the motive in creating APAs was important in determining local support. This research
identified two types of APAs: those created as environmental safeguards to public
infrastructure projects, and those created to curb environmental problems caused by tourism
or urban development. Although management plans for the former were approved in a timely
manner, they could not muster as much local support for enforcement as the latter.
Second, APAs contained within a single municipality seem to receive more local
support than APAs involving various municipalities. The state agency's interactions were
simpler when it dealt with only one municipality than when it dealt with several, and agencies
could concentrate their efforts and resources on one target. Third, the involvement of local
actors in the early stages of the enforcement process facilitated local support. Besides
opening a negotiation channel with local actors and disseminating information about
environmental guidelines, early involvement legitimated APA management plans and
fostered local support for enforcing APA guidelines.
7.2) Lessons for the Classical Implementation Literature
This study was influenced by, and could be included in, some of the classical
implementation literature described in Chapter 2. As in the third generation of the
implementation literature classified by Goggin et al. (1990), this research identified the key
factors that were important in explaining implementation of APA policy in the State of Bahia.
These factors were then combined to create an analytical framework that was used to
understand the cases of policy implementation. Also in this research, as in some of the latest
literature on developing countries, implementation analyses were based on cases where policy
implementation actually was carried out with relative success.
The analytical framework developed in this research is primarily relevant to
developing countries. I identified four constraints to the implementation of environmental
policies: lack of political support at the central level, lack of financial resources, lack of
institutional capacity, and resistance at the local level. Although these constraints could exist
in any context, they express themselves differently in developed countries.
For example, lack of institutional capacity is a crucial constraint on policy
implementation in many developing countries, especially with regard to equipment and
human resources. This problem is less relevant in more developed countries, which tend to
have stronger institutional capacity. The same is true for financial resources. Although some
environmental policies in developed countries are restrained by lack of financial resources,
funding is more problematic in poor countries.
The nature of political support for environmental policies also has different dynamics
in diverse contexts. In developed countries, political deadlocks can occur when lobbyists try
to block implementation of environmental policy. Opposing pro- and anti-environmental
forces often battle. In developing countries, political problems result from a lack of
environmental policies on the political agenda at all. Thus, the framework for this research
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can be used to identify constraints on policy implementation, but it must be adapted to a
specific context, such as international environmental policies, or local environmental policies
in developed countries.
This research can also contribute to the debate between top-down and bottom-up
approaches to implementing policy. Reflecting the trend of recent debates, the evidence in
this research supports the claim that implementation requires components of both approaches
(Najam, 1995). In Bahia, for example APA policy had a strong top-down component early
on, when state agencies played a key role in promoting the establishment of APAs. At the
same time, bottom-up actions also influenced policy implementation, especially at the local
level, even in the beginning. For instance, the idea of creating APAs at the state level to
mitigate the impact of development projects began with discussions at the local level, when a
development project in Guaibim resulted in the idea of the creation of the Guaibim APA. In
another case, in the Tinhare-Boipeba APA, the local government pursued the enforcement of
APA guidelines on its own initiative and without much interference from state agencies. As
these two examples in Bahia show, many policies that start as or look like straight top-down
implementation are actually a combination of both approaches.
7.3) The Dual Mandate of Government: Development versus Environmental Protection
The role of the public sector in disciplining development has been essential. On the
one hand, governments must react to private demands for investment in infrastructure and
public utilities, because in many countries, including Brazil, provision of at least some
utilities is assigned to the governmental sphere. These utilities include roads, airports, water
treatment plants, sanitation, electricity, and telecommunication projects. In Bahia, various
state and municipal development agencies were pursuing a series of infrastructure projects to
foster tourism development on the coast.
On the other hand, government agencies must create and enforce rules for the use of
environmental resources through land-use regulations, construction licenses, and projects that
conserve fauna and flora-efforts that sometimes conflict with developmental projects, which
may have the potential to cause serious environmental damage. In Bahia the State
Environmental Agency (CRA) was responsible for enforcing environmental rules, which
sometimes conflicted with development interests in the tourism sector.
How can government handle and integrate these two mandates? My research offers
some lessons. The main one is the need to integrate environmental concerns with mainstream
development discourse and practice in government. In the case of Bahia, environmental
protection was a key aspect of the state strategy of tourism development, at least in theory.
To acquire the political, financial, and institutional support to implement environmental
policies, these policies had to be compatible with development objectives so development
agencies would help implement them.
But how is this possible? How did it happen in Bahia? Four basic factors explain the
involvement and interest of development agencies in pursuing environmental policies in
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Bahia: market pressure, pressure from civil society and external actors, bureaucratic
maneuvering, and financial incentives.
First, the marketplace for nature-based tourism and related investments has grown
dramatically. Development agencies knew about this growth and created a strategy based on
designing projects to attract investments in this kind of tourism. Environmentally protected
areas were an important part of this strategy. For example, Sectur advertised APAs and their
potential for nature-based tourism in brochures distributed to potential private investors
(Bahia State Government, 1997).
Second, civil society and external actors pressured development agencies to adopt
certain environmental safeguards. With the democratization of the country in the 1980s,
environmental groups voiced their concerns and pressed development interests to be more
environmentally friendly. In Itacare APA, for instance, pressure from local environmental
groups changed the design of a sewage treatment plant that would have discharged its waste
into a mangrove. International donors and banks were also increasingly requesting
environmental guidelines as a condition of loan approval for development projects.
Third, development-oriented agencies have an interest in keeping environmental
matters within their jurisdiction to avoid interference from other agencies. In this case, Sectur
decided to retain APAs within its own jurisdiction because several infrastructure projects had
APAs as environmental safeguards. Sectur did not want to depend on the state environmental
agency to develop APA management plans because CRA could have significantly interfered
in the design and schedule of Sectur's projects.
Fourth, involvement in the environmental "business" can enable an agency to attract
funding from diverse government, international, nonprofit, and private sources. In Bahia,
Conder received funds from the state treasury to develop the management plan for the
Northern Coast APA, and from a technical agreement with the English ODA.
Environmental objectives must be integrated with mainstream development practice
during implementation. For this to occur, development agencies should be allowed to pursue
environmental policies, but with checks and balances. This entails changing environmental
enforcement from the old-style environmental "police" - in which environmental agencies
bullied and penalized offenders - to technical cooperation and implementation by other
actors, public and private.
However, handing discretion over environmental issues to development agencies risks
allowing such actors to undermine or neglect these responsibilities -- akin to putting the fox in
charge of the chicken coup. How can development agencies be prevented from appropriating
the environmental agenda? The creation of oversight bodies is one approach. Handing more
responsibility for implementing environmental policy to development agencies through
decentralization should be followed by establishing more oversight mechanisms. Effective
oversight requires clear goals measuring environmental performance and transparency and an
independent body composed not only of governmental actors but also of NGOs and the
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private sector. In the case of Bahia, the state environmental council (CEPRAM) filled this
oversight role.
Institutional challenges stemming from the dual governmental mandate also occur at
the local level. Local governments are in charge of many interventions that affect both
economic development and environmental protection. Because of their different institutional
contexts, state and local governments have different abilities and incentives to create and
implement certain government interventions. Some of the incentives that influence state
agencies may not exist at the local level. In the case of Bahia, state development agencies had
at least two incentives to establish APAs: the availability of funds for environmental policies,
and the opportunity to control environmental issues to avoid interference from other agencies.
These incentives were not available to local actors on an ongoing basis.
Many local governments did perceive the creation of protected areas as an incentive to
attract public and private tourism investments. This incentive helped state agencies obtain
local political support for creating APAs - but not for enforcing or monitoring them, since
once the APAs were created (with management plans) and development projects were
approved, the incentives ceased to exist. Thus, the creation of more lasting incentives at the
local level could foster more local institutional support for implementing environmental
policies. For example, the state could give financial support to local institutions to perform
certain enforcement tasks (see Section 6.6).
Therefore, integrating environmental protection into the development agenda must
entail more than simply promoting economic investment to overcome the point when society
can afford environmental amenities, as some proponents of the Kuznet curve suggest. To
foster positive environmental change, governments can lubricate the development agenda by
establishing incentives for environmental protection, and by introducing the political voice of
civil society, internal actors within the government, and external actors in the development
process. Creating incentives for government developmental agencies to act in an
environmentally friendly manner, as well as opening channels for other voices, are important
steps in integrating the two government mandates.
Thus the government policymaking structure is fundamental to effective
implementation of a joint mandate. This case study showed that decentralization can help
provide such institutional incentives for integrating environmental protection into the
development agenda.
7.4) How to Organize the State? Centralization versus Horizontal Decentralization
The decentralization of protected-area policy in Bahia was crucial in generating a
large number of APAs in the implementation stage. The conditions under which
decentralization occurred placed protected areas in the mainstream development agenda.
Thus, decentralization created an institutional synergy that generated political, financial, and
institutional support for APA policy at the state and local level.
Decentralization without much coordination, but with checks and balances
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The case of Bahia offered a different angle on the traditional
decentralization/coordination challenge: decentralization without coordination, but with
incentives and checks-and-balances. As discussed in Chapter 5, centralizing protected-area
policy in the state environmental agency (CRA) would likely have failed, because that agency
lacked the institutional, financial, and political support necessary to implement the policy.
Decentralization involving other state agencies was the alternative.
The involvement of other agencies would, in principle, require some coordination to
make sure each agency was fulfilling its role in the implementation process. However, the
coordination problem did not undermine policy implementation in the Bahia case. Instead of
distributing implementation tasks to different agencies and developing tight, centralized rules,
the state government allowed agencies to establish protected areas without much
coordination. Indeed, coordination was not strictly necessary because tasks were not
complementary. Agencies developed the process for establishing APAs almost independently
from each other. They could innovate in creating financial and institutional capacity by
obtaining funds from different sources and developing the capacity they lacked.
Because of this independent process, state agencies in Bahia took different approaches
to developing APA management plans according to their needs and capacities. CRA chose to
do most of its work with its own resources and staff because it had limited funds for hiring
consultants, and its staff members wanted to show that they could manage the whole process
of APA implementation. Conder hired consultants to do the job in-house, so the agency could
learn from that experience and add APAs to its portfolio of projects. Conder officials
believed that this experience in land-use planning could make it the leading state agency in
the APA "business." Sectur hired consulting companies to speed up development of APA
management plans because it had a schedule for approving and building infrastructure
projects, for which APAs were the environmental safeguards. Thus, lack of coordination did
not lead to lack of implementation but provided agencies with the flexibility to overcome
obstacles that impeded implementation.
Two factors contributed to effective implementation of APA policy: incentives and
checks and balances. First, agencies were motivated to establish protected areas because
doing so enabled them to increase their political power and financial resources. Development
agencies, in particular, had an incentive to create protected areas to acquire more control over
their development objectives, thus avoiding interference from other agencies, especially the
environmental agency. Even though these incentives were not "planned" - they were already
in place - similar incentives could be created in other institutional settings. For example, a
government could make a centralized fund available to any agency involved in implementing
certain environmental policies.
Second, in Bahia, a system of checks and balances governed implementation of
environmental policy. CEPRAM members and CRA officials had to approve both APAs and
development projects, blocking any that did not satisfy certain environmental guidelines.
Thus development agencies could not create APAs only on paper; they also had to create
APA management plans. Through incentives and checks and balances - which together
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constituted a kind of carrot-and-stick system - agencies implemented APA policy in a
decentralized fashion with minimal need for coordination.
Beyond definitions of decentralization
This research points to little practical use for the different types of decentralization
identified in the literature. The main authors of that literature tend to categorize
decentralization into various types, including deconcentration, devolution, fiscal
decentralization, and privatization (Rondinelli, 1981; Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983; Manor,
1999). However, these categories do not shed light on how decentralization actually occurs,
and on how it makes policy implementation more effective. Indeed, many cases, including
the one in this study, combine all types of decentralization defined in the literature.
APA policy in Bahia encompassed degrees of horizontal decentralization,
deconcentration, devolution, and privatization. The state government authorized several state
agencies to establish APAs (horizontal decentralization). In turn, these agencies created local
branches to execute some tasks (deconcentration), planned to transfer some enforcement
responsibility to municipal actors (devolution), and hired some consultants and companies to
perform another tasks (privatization). At the same time, a centralized system of checks and
balances provided oversight for the whole process. Thus, rather than promoting
decentralization for its own sake, analysts must go beyond theoretical definitions to learn
what works based on empirical results.
The forgotten type of decentralization: "Horizontal decentralization"
My research presents another unusual view of the decentralization puzzle.
Implementation of APA policy in Bahia at the state level was conducted mostly through
"horizontal" decentralization -- distribution of authority among several agencies at the same
governmental level. Such cases are scarce in the decentralization literature. A large part of
that literature focuses on "vertical" decentralization - the transfer of authority from central
authorities to lower levels of government. Some experts in the field do not even consider
horizontal decentralization. For example, my case study would not fit the definitions of
decentralization presented by Cheema & Rondinelli (1983) and Manor (1999).
For these authors, true decentralization brings government closer to the population
served, as in the case of devolution. This bias seems to result from the context under which
the decentralization literature emerged in the 1970s: the failure of large-scale, centralized
policies and the rise of democratic movements in many developing countries. The scant
attention paid to horizontal decentralization may also reflect the scarcity of examples in the
literature and in practice. Cases of horizontal decentralization are often portrayed as agencies
squabbling for limited financial and institutional resources (MacKinnon et al., 1986). In the
case of Bahia, such infighting did not occur because different decentralized agencies had
opportunities to attract resources from different sources.
Horizontal decentralization, indeed, has advantages over both centralized and
vertically decentralized structures. Horizontal decentralization entails different dynamics
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from the most common approaches to vertical decentralization. Although the former does not
present some of the supposed benefits of vertical decentralization, such as improved
knowledge of local conditions and be close to the population, this research suggests that
horizontal decentralization can foster interesting improvements in institutional capacity in
developing countries, particularly in Brazil. For example, central governments (in this case,
state government) tend to have more financial and human resources compared with local
governments. Especially in the environmental field, municipalities often have weak
institutional capacity and are unable to implement environmental policies alone. Owing to
economies of scale, increasing the institutional capacity of a large number of local
governments to implement many environmental policies without much central aid does not
make sense. Implementation of APAs requires considerable institutional and financial
resources, and municipalities are often unable to implement environmental policies alone. (As
Table 5.3 shows, none of the municipal APAs had developed a management plan.) What's
more, efforts to increase local capacities may not always pay off.
On the other hand, horizontal decentralization also offers some outright advantages
over centralized implementation. For instance, different state government agencies attracted
alternative human and financial resources for APA implementation, and the incentives
encouraging development agencies to become involved in APA policy helped prevent the
traditional polarization between development and environmental protection. Also, different
agencies could innovate and adopt different solutions to implement APAs, increasing their
institutional capacity as they faced different problems. Thus, horizontal decentralization can
offer unusual approaches to effective policy implementation that surmount the presumed
dichotomy between centralization and vertical decentralization.
The role of locals in decentralization
Local governments and non-governmental groups' 18 can play important roles in
making and implementing policy. However, instead of blindly believing that they can and
should be in charge of almost everything, policy analysts must reflect on the institutional
limitations of local organizations. The ability of local actors to perform institutional roles
depends on the kinds of policies in place and the institutional context in which they occur. In
environmental policymaking, local actors can provide essential information, and may even
prove to be the driving force. For example, in Guaibim APA, locals played an important role
in introducing and disseminating the concept of environmentally protected areas statewide.
The state used the experience in Guaibim to create other APAs and expand APA policy. The
involvement of local actors can also determine the effectiveness of policy implementation.
Locals helped establish APA boundaries and the kinds of land use allowed within their
borders. Such involvement was essential in motivating local support for enforcing APA
guidelines.
However, the role of locals in policymaking is limited by jurisdictions, economies of
scale in institutional capacity, and the limitations of local political agendas. For example, in
the case of protected areas, local governments cannot create protected areas beyond their
18 When I refer to local actors, or simply locals, I include both local governments and non-governmental groups.
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political control. At the same time, many of these governments do not have the financial or
human resources to sponsor studies to determine which important ecosystems should be
protected. Similarly, protected areas may not rank high on municipalities' agendas even
though they contain unique and important ecosystems. A more central government confronts
fewer policymaking limitations in many cases.
It is in the implementation stage that locals often contribute most to environmental
policy. Locals can provide important support such as enforcement, monitoring, and
adaptation of environmental policies. For example, in protected areas, locals can make
periodic visits, investigate and denounce offenses, screen development projects, provide
information on environmental quality, and help establish the boundaries of protected areas
and their land-use rules, as in Guaibim. However, the kind of policy and the local
institutional context can limit such support. Some local organizations (government and non-
government) have very limited financial, human, and technical resources to devote to policy
implementation. In Bahia, for example, land-use planning, a local responsibility, is barely
pursued. Of 415 municipalities, only one, the state capital, had an approved master plan in
1997.119
In Bahia, state agencies involved municipal governments and non-governmental
groups in APA implementation tasks, such as discussion and enforcement of management
plans. However, in only a few cases did municipal organizations play the strong role state
agencies had expected. This can be explained by a few factors. First, many municipalities
lacked the institutional capacity to perform such tasks. Although state agencies invested
some effort in local education, training, and outreach, the practical results often proved
disappointing because of the short time frame allowed for such capacity building.
Second, municipal organizations had few incentives to engage in capacity building,
project screening, and enforcement, as incentives to do so ceased once APAs were created.
Third, no independent and centralized system of checks and balances tracked implementation
of APA guidelines. Except for sporadic visits and denouncements, state officials did not
monitor environmental quality or the performance of municipal governments in enforcing
APA guidelines. Finally, many municipal officials are political appointees who can be
replaced after elections, so the local government loses much of the enhanced institutional
capacity it gains through training and education. Thus, central organizations must drive the
decentralization process, continually developing local institutional capacity and providing a
system of incentives and checks and balances.
The role of central authority
Decentralization should not be viewed as simply the complete transfer of
responsibilities from central to local government. It also involves building capacity in the
organizations that will perform new tasks - not only in the decentralized organizations but
also in the central organization. Central governments have to maintain important roles even
as they devolve power (Tendler, 1997), and building capacity for these new roles is necessary.
119 From interview with officials in Conder.
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Decentralization must therefore be incremental for all organizations involved, both central
and decentralized (Rondinelli & Nellis, 1986). In the Bahia case, central organizations (state
agencies) were willing to devolve power to local actors, but could not always create the local
institutional capacity needed to transfer responsibilities. State agencies provided some
training and information, but they did not offer incentives for local implementation of APA
guidelines based on a system of checks and balances.
Central government should play two basic roles in the decentralization process. First,
it should create the institutional conditions - including the financial and human resources -
decentralized organizations need to perform their new tasks. Central governments should also
provide incentives such as fiscal decentralization or funding based on performance. Second,
central governments should establish an independent system of checks and balances to
oversee the decentralized tasks and provide a mechanism for resolving conflict. This system
of checks and balances could link to incentives for good performance on decentralized tasks.
Conflict resolution is needed in the event of disputes among decentralized organizations
and/or clients (the public or firms). In Bahia, the state environmental council (CEPRAM)
filled both functions, mostly at the state level. Because they participated in CEPRAM, civil
actors such NGOs and union representatives played a somewhat independent role in settling
disputes and overseeing the APA process.
7.5) Does the Bahia case suggest an effective way to deal with the environmental impacts
of tourism development?
Debates over sustainable development often raise questions regarding what to
preserve, to what extent, how, and for whom. In tourism development, these questions are
particularly important, since tourism depends on a region's social and environmental assets,
and several conflicts can occur over these assets (see Appendicces 3 and 4 for a more
complete discussion). How can countries and localities balance environmental and
development objectives in this arena?
Or, to ask the question more precisely for this case study: did tourism help protect the
environment? There is no clear answer. This research did not assess whether tourism can
protect the environment. Such an assessment would be difficult to perform properly. First,
no comprehensive data are available to thoroughly evaluate environmental change over time
in regions with APAs. Second, even if such data were available, determining causality
between environmental protection and tourism development would be difficult. In many
areas, tourism is one among many activities taking place. What can be said is that the notion
of a win-win link between tourism and the environment can overcome the political, financial,
and institutional obstacles to environmental policies such as the creation of protected areas.
Were APAs a promising solution for protecting the environment? Many APAs were
in fact created to mitigate the environmental impacts of tourism development, such as roads,
resorts, and tourism-related businesses. One could argue that if the objective of APAs is to
protect the environment, no development project should go forward in the first place. On the
other hand, if no development had been occurring, APAs would probably not have been
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created. The existence of development projects was the key factor spurring the creation of
APAs as an environmental management tool.
Many of the development projects within APAs had long been planned, and had the
support of strong constituencies such as federal, state, and municipal governments as well as
the local population. They were likely to be implemented anyway, sooner or later. For
example, the Green Line road had existed on paper for 20 years. The regional tourism plan
(Prodetur) was a regional priority and the federal government was distributing resources for it.
The idea of creating a series of APAs in the 1990s resulted from these projects. APAs were
mainly designed to appease local and external pressures for environmental safeguards for
those projects, and to attract a certain niche of private investors (low-density nature-based
tourism).
However, many APAs on the Bahian coast were suffering from rapid and chaotic
tourism development before the 1990s. Local governments had little institutional capacity to
control this development. Before APAs became popular, state government, too, had limited
tools for interfering in private projects in areas already altered, such as those with coconut
farms or cattle ranches. Development in certain regions was proceeding at an impressive pace
with few environmental controls. Thus, APAs provided a powerful management tool to try to
control new as well as old development pressures.
7.6) Concluding Remarks: Recommendations for Developing Countries
The dominant view of agencies in charge of environmental issues in developing countries is
that they lack the institutional, political, and financial resources to fulfill the most basic
environmental responsibilities. Governments in these countries are usually under pressure to
encourage rapid economic development but also to tightly restrict their budgets.
Environmental issues may appear in government discourse but they are hardly a priority,
because they must fight for a share of a scarce public budget and are not often clearly
associated with economic development. In this context, surmounting all the obstacles to
implementing environmental policy effectively is a formidable challenge.
The Bahian case shows how to place environmental issues on the mainstream political
agenda of developing countries. Instead of assigning complete responsibility for establishing
APAs to the environmental agency, which would be unlikely to do the job well, the state
divided responsibility among several agencies, which could attract more resources to APAs.
The growth of nature-based tourism also linked environmental protection with
development and spurred environmental management in touristic areas. However, it is naive
to view ecotourism as a panacea for environmental protection in developing countries
(Honey, 1999). Nature-based tourism requires the same amount of environmental oversight
as other forms of tourism. The difference is the opportunity to identify environment and
development as a win-win combination, thus fostering government and non-governmental
support for the protecting the environment in the development process.
If governmental and non-governmental actors see the environment as an asset to be
preserved, they will be more willing to invest political and financial support in preventing
environmental destruction. Linking environment and development can also generate financial
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and institutional resources, especially from agencies associated with tourism development.
Once such agencies associate environmental protection with the success of the tourism
industry, they become more susceptible to working with local and external environmental
actors.
The win-win association of protected areas with development in tourism zones was
key to fostering support for those areas. The example of Bahia shows how tourism can be a
tool for overcoming the four obstacles to the establishment of protected areas in developing
countries. The same framework could be used to analyze similar environmental management
tools in areas facing tourism development, such as provision of sewage treatment services and
collection of solid waste. These tools can be clearly identified as win-win for tourism (sewage
systems can maintain cleaner beaches, for example). However, governments must also
establish the institutions for overcoming the obstacles to implementing these tools. The
experience in Bahia offers some insight into how to arrange such governmental institutions,
but further research is needed to provide clearer policy recommendations.
The Bahian experience was important because it showed that alternative institutional
and organizational arrangements for making and implementing environmental policy can
work under certain conditions. Perhaps these arrangements are not the way many policy-
makers and planners consider when they think about the "ideal," and sometimes unrealistic,
models of institutional structure to cope with environmental problems: (i) a strong and
centralized environmental agency with money, police power and committed and well-paid
staff to implement environmental policies, or (ii) a grassroots, completely devoluted and
bottom-up system of policy implementation. Moreover, the Bahian solution may not be
replicable in every country or region, or even prove to be a long-term alternative in Bahia
itself,12 0 owing to varying economic, institutional, environmental, and social conditions.
However, this research shows that a second-best alternative can work relatively well,
even if it is not the model that many planners have in mind. Indeed, the Bahian alternative
may be the most effective solution to the environment/development challenge under existing
conditions and constraints. My objective was to try to understand one alternative and provide
planners with insights in applying some lessons from Bahia to other situations.
120 Indeed, as mentioned before, all the APAs were put under CRA responsibility in 1999, after the field research
was finished.
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APPENDIX 1: THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST AND BAHIA
The Brazilian Northeastern region comprises ten states (Figure 1.1). The Northeast
has an area of over 1.5 million square kilometers and occupies 28.3% of the Brazilian
territory (Table A. 1, Figure 1.1). Its population is 43 million inhabitants. It is greater than
that of any other South American country, and the area of the Northeastern region is the
second largest, only behind Argentina. Bahia State has the largest economy (GDP of 34.3
billion dollars) and population (12.276 million) in the region.
The economic and social indicators of the Northeast have lagged behind the rest of
Brazil for many decades. For example, the Northeastern income per capita is only about half
of the rest of the country and its illiteracy rate is more than double that of the rest of the
country (Table A. 1). The state of Bahia is slightly better off with a per capita income of 61%
of the Brazilian average. In terms of income inequalities, its Gini coefficient is higher than
the Brazilian one, which is one of the highest in the world. Particularly, the states of
Pernambuco, Bahia and Ceara have the highest Gini coefficient in the country, respectively.
Table A.1 - Characteristics of three States and the Northeast compared to Brazil
(the numbers between parentheses are in relation to the Brazilian total numbers)
Region Areaa Populationb Per Capita GDPd Illiteracy Gini
(Km2) (millions) Incomec (US$ Ratee Coefficient f(US$) Billions) (%)
Bahia State 567,295 12.276 2,709 34.3 35.3% 0.653
(6.6%) (8.1%) (61%) (5.0%)
Ceari State 126,348 6.549 2,613 17.5 37.4% 0.647
(1.5%) (4.3%) (59%) (2.5%)
Pernambuco 98,938 7.294 2,533 18.9 34.3% 0.660
State (1.2%) (4.8%) (57%) (2.7%)
Northeast 1,561,177 43.792 2,437 109.6 38.8% 0.651
(18.3%) (28.9%) (55%) (15.9%)
Brazil 8,547,403 151.523 4,417 688.3 17.6% 0.637
(a, b) Year 1993. Source: Alamanaque Abril (1995).
(c, d, f) Year 1994. Source: Banco do Nordeste (1996).
(e) Year 1995. Source: SUDENE (1999).
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For many decades, the Northeast has been a symbol of backwardness for many
Brazilians and a challenge for regional policies to reduce the disparities between the
Northeast and the most developed regions in the south. Since the 1950s, several regional
policies have aimed at attracting national or international private investments through fiscal
incentives and financing facilitation. There are two important public regional development
institutions managing these policies in the region: the Bank of the Northeast and the
Superintendence for the Development of the Northeast (Sudene). In the last two decades, the
Northeast has attracted important investments in chemicals, pulp and paper, and textiles.
However, these investments have been insufficient to foster sustained development and break
the south-north disparities. More recently, in the 1990s, tourism was the focus of regional
policy makers and the hope for economic development.
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APPENDIX 2 - RESEARCH STAGES AND METHODS
The methodology consisted of collecting quantitative and qualitative information
through data gathering and open-ended interviews with personnel in governmental, non-profit
and private organizations involved in tourism and environmental decision-making in the
Brazilian Northeastern region. My research was divided into three stages. First, I collected
data and conducted interviews in the capital of the state, Salvador, where the headquarters of
most of the state and federal agencies are located and some of the key actors in the
environmental arena and tourism sector work. Second, I selected the seven case studies of
Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) for in-depth analysis based on the information
collected in Salvador. Third, for the selected in-depth studies, I moved to the specific regions
to complete interviews and data collection with local actors.
Evaluating APAs' Creation, Implementation and Effectiveness
In the field research, I evaluated APAs by obtaining information and data on
quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the extent of creation of APAs, their
implementation and their effectiveness to protect the environment. The selected indicators in
Table A.2 and A.3 represent proxies for environmental management practices in tourism
according to the World Tourism Organization (WTO & IISD, 1993). I attempted to collect
information on all the indicators for the story at the state level and in the seven case studies of
specific APAs for the stories at the local level. I explained possible changes in APAs'
creation, enforcement and effectiveness in managing environmental impacts using data
information and open-ended interviews. I adopted two sets of indicators. The indicators in
the first set are proxies to evaluate the extent to which APAs have been effectively created
(Table A.2). These indicators are a sample of procedures that governments follow to give
political, financial and institutional support to create APAs. The second set of indicators
comprises measures of the proper enforcement of the APAs' guidelines (Table A.3). It was
not possible to collect all the indicators for all the situations, but I collected as many
indicators as possible for each case study, depending on the availability of data and
information provided during the interviews. These two sets of indicators reveal the extent to
which governments have been able to succeed in offering and receiving political, financial
and institutional support to enforce APAs' guidelines. Based on these indicators, I focused
the interviews on collecting information about possible changes in environmental policy-
making, implementation and impact and about how these changes are related to tourism
development and other activities, such as urbanization and growth in other economic sectors.
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Table A.2 - Indicators of Creation of APAs
Indicators of APA creation Source
Area officially protected APA administrator and municipal
governments
Area of important ecosystem completely APA administrator and municipal
preserved governments
Area allocated for visitor use APA administrator and municipal
governments
Area designated for development APA administrator and municipal
governments
Creation of environmental agencies or Interviews, and state and municipal
departments within agencies to work on government documents
APAs
Number of environmental specialists in the Interviews, and state and municipal
government working on APA creation government documents
Existence of environmental regulations to Interviews, and state and municipal
back APA creation government documents
Financial resources invested in the creation Interviews, and state and municipal
and maintenance of protected areas government documents
Existence of tourism/environment training Interviews
programs concerning to APA
Change in the discourse about the Interviews, state and municipal documents
environment and newspaper articles
Existence of economic-based incentives for Interviews, and state and municipal
preservation government documents
Existence of a regional tourism development Interviews, and state and municipal
plan that takes into account APAs government documents
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Table A.3 - Indicators of Enforcement of APAs
Enforcement Indicators Source
Existence of environmental regulations to Interviews, and state and municipal
back enforcement legally government documents
Number of infractions registered Interviews, and state and municipal
government documents
Number of regular inspection Interviews, and state and municipal
government documents
Change in the discourse about the Interviews, state and municipal government
environment supporting enforcement APA documents, newspaper and advertising
guidelines
Screening of regional development plans Interviews, and state and municipal
government documents
Information distribution to population Interviews, state and municipal government
about APA guidelines and how to denounce documents, newspaper and advertising
infractions
Creation of environmental agencies or Interviews, state and municipal government
departments to enforce APAs guidelines documents, newspaper and advertising
Number of environmental specialists in the Interviews, and state and municipal
government to work on enforcement of APA government documents
guidelines
Financial resources invested in the Interviews, state and municipal government
enforcement of APA guidelines documents
Screening of private projects in APAs Interviews, state and municipal government
documents
Existence of economic-based incentives for Interviews, state and municipal government
denounce and preservation initiatives documents
Responsiveness to denounces of Interviews, state and municipal government
environmental degradation in APA documents
160
Field Research
The field research consisted of data collection and open-ended interviews. Data
related to the development of tourism and environmental issues in the selected regions were
available in the main sources of quantitative and qualitative information such as statistics and
reports published by some governmental, non-governmental and private organizations. Open-
ended interviews were carried out with some of the actual and former actors in the process of
tourism and environmental policy-making and implementation in the specific states and
regions. I went to the capital of the state for preliminary open-ended interviews with key
actors before selecting specific APA case studies and going to the selected regions to perform
in-depth studies. The field research occurred in different periods between August 1997 and
August 1999.
In my open-ended interviews, I focused on important actors in the environmental and
tourism sectors. Through site visits, I checked their opinions if and how changes in the
environmental practices and institutions were introduced and implemented, how they
influenced the creation of APAs, what their impacts were on the local environment, and how
important tourism had been to spur such environmental practices. The sets of issues
addressed in each interview varied according to the kind of organization and actors
interviewed.
Interviews and data collection with government officials, members of the business
community in the tourism sector and members of NGOs in the capitals of the state of Bahia
(Salvador).
I interviewed (actual and former) personnel of the main government agencies involved
in environmental policy and in the process of planning in the tourism sector. These included
environmental agencies, governmental tourism agencies, state planning secretariats and
financial institutions. In the business sector, I talked to business investors, managers and
employees. Finally, I contacted members of NGOs in the state related to tourism and/or the
environment.
In Salvador, my research involved the following organizations:
- Center for Environmental Resources (called CRA, or Centro de Recursos
Ambientais). CRA is the state environmental agency under the State Secretariat of Planning.
CRA controls Bahia's environmental policy and management. It is in charge of the
management of some of the Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs). In CRA, I collected
data with and interviewed its director and the personnel in charge of licensing and
administration of environmentally protected areas.
- State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur). Sectur defines and coordinates
state tourism policy. It decides on the main public investments on tourism and coordinates
actions with other state and municipal agencies. In Sectur, I contacted the personnel involved
in investment planning and coordinating tourism in the regions of my case studies.
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- Bahia Tourism Authority (Bahiatursa). Bahiatursa is an enterprise formed by private
and public capital in charge of promoting and monitoring Bahian tourism. Also, it manages
some Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) located in areas with tourism potential. I
interviewed and collected data with officials who work in the environmental sector.
- Bank of the Northeast (BN). BN is the public development bank for the
Northeastern region of Brazil. It is one of the main financial institutions acting in the region
lending to the public and private sector. In the BN, I collected information regarding
economic and financial aspects of the BN's operations in the tourism and environmental
sector in the region.
- Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA). IBAMA is the federal agency in charge
of implementing national environmental policies. In Bahia, IBAMA manages the national
parks and biological reserves.
- Non-governmental and private organizations in Bahia involved with tourism or
environmental issues. These include tourism entrepreneurs and unions and environmental
NGOs.
In-depth study in the region of the selected case studies
In order to detail the functioning of APAs at the local level, after concluding the
interviews in the state capital, I chose seven Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) as in-
depth case studies for another round of interviews and data collection focusing on the
localities. All these APAs had management plans approved by the state environmental
council (CEPRAM). There were two criteria for choosing these seven APAs out of the
twenty-nine existent. First, in order to study the implementation process over time, I selected
APAs that had creation decrees issued at least four years before I started my field research in
September, 1998. Second, they had been implemented, at least in part. These seven APAs
were the only APAs in coastal areas that had management plans approved by CEPRAM
before September, 1998. The set of seven APAs represents a rich illustration of the
environment under which APAs were implemented. These APAs were administered by
various state agencies (CRA, Conder and Sectur) and were in different geographical regions.
The seven case studies were: Guaibim, Mangue Seco, Northern Coast, Tinhare-Boipeba,
Itacare, Santo Antonio and Abaete APAs
I carried out open-ended interviews with regional government and business leaders,
community leaders and important actors in the process of planning. In my open-ended
interviews, I checked how APAs were implemented at the local level, what their impacts were
on the local environment, and how they were related to tourism investments. In each of the
localities, I conducted interviews and collected data in the following local organizations:
- municipal environmental agencies or secretariat
- municipal tourism agencies or secretariat
- branches of state or federal environmental agencies or secretariat
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- tourism entrepreneurs
- regional or local tourism councils
- regional or local environmental councils
- environmental non-governmental organizations
- community organizations
Field Research in Brasilia
I traveled to the Brazilian capital, Brasilia to gather information in the headquarters of
the Brazilian Tourism Institute (EMBRATUR) and the headquarters of the Federal
Environmental Agency (IBAMA).
The list of interviewees
Over one hundred and fifty open-ended interviews and field visits were executed
between August 1997 and August 1999. Several of the interviewees did not want their names
released and I could not get the names of many others (especially short interviews in the field
visits). The formal relevant interviews (between 30 minutes and 2 hours) were made with the
following persons (alphabetically ordered):
* Mr. Acir Padilha dos Santos, CRA (Santa Cruz Cabrlia), coordinator of Santo Antonio
APA.
" Mr. Agnaldo Green, president of the association of hotels, bars, restaurants and similar
businesses, municipality of Itacar6 (Itacare APA). Member Boto Negro environmental
NGO.
* Mr. Algemar, advisor to the mayor of the municipality of Santa Cruz Cabrlia, Santo
Antonio APA. Former elected member of the city council.
* Ms. Ana Mota, Planarq Consultants (Salvador), consultant responsible for the
management plan for Santo Antonio APA.
" Mr. Antonio, land registration office, municipality of Jandaira, Mangue Seco and
Northern Coast APA.
* Dr. Antonio S6rgio, state public attorney, environmental specialist, Bahia State justice
department.
* Mr. Arnauld, landowner and bar owner, municipality of Itacar6.
* Mr. Benedito Correia, secretary for the environment, municipality of Porto Seguro.
" Ms. Carla Fabiola Pereira Ribeiro, CRA (Salvador), coordinator of the Northern Coast
and Mangue Seco APAs.
* Ms. Caissia Boaventura, coordinator of the Porto Seguro branch of the Institute for the
Preservation of the Historical Properties (IPHAN, a federal public institution).
* Mr. Cleber Isaac Soares, landowner/entrepeneur, owner of Sio Jos6 Farm, Itacar6 APA.
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" Ms. Ceonilce Almeida Pinto, public official, Ceara environmental protection agency
(SEMACE).
" Ms. Dalva Garcia Santana, tourism specialist, Sectur (Salvador), worked Prodetur in the
coordination of Porto Seguro's tourism council.
* Mr. Danilo Lopes, Bank of the Northeast (Fortaleza), coordinator environmental
department.
" Mr. Delivaldo dos Santos, CRA (Salvador), coordinator Tinhare-Boipeba APA and
coordinator of the CRA's Atlantic Forest Conservation Project in Bahia.
* Ms. Deodir, Conder (Salvador), coordinator of accounting office.
* Ms. Dione Corte, IBAMA (Brasilia), planner, specialist in protected areas.
* Mr. Durval Olivieri (two interviews), CRA (Salvador), former general director of CRA
between 1991 and 1998. Currently he is special advisor to the Secretariat of Planning,
Technology and the Environment in Bahia.
* Mr. Edmundo Tavares, tourism entrepeneur, municipality of Caraivas, Trancoso APA.
* Ms. Elizabete, CRA (Salvador), coordinator of Coastal Management Program (GERCO).
* Mr. Francisco Cesar Rodrigues Pimentel, Bank of the Northeast (Fortaleza), coordinator
of the policy department.
* Mr. Frederico Mendonga (two interviews), Conder (Salvador), coordinator of the
Northern Coast APA during the development of its management plan.
" Mr. Geraldo Aquino, CRA (Salvador), coordinator of the protected area group.
* Mr. Gerardo Schmidt, director of the Department for Forest Development, state secretariat
of agriculture and forest (Salvador).
* Mr. Gongalves, secretary of tourism and the environment in the municipality of Conde,
Northern Coast APA.
* Mr. Gordilho, secretary of public works at the municipality of santa Cruz cabralia, Santo
Antonio APA.
* Ms. Graga Gondim, Sectur (Salvador), official at the Sectur's Superintendence of Tourism
Development (Sudetur).
* Mr. Godoy, environmental activist and shop owner, village of Mangue Seco, Mangue
Seco APA, municipality of Jandaira.
* Mr. Heron Santana, state public attorney, environmental specialist, Bahia State justice
department.
* Ms. Ida Rosatelli, hotel owner and member of the Porto Seguro tourism council.
* Ms. Ines Garrido, Sectur (Salvador), tourism specialist working on APAs.
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e Mr. Jac6, former mayor of the municipality of Jandaira, Mangue Seco and Northern Coast
APA.
* Mr. Jacozinho, municipal tourism secretary, Mangue Seco and Northern Coast APA,
municipality of Jandaira.
* Mr. Jaime Matos, secretary of tourism, municipality of Itacar6.
* Mr. Joio Saraiva, president of the Green Party, Ceara branch.
" Mr. Jorge Everaldo, secretary of economic development in the municipality of Entre Rios,
Northern Coast APA.
" Dr. Jos6 Geraldo de Oliveira, professor, Federal University of Ceara, director Center for
Graduate Studies on the Environment.
* Mr. Julio Cesar, municipal secretary of agriculture and the environment in the
municipality of Valenga, Guaibim APA.
* Ms. Kikiu Gongalves, environmental activist, municipality of Itacar6
* Ms. Leila Murici Torres, CRA (Ilh6us), coordinator of the Itacar6 APA.
* Ms. Livia Gabriele, Conder (Salvador), coordinator of development of management plan
for Tinhare-Boipeba APA.
* Mr. Lucas Materron, Flora Brasil environmental NGO (Santa Cruz Cabralia, Santo
Antonio APA), member.
* Mr. Luis Osvaldo dos Santos, municipal tourism secretary, municipality of Icapui (Ceara
State).
* Ms. Malu Miranda, municipal secretary of tourism, Santa Cruz Cabrilia, Santo Antonio
APA.
" Ms. Margarete Grillo, Fernando de Noronha administrative office (Recife), environmental
and tourism department.
* Dr. Maria Gravina Ogata, environmental lawyer and researcher in SEI (Bahia State Center
for Economic and Social Studies, a state institution).
* Ms. Maria Teresa Sales, Ceara environmental protection agaency - SEMACE (Fortaleza),
coordinator of the Baturite APA.
* Ms. Maria Tereza Stradmann, GAMBA environmental NGO (Salvador), staff, biologist,
advisor in the Atlantic Forest Network (a nation wide network of NGOs working on the
defense of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest).
" Ms. Maridalva, official in the department of registration of federal state property.
* Dr. Marieta Borges, Fernando de Noronha administrative office (Recife), historian
specialist.
" Ms. Marina Beltrio, Conder (Salvador), deputy director.
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" Mr. Marlon, member of the Movement for the Preservation of Porto Seguro,
environmental NGO, municipality of Porto Seguro.
* Ms. Marta Bezerra, Vice-mayor in the municipality of Mata de Sio Joio, Northern Coast
APA.
* Ms. Milene Maia, official in the secretariat of the environment in the municipality of
Porto Seguro.
" Mr. Miguel Ballejo, member of the municipal city council, Brazilian Green Party,
municipality of Porto Seguro.
" Mr. Mois6s, theater teacher and environmental/social activist in the municipality of
Belmonte, Santo Antonio APA.
* Ms. Myrtis Souza, Bank of the Northeast, economist and tourism specialist.
* Mr. Nequinha, member of the local commercial association, village of Mangue Seco,
Mangue Seco APA, municipality of Jandaira.
* Mr. Norival, member, Grupo Calango environmental NGO, Camagari.
* Mr. Paulo C6sar Magalhies, municipal tourism secretary, municipality of Porto Seguro.
* Mr. Pedro Azevedo, municipal secretary of agriculture, tourism and the environment in
the municipality of Cairni (Tinhar6-Boipeba APA).
* Ms. Raimunda, community leader at Mangue Seco APA, Mangue Seco village,
municipality of Jandaira.
* Ms. Raquel Matedi, Professor at Facs College(Salvador), sociologist in charge of an
evaluation of the social conditions in the Northern Coast APA.
" Mr. Raul, public works engineer at the municipality of Santa Cruz Cabrilia, Santo
Antonio APA.
" Mr. Reinaldo Dantas, Sectur (Salvador), Director at the Sectur's Superintendence of
Tourism Development (Sudetur).
* Mr. Renato Cunha, Gamba, environmental NGO (Salvador), coordinator and member of
the state environmental council (CEPRAM).
" Mr. Ricardo Ari, biologist, CETREL (environmental treatment company for the Camagari
Petrochemical Complex)
* Mr. Ricardo Montagne, ASCAE environmental NGO (Santa Cruz Cabrilia), director,
member of the state environmental council (CEPRAM).
" Mr. Roberto, environmental enforcement staff in the municipal secretary of agriculture,
tourism and the environment in the municipality of Cairn' (Tinhar6-Boipeba APA).
" Mr. Roberto Barreto da Silva, CRA (Salvador), coordinator Ponta da Baleia and Trancoso
APAs.
" Mr. Roberto Morais, Federal University of Bahia (Salvador), Professor.
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" Mr. Romeu Fontana, historian, municipality of Porto Seguro.
* Mr. Ronaldo Lirio, consultant, former CRA official.
* Mr. Ronaldo Martins, CRA (Salvador), manager for environmental evaluation and
control.
* Ms. Rosane Garrido, Conder (Salvador), staff member in the development of the
management for Tinhar6-Boipeba APA.
" Ms. Rosangela, municipal secretariat of tourism in the municipality of Valenga, Guaibim
APA.
" Mr. Saraiva, Grupo Germen, environmental NGO (Salvador), coordinator and member in
the state environmental council (CEPRAM). He is also officla in the Urban Development
Department in the municipality of Salvador.
" Dr. S6rgio Mendes, public attorney, coordinator of the environmental public attorneys in
the state of Bahia.
* Mr. Severino Agra Filho, Federal University of Bahia (Salvador), Professor in the
Interdisciplinary Nucleus of Environmental Studies.
* Dr. Silvia, professor, Fortaleza University Fortaleza), tourism specialist.
* Ms. Socorro Mendonga Vasconcelos, Sectur (Salvador), accounting official at the Sectur's
Superintendence of Tourism Development (Sudetur).
* Ms. Teresa Murici, CRA (Salvador), manager of the environmental policy group.
* Mr. Tibd'rcio Medeiros, state public attorney specialized in environmental issues
(Salvador).
* Ms. Vera Mendes, Sectur (Salvador), environmental specialist working on APAs.
* Mr. Walmir do Carmo, GRAMA environmental NGO, coordinator, member of the state
environmental council (CEPRAM).
* Mr. Walteco, official in the public work secretariat, municipality of Jandaira, Mangue
Seco and Northern Coast APA.
" Mr. Wilson Espanhol, hotel owner and director of the Hotel Association of Bahia (Porto
Seguro).
* Mr. Wolf, Sectur, coordinator of the management plans for Sectur's APAs.
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APPENDIX 3 -IMPACTS OF TOURISM
The literature on tourism has evolved over time, shifting the way of stressing the
different facets of tourism's impacts. In the 1960s and until the middle of 1970s, research
about the impacts of tourism looked almost exclusively at its positive economic impacts on
local, regional and national economies (Mathieson & Wall, 1996). Tourism was viewed as a
means of improving the balance of payments, employment, income and tax revenues (World
Bank, 1972; Peters, 1969). In the 1970s, research on the negative effects of tourism started to
emerge (Hall, 1970, Young, 1973; Turner and Ash, 1975; Graburn, 1976; Smith, 1977;
Pizam, 1978). Social and environmental impacts of tourism started to come to light in places
like the French Riviera and Acapulco in Mexico (Bosselman, 1978). In these places, tourism
had potentially altered traditional culture, degraded landscapes, encouraged prostitution,
increased criminal behavior and destroyed the local environment (Mathieson & Wall, 1996).
By the 1980s, researchers and policy-makers agreed that tourism in the way it was
developed had tremendous negative impacts, and preventive and reactive measures to prevent
or mitigate these impacts ought to be in place (OECD, 1980). Also, in the middle of 1980s
and 1990s, with the spread of the idea of sustainable development, efforts to reconceptualize
new forms of tourism with low or no impact on the environment emerged, including
ecotourism, nature tourism and soft tourism.12 1 All definitions share the idea that tourism
could contribute to the preservation of the environment if it is planned and implemented in an
environmentally and socially friendly manner. Tourism, thus, has reborn as a possible tool
to spur economic development while at the same time benefiting the environment and local
social conditions (Ceballos-Lascurain, 1988; Whelan, 1991; WTO & UNEP, 1992).
However, most recently, several authors have expressed skepticism about the achievable
benefits of ecotourism and suggested that ecotourism is just another fad (Wilkinson, 1992;
Pleumarom, 1994; Munt & Higinio, 1997; Machlis & Bacci, 1992, quoted by Ceballos-
Lascurain, 1996). Thus, even though there are several decades of research and debates about
tourism, widely-accepted procedures to analyze the impacts of tourism do not yet exist
(Mathielson & Wall, 1996).
The social and environmental impacts of tourist activities depend on two sets of
factors (Briassoulis & Van der Straaten, 1992). On the one hand, these impacts are the result
of the kind and intensity of these activities such as the quantity of tourists, the characteristics
of these tourists, the distribution of the impacts spatially and temporally and the kind of
tourist activity involved. On the other hand, these impacts depend on the characteristics of
the impacted environment and society. The local environment and society has a limited
capacity to absorb and recover from impacts of tourism, the so-called carrying capacity2 3
121 Other terms include nature-based tourism, nature-oriented tourism, wilderness tourism, adventure tourism,
green tourism, alternative tourism, sustainable tourism, appropriate tourism and low-impact tourism (Ceballos-
Lascurain, 1996).
122 For details about the characteristics and how to design alternative tourism see Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996.
23 The concept of carrying capacity comes from population models in ecology (Coccossis & Parpairis, 1992).
Ecologists have tried to determine mathematically the maximum population of certain species based on the
limitation of certain resources, such as water or food.
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(Pearce & Kirk, 1986). In tourism, the carrying capacity can be defined as the maximum
level of recreation use that can take place in certain place without having significant impacts
on this ecosystem. If these impacts exceed the carrying capacity, their effects on the
environment and local society can become irreversible and cause serious environmental,
social and cultural problems. Thus, the estimation of the carrying capacity of a certain
environment is fundamental to determining the limit for tourism development in a region.
However, assessing the impacts of tourism development and the carrying capacity of a
place is a complex task because tourism is not a single well-defined activity, but rather a set
of several activities, such as transportation, building construction, lodging and recreation
(Briassoulis, 1995). Moreover, any assessment of the ultimate impacts of tourism implies not
only the direct impacts of all its related activities, but also the interaction among all these
activities.
The impacts of tourism on society can be divided into positive and negative (see Table
A.4 a summary of the negative and positive impacts of tourism). However, the distribution of
these impacts is not even among all the stakeholders (Lovel & Feuerstein, 1992). Some
stakeholders make significant gains while others gain much less or even lose. Also, there are
different views about the impacts of tourism. For example, some locals can see tourists as an
opportunity for learning about different cultures while others think tourists as an annoyance to
their daily lives.
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Table A.4 - The positive and negative aspects of tourism
Aspect (Below) Positive Negative
Environment/ - Tourism fostering environmental - Increasing sewage, solid waste,
Ecology conservation noise, habitat destruction, air
- Ecotourism pollution, changes in landscape
Economy - Employment to locals - Breakdown of traditional
- Increase in tax revenues industries
- New Investments - Poor pay/low skill jobs
- Increase in local prices
- low status for locals
- lack of local control over the local
economy
Education - Learning from travelers (cultural - Limited insight into local
education) conditions
- Learning from traveling (cultural - Ignorance of multi-faceted nature
tourism) of tourism
- Increase awareness for local - Lack of schools for increasing
heritage local population due to immigration
- Tourism studies/training-Li
Culture - Respect for local culture and - "Borrowing culture for a day"
customs - Tourist arrogance
- Interaction between different - Social tension
culture/mutual learning - Drugs, alcoholism, prostitution
- Xenophobia
Gender - Wider horizons for young - Sex tourism
educated women - Child prostitution
- More opportunities for local - Local women relegated to the
women "jobs at the bottom"
Health - Rest and Recuperation - Poor sanitation
- Family Interaction - Poor food
- Lack of basic hygiene
- Import/export of diseases
- Drugs and alcohol problems
Agriculture/Fishing - Increase in the demand for local - Decrease in farming/fishing
products - Increase in land values and taxes
Property Rights - Increase in local ownership - Loss of local ownership
- Increase in the value of property - Land speculation
owned by locals - Conflicts over property rights
Future - Sustainable tourism - Tourism overcrowding
Expectations - Ethics for tourists - Pollution
- Unpleasant travel
- "Move to next destination to be
created"
Adapted from Lovel & Feuerstein, 1992.
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APPENDIX 4 - THE GOVERNMENT ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
In tourism, there are two main justifications for government intervention through
environmental planning and management: externalities and "the tragedy of the commons"
(Roy & Tisdell, 1998). First, tourism development can impose a series of externalities to
other activities and society. Although it is very hard to separate the environmental impact of
tourism related activities from the impacts of other activities, tourism industry as a whole
certainly has a set of negative and positive environmental externalities to the rest of society
(Coccossis & Nijikamp, 1995). In terms of negative externalities, tourism competes for
environmental resources (water, land, etc.) with other human uses, such as agriculture,
industry and urban sprawl. If there is no good management of environmental resources,
tourism activity can comprise the quantity and quality of these resources (see Table A.5). For
example, resorts in Bali (Indonesia) and Goa (India) consumed significant part of the local
water and electricity causing shortages of these resources for local population (Goodwin,
1995). In similar fashion, the use of natural resources on which tourism quality depends by
other economic activities can cause deterioration of those resources and, consequently, affect
tourism activity. In Italy, hundreds of historical monuments that are tourist attractions were
damaged seriously by sulfur dioxide from nearby industries costing several tens of dollars to
the Italian government to restore them (Jenner & Smith, 1992). In the Brazilian state of
Ceara, the construction of a huge port in a zone with scenic beaches can compromise the
growing regional development of the tourism industry (Vasconcelos & Silva, 1996).
On the other hand, tourism activities can also bring positive externalities to society.
For example, infrastructure for tourism can be used for other purposes as well. Airports can
be used by locals who want to travel. Roads can be used for transportation of local
passengers, and agricultural or manufactured products. In Bahia, Brazil, the paving of the
touristic road connecting the small town of Itacare to the larger town of Ilheus allowed the
creation of new bus lines. Before the construction, Itacare had only few bus lines, which were
interrupted after heavy rains, that limited the transportation options of the local population.
The new road increased the access of the local population to Ilheus for shopping, recreation
and medical emergencies. 1 25 The creation of environmentally protected areas for tourism
purposes can be used by locals for entertainment, work (fishermen who benefit from
preservation of fishing habitats) and supply of environmental amenities (protection of water
reservoirs). For example, the New York's Adirondack State Park, besides protecting the
natural environment, provides a forested watershed for the state's water supply (Nash, 1978).
Second, the uncontrolled competition within the tourism industry over environmental
resources (water, land, environmental amenities, etc.) can generate a kind of "tragedy of the
commons," which can harm the whole industry. The increase of tourism activities can
124 Hardin (1968) used the term tragedy of the commons to describe the overgrazing of the common pastures in
England during the eighteen century. Villagers could bring their cows to graze on the common pasture as much
as they wanted at no cost. As the number or herders grew and they kept increasing the number cows grazing, the
grass became scarce. In the end, overgrazing destroyed the common pastures and all cows died.
12 Information collected from interviews with municipal officials in Itacare in 1999.
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generate a growing demand for certain touristic products. An increasing demand for scenic
unexplored beach can generate a growing construction of hotels and houses in the sea side
which can degenerate the primary environmental quality of the beach (the beaches ceases to
be unexplored and scenic). In turn, this can also cause a series of environmental problems
(e.g.; deforestation, air and water pollution, degeneration of the landscape), which can affect
the whole tourism industry in a region. For example, Benidorm, a popular typical tourism
spot in England, had had a sharp decline in tourist numbers in the end of the 1980s because
visitors perceived it as crowded and not "green" (Goodwin, 1995). Thus, an uncontrolled
growth of tourism in one region can undermine its tourism potential by damaging its
environmental or cultural resources, if proper intervention is not in place.
The use of environmental resources in the tourism industry can affect regional
economic activities, including tourism itself. If there is no rule or control for the use of
environmental resources through well-established and enforced rules and property rights, the
tourism activity can cause a series of environmental problems and end up in a "tragedy of the
commons." Thus, the sustainability of environmental resources for the tourism industry
depends on how the different actors define and enforce rules for the public and collective use
and conservation of these resources. Government interventions should try to assure minimum
levels of negative externalities and maximum levels of positive externalities to society, as
well as help to organize the different actors in the tourism sector to avoid the tragedy of the
commons. Governments play these roles through environmental planning, regulation, and
provision of infrastructure and financing.
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Table A.5 - Some negative impacts of tourism on the environment
Activities Related to Tourism Possible Environmental
Consequences
Water - release of sewage/garbage onto - health hazard to local
beaches, rivers, lagoons, lakes and people and tourists
subterranean aquifers - destruction of aquatic life
- release of oil/garbage from (animals and plants)
recreational and transportation - losses of aesthetic values
vehicles - reduction of activities such
- land reclamation as fishing and bathing
NATURAL Air - increased air and noise pollution - health hazard to local
ELEMENTS by transportation means people and tourists
- increased air and noise pollution - loss of recreational values
by construction works - negative impact on plant
and animal life
Wildlife - use of local trees for resort - decline in plant and animal
construction and firewood species/numbers
- increase in accidental/criminal - increased soil erosion
fire in parks and forests - changes in species
- collection of wildlife for composition
collection and souvenir industry - destruction of wildlife
- development of highway and habitats
trails through natural areas - disturbance in migration
- chase away animals to view and patterns
_____________photograph _____________
ECOSYSTEMS Coastlines and - Construction of hotels, roads, - elimination of aquatic and
Oceanic Islands campsites, parking lots, golf terrestrial wildlife habitats
courses, harbors and other facilities - interference with breeding
- use of sand from dunes and habits
beaches for construction - erosion of beaches and
- Land reclamation dunes
- Alteration of coastal land (sea - loss of aesthetic values on
walls, reefs, etc.) the landscape
- alteration of drainage
- chaseawayanimalssystem and water run-off
HUMAN MADE Human - follow up infrastructure: hotels, - displacement of people
ENVIRONMENT settlements bars, restaurants, souvenir shops, - traffic congestion and
houses for local population, roads overloaded infrastructure
- Immigration - loss of amenity of
residents
- unpleasant architecture
Historic and - excessive use for tourist purposes - trampling and littering
Religious - thefts and destruction of - alteration of original use
Monuments historical pieces and function in detriment
of locals
- desecration
Adapted from O'Grandy (1990)
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Government Strategies
Governments have realized the importance of adequate tourism planning in order to
try to avoid environmental degradation (and consequently losses in the tourism activity).
Government strategies for environmental policy and planning in tourism have been created in
various forms, managed by different jurisdictions of government and had diverse interactions
with civil society and external actors. Four strategies are the most typical responses of local
and regional governments to cope with the environmental impacts of tourism development:
(i) Building Institutional Capacity. Governments create governmental environmental
organizations, train and educate government officials in environmental issues, and enforce
environmental regulations.
(ii) Investments in Environmental Projects. Governments invest in environmental
infrastructure and institutional projects such as sanitation and water supply, environmental
education to groups outside the government, and environmental restoration such as
reforestation and pollution clean-ups.
(iii) Control of Development and Tourist Flow. Government can impose and enforce
development rights, restrict public financing to certain environmentally sensitive areas and
control the flow of tourists in protected areas.
(iv) Creation of Protected Areas, Governments are responsible for creating protected
areas, for enforcing environmental zoning, and for providing incentives for private actions
towards environmental protection.
Each of these strategies is further analyzed below.
Building Institutional Capacity
Some governments try to create or strengthen institutional capacity to respond to
actual or potential environmental impacts of tourism. This is one of the main
recommendations of tourism planning guidelines in any advisory document (OECD, 1980;
CIDA, 1987; WTO & UNEP, 1992; Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). Building institutional
capacity could take several forms. Governments can create independent environmental
agencies, such as ministries or secretariats, or create regulations to confront with the
environmental issues that a particular government faces. Also, many times, building
institutional capacity involves hiring of new people with environmental background or
offering environmental training for actual officials.
External actors and governments have often supported this kind of policies. External
actors, such as international donors and federal agencies, suggest the creation of
environmental agencies at the local and regional level as a form of formal commitment to
environmental protection (CIDA, 1987; WTO & IISD, 1993; EMBRATUR, 1995). Also,
they can help these agencies with training and technical support. Governments endorse the
creation of environmental agencies or divisions, first because they can keep environmental
local matters under their control, and second because this is a form of visible environmental
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attitude which please outsiders and locals. In Porto Seguro, Bahia, local government created
a secretariat of environment to face the increasing environmental demands due to tourism
activities in the last two decades and to receive tourism projects financed by the state
government and the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). Likewise, environmental
divisions within sectoral agencies, such as secretariats of tourism or agriculture, have been
instituted to cope with specific environmental issues in those sectors. In Bahia, Brazil, this
has been a common approach in the last decade. Several sector secretariats, including the
secretariat of culture and tourism, have created departments of environmental affairs to plan
and implement their environmental policies and project.
Investments in Environmental Projects
Environmental projects are forms of mitigating current or potential environmental
problems in tourism areas. They include sanitation and water supply infrastructure,
urbanization and public environmental education. Environmental projects in tourism come as
a response to critical environmental problems that can affect tourism activities in a certain
area, such as water pollution, uncontrolled urbanization or lack of garbage collection. Some
development-oriented conservationists have argued that tourism development can improve
environmental quality because under certain conditions developers can invest heavily in water
and sanitation projects to mitigate current and future environmental problems (Towle, 1973).
Many tourism areas that boomed without strong effort on environmental planning
have suffered from severe environmental problems, and ultimately in decline of the number of
tourists. Even those that went through a careful planning did not ensure a harmonious
interaction between tourism development and the environment conservation (Bosselman,
1978). However, when the process of decline was detected or environmental movements
within and outside the tourism industry made their voice listened, some governments in these
areas invested in and implemented measures for improving environmental quality, such as
introducing sewage systems, renovation projects and environmental education. Part of these
areas were successful in improving environmental quality, and once more they could recover
its normal flow of tourists, such as Mallorca in Spain (Llinis, 1996). Others faced deep
decline and were victims of themselves, such as Acapulco and Jerusalem in Mexico
(Bosselman, 1978). In addition to mitigating environmental impacts, environmental projects
can be part of environmental safeguards to get tourism development projects approved or
justified. In many big tourism projects, developers include an environmental component that
can involve mitigation procedures of their impact, such as a sewage treatment plant, or
procedures related to surrounding communities or environment, such as projects of
environmental education for the neighboring communities (OECD, 1980; Leon & Gonzalez,
1995).
Many environmental projects can be made possible due to the existence of
investments in the tourism sector. When investments are planned in certain economic sector,
policy makers can allocate part of these investments to environmental measures. A number of
research articles and campaigns among policy makers and developers has contributed for the
growing attention to environmental issues (e.g., OECD, 1980), and policy makers and
developers seem to be more permeable to environmental claims. Investments can come, for
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example, as environmental projects linked to that economic sector or as financial support to
governmental institutions in order to implement and enforce environmental guidelines. At
planning stage, there is often a wider budget flexibility to attend the various demands from
different groups in the process. New projects, therefore, are "windows of opportunities" to
introduce environmental projects at planning stage. For example, the regional government of
the Spanish island of Mallorca implemented public works to improve environmental
amenities, such as tree planting and construction of beachfront public esplanade, to face
opposition to a controversial marina project in their jurisdictions (Morgan, 1991). In Porto
Seguro, Bahia, plans of investments in tourism by the state and municipal governments
included several environmental projects, such as sanitation and water supply infrastructure. It
has been the first time significant environmental projects are implemented in the municipality.
These environmental projects would not be possible, politically or financially, without the
whole bunch of investments in tourism infrastructure. 126 Furthermore, during the planning
process in the discussions with local groups, other environmental projects were included in
the plans due to the flexibility in the budget allocation.
Control of Development and Tourist Flow
Another form governments attempt to manage environmental impacts of tourism is to
control development and tourism flow in certain tourist areas. Controlling development
consists of limiting development to low levels and demanding a rigorous screening process
for project approval, including several environmental guidelines to be followed. There are
several tools for implementing development control, such as introducing land use planning,
issuing development permits, limiting the number of lodging to be constructed, and asking
environmental impact assessment (EIA) and public hearings for certain projects. For
example, some governments, such as Malta, have firmly applied restraints to new tourism
infrastructure development in order to cope with natural resource scarcity like water
(Goodwin, 1995).
Governments can also control the flow of tourists and length of stay in tourist areas.
Limiting tourists' access or charging entrance or permanence fees have been the main
mechanisms to implement these policies. For example, many national parks in the United
States limit the number of visitors in the high seasons by issuing a limited number of entrance
tickets. This is due to the extremely high number of tourists willing to visit some of the
parks. For example, the Greater Yellowstone National Park has received over 10 million
tourists annually in some years (Glick, 1991).
However, some authors are skeptical about the feasibility of policies involving
controlling development and tourism inflow in developing countries (Butler, 1991 and May,
1991). They argue that these kind of policies face strong opposition from local population
and businesses in response to potential losses of revenues generated by tourism, as happened
in some mountains regions in Asia (May, 1991). In Mallorca, Spain, local tourism industry
opposed a government project to renovate a certain area with the construction of a marina
which would require the demolition of various mass-market shops and hotels (Morgan, 1991).
Especially in developing countries, the need to attract foreign investments and generate jobs
126 Information from an interview with municipal officials.
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and income makes those policies extremely difficult to be accepted and implemented (Tyler,
1989). For example, Albanian local and central governments opposed any initiative to
restrain tourism development on the coast because of their need for foreign investments, even
tough environmentalists pressured for and proposed more environmental control (Goodwin,
1995).
Two cases in Brazil have shown evidence that this kind of policies is feasible under
certain circumstances, such as when government controls development are easily
implemented and local interests support these policies. In both cases, local groups who
benefit from tourism feared competition from outsiders and strongly supported controlling
development. In Fernando de Noronha, state government owns all the land and allows only
low impact projects to be build, under support of environmentalists and local groups. Also,
because of the difficult access government has controlled the flow of tourist by limiting the
number of flights to and boats in the islands, and controls the stay by applying a daily charge
to tourist stay. In Icapui, Ceara state, municipal government created a tourism council formed
by local communities to evaluate and approve tourism projects. Projects should be authorized
by large part of the communities. As most of the tourism businesses were local, large projects
or development controlled by outsiders were difficult to be approved. Until recently, this
council had approved only small local tourism projects controlled by locals.
Creating Environmentally Protected Areas
To cope with environmental impacts of tourism, many governments all over the world
have created environmentally protected areas. These environmentally protected areas have
constituted an attempt to discipline tourism development in areas where tourism has exposed
fragile environments to stress or where recent vectors of development, such as an opening of a
new road, expose remote and fragile zones to quick development. The rationale behind this
approach is that; first, the creation of the environmentally protected area fulfills some of the
environmental impact mitigation guidelines to approve or legitimate a certain tourism project;
second, this is a marketing response to the need of a good environment as part of attracting
tourists; and third, entrance or user fees to certain environmentally protected areas can be
used to raise revenue to pay for maintenance and enforcement expenses (WTO & UNEP,
1992; Ceballos-Lascurain, 1996). In some countries, like Kenya, tourism in protected areas
has become one of the main sources of foreign exchange (Olindo, 1991). However, protected
areas can also be a source of conflicts or just not be enforced. For example, local population
has not supported the establishment of Nelson's Dockyard National Park in Antigua because
of the fear in government's control over private land (CIDA, 1987). Also, in many
developing countries, protected areas "exist only on paper." Barzetti (1993) found that large
part of the protected areas in Latin America did not have any implementation mechanism after
being officially declared.
Governments can also create protected areas to curb potential environmental
degradation by big projects and to control ecosystem stress. In Icapui and Fernando de
Noronha in Northeastern Brazil, local governments created a protected area to impede the
construction of a big resort in the place, under pressure from environmentalists and local
groups who fear about being harmed by this project. In the state of Bahia, a new concept of
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Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) became the main environmental tool to control
development in areas that received investments in tourism infrastructure in the last decade.
Also, APA could be used as a marketing mechanism to attract a growing number of potential
ecotourists. To attract these ecotourists, governments and industry invested in advertising
their region as environmentally preserved areas and tried to divulge their achievements in the
environmental area. Chapter 3 covers protected areas in detail.
The Policymaking Process in Tourism Development and Environmental Protection
Both the state and the private sector 127 can play important roles in tourism
development. The development of tourism requires the implementation of several activities,
such as promotion, supply of basic infrastructure (e.g., road and utilities), financial
mechanisms, environmental regulations and services (e.g. transportation, hotels and
restaurants). The division of the roles between the state and the market vary from country to
country and according to the country's political, economic and social conditions over time. In
some countries, tourism is almost completely in the hands of the state. For instance, in Cuba
and some of the former republics in the Soviet Union, such as Uzbekistan, governments run
almost everything from tourism promotion to management of hotels (Airey & Shackley,
1998; Honey, 1999). In other countries, such as the Seychelles, some services, such as hotels,
are provided by both the state and the private sector (Gabbay & Gosh, 1998). However, in
most countries, the state commonly holds the primarily responsibilities for promoting tourism,
providing economic incentives, building infrastructure, and working on environmental
planning and management (Britton, 1991; loannides, 1995).
Within governments, responsibilities regarding tourism development vary from case
to case. In general, governments (countries, states or cities) have an agency to organize and
promote tourism for their jurisdiction. But tourism interests often run in several departments
or agencies, including agencies for tourism promotion, transportation, the environment and
financing. For example, in the United States, the federal government has the US Travel and
Tourism Administration (USTTA) in charge of tourism promotion, and the states and cities
have their respective agencies for tourism (McIntosh & Goeldner, 1990). However, several
other agencies have their responsibilities regarding tourism development, such as, at the
federal level, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, the
National Park Service, the Forest Service and Office of Management and Budget. Because of
the broad range of activities related to tourism, there are several conflicts among government
agencies involved in tourism development. Agencies can compete for budgetary allocations
or disagree about the impacts of tourism project.
Some of the roles of the public sector in disciplining tourism development can be
conflicting. On the one hand, governments have a developmental role. Governments should
attend private demand for investments in infrastructure and public utilities (in many countries,
like Brazil, some public utilities belong to governmental sphere). Particularly in developing
countries, governments are major players in tourism development through the provision of
marketing, regulations, training of labor force and infrastructure projects (Wall, 1997),
including roads, airports, electrification and telecommunication projects. These projects can
127 In private sector, I include all non-governmental institutions, such as community groups, firms and NGOs.
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cause a series of direct and indirect environmental problems. On the other hand, government
agencies have to create and enforce rules for the use of environmental resources through
mechanisms of environmental planning and management such as land use regulations, rules
for licensing projects and regulations for the conservation of fauna and flora. This
environmental role can often conflict with the developmental role.
As mentioned above the private sector and the state play different roles in tourism
development according to the country or region where it takes place. In most developed
countries, decisions about tourism development are mostly dependent on the private sector
(Wall, 1997). Central governments only influence peripheral matters like tourism promotion
and regulation on airline flights and visas. The private sector has to deal mostly with issues
that are generally in the hands of local governments such as zoning systems, development
permits and environmental regulations that may apply locally.
In developing countries, however, government's influence in tourism development
generally is much greater (Wall, 1997). Besides promotion and regulation, governments often
play a major role as investors in public infrastructure, promoters of training and sources of
financial incentives. To attract national and international private investments in tourism,
governments in developing countries have to come up with plans to assure the security of
these investments. Thus, plans are designed to promote tourism development, often with the
assistance of private consultants and with the interference of external actors responsible for
part of the financing. In addition, because of the raise of the environmental movement and
pressure from local and external actors, some governments have opened the process of
discussing environmental issues among different stakeholders in the public and private
sphere. This has allowed groups inside and outside the government, ranging from local groups
to international institutions, to introduce their values and interests in the policy process. For
example, in Costa Rica, which has embraced nature based tourism as a priority for economic
development, central government involved tour operators, local population and environmental
groups in its tourism plans (Boo, 1990).
In the development process, many of the conflicts described in Table A.4 come to
light. Different groups interested in tourism development stress different concerns. The case
of tourism development in the Brazilian Northeast can illustrate the facts described above.
Groups keenly diverge about the social and environmental effects of tourism development in
the northeastern region. This debate became evident in the 1990s when the federal and state
governments planned to invest more than 1 billion dollars in infrastructure for tourism in the
region, with financial support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) channeled
through the Bank of the Northeast (BN). On the one hand, developers and part of the state
and local governments supported the activity saying that it would generate a lot of jobs with
little investment and it would not degrade the environment. 128 On the other hand, some
NGOs, local communities and some groups within the governments argued that tourism, in
the way it had been developed (based on big hotels and infrastructure projects), could degrade
the environment both aesthetically and physically and cause social problems (e.g., projects
displace locals from their properties and traditional jobs to serve the tourist industry in low
128 It is common to hear from them that "tourism is a smokeless industry."
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paying jobs and illegal activities, such as prostitution and drug dealing). In another example,
in Albania, government and international donors proposed plans that would open some
unspoiled beaches off the Adriatic and Ionian seas for tourism development. While central
governments supported these plans arguing that tourism would bring economic development,
environmentalists viewed tourism as a threat to the environment. Instead, they proposed
projects that would be unlikely to be profitable (Goodwin, 1995). Thus, because of these
different views, it is often very hard to reach a wide consensus in tourism planning about the
desirable environmental/social impacts of the tourism activity. The increasing complexity of
the relations between tourism development and its environmental and social consequences
open rooms for the involvement of different agencies in the central government, local
interests, developers, environmental groups, social NGOs, international donors and the media.
Local Pressure
Environmental interests have grown in many developing countries. They include
community groups, environmental NGOs and even more environmentally conscious groups
inside the government (Viola, 1992). These groups have been responsible for introducing a
series of new values in society and in the policymaking process. Particularly, NGOs have
been essential in diffusing environmental values and strengthening environmental interests in
many countries (Paehlke, 1994). They have campaigned against projects that can potentially
affect the environment and for the diffusion of knowledge about the costs and benefits of
preserving the environment. These campaigns have convinced many people in civil society,
including some in the government, about the importance of the environment. Furthermore,
they have been legitimated as representatives of civil society in some policy and planning
processes, such as environmental impact assessments and environmental councils. 129 Also,
many environmentalists can later work for governmental organizations, contributing for the
introduction of their environmental ideas in these organizations.
For the adoption of environmental safeguards in the process of tourism development,
these groups, often using alliances with external actors, make political pressure on policy
makers. Groups that support more determined environmental policies can request different
forms of measures, such as more investments in environmental projects, investments in
environmental agencies to implement weakly enforced regulations or the creation of new
tools for environmental management. They can use all kinds of means to express their
concerns such as protests, messages through the media, campaigns for the electorate, judicial
processes and letters to the financing institutions. For example, in Fernando de Noronha,
Brazil, local community groups, local environmentalists and groups within the federal
environmental agency pressured the government to create a national park in the islands. This
objective was threatened by the desire of big hotel chains that had plans to construct resorts in
the islands. In the end, the media coverage supporting environmental groups, the coalition
with national scientific groups and the fully support of local population resulted in the
creation of the park. 3 0
129 Since 1970s, besides the National Environmental Council (CONAMA), several state and municipal
environmental councils have been created. They are responsible for defining local and state environmental
policies.
130 From interviews with officials in the Fernando de Noronha government authority in Recife, July 1998.
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External Pressure
External pressure on environmental policymakers at the local and regional levels can
come from some financing institutions such as the federal government, the World Bank or the
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), or even from some international NGOs (Dwivedi
& Vajpeyi, 1995). Governments at lower level can be extremely dependent on public
investments from public institutions at the upper levels. 131 Therefore, they can be susceptible
to all kinds of external pressures from upper level governments, including changes in their
environmental practices, in order to receive public and private investments in tourism
development
Starting in the 1960s, there was a rising public concern about threats to the
environment that were harming wildlife and human health in developed countries. The
growth of environmental movements made significant pressures not only in the way public
and private developers in the industrialized nations took into account the environment in their
policies and plans, but they have also changed environmental values in society in general.
For example, due to this public pressure, in the United States, many governments were eager
to respond by creating new institutions, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and by introducing environmental regulations, such as the Clean Air Act. As developed
countries shifted from industrial to post-industrial societies, public concerns moved to value
quality of life issues such as environmental quality. Environmental values were part of the
spread of postmaterialist values, which also includes human rights, of the "silent revolution"
started in the1960s (Paehlke,1994). The silent revolution significantly changed governmental
practices towards the environment (Kraft & Vig, 1994). Nowadays, environmental values
have definitively settled as one of the institutions that shape policy decision-making in
societies in industrialized countries. In the 1980s, these values were introduced in some
international development organizations (like the World Bank and the United Nation
Development Program - UNDP), especially as result of the pressure from governments and
NGOs of industrialized countries to make them include environmental analyses in their
projects and to hire specialized personnel (Wade, 1997). Donors, especially the World Bank,
suffered rush criticism from projects that caused environmental destruction by northern
NGOs. For example, the World Bank was accused of stimulating environmental degradation
in the Polonoroeste Project in the Brazilian Amazon in the 1980s (Rich, 1985; Lutzenberger,
1985). Due to these criticisms, the Bank made several environmental reforms in 1987.
Today, international development organizations have tried to influence development
agents in developing countries to introduce environmental procedures in their plans and
policies and to adopt environmental values by divulging the benefits of environmental
preservation and by stimulating the presence of environmental groups in the planning process
(World Bank, 1992). Donors have increasingly interfered on national and local
environmental policy processes to make governments in developing countries change their
attitude towards environmental issues. For example, donors, especially the World Bank and
131 In Brazil, for example, 56% of public revenues are retained by the federal government, 28% by state
governments and 16% by municipal governments (Souza, 1996). However, some governments in poor zones,
especially in the Northeast, possibly receive much less than 16%.
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IDB, were important actors to spur changes in environmental technology in the Mexican
electric power sector (Norberg-Bohm, 1995). Donors can affect local environmental policies
in two ways: By conditioning loans to the adoption of certain environmental measures or by
using loans to open a policy dialogue with borrowers thus being able to introduce policy
changes steadily (Fairman & Ross, 1996). In the first way, donors lend to borrowers that
have adopted certain environmental measures or condition loans to the borrowers' promise of
creating and implementing environmental measures. In the second way, donors use loans to
influence local policy decisions in order to try to introduce their environmental concerns.
Donors have conditioned loans in the tourism sector to environmental guidelines and
to the reservation of part of the budget to environmental projects. Donors have increasingly
worried about their image and the legitimacy of their actions in order to avoid accusations of
being responsible for widespread environmental destruction as in the 1970s and 1980s
(Dwivedi & Vajpeyi, 1995). For instance, the World Bank created a tourism department to
finance US$ 450 million in tourism projects in 1969. Due to increasing criticism from non-
governmental organizations regarding the impacts of those projects on communities and on
the environment this department was shut down and the tourism program discontinued
(McLaren, 1998). Changes have been made in the World Bank, but environmental groups
have questioned the environmental effectiveness of some projects. Even recently, some
critics argued that ecotourism projects under the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
bypassed less cooperative local groups and provoked environmental degradation (Mclaren,
1998).
Brazilian federal government can also condition federal projects and loans in tourism
development on the adoption of environmental measures. First, the federal government tries
to improve its image internationally, since it had been accused of environmental destruction,
especially in the Amazon, by environmental NGOs and members of the international
community for a long time (Lutzenberger, 1985; Mahar, 1989). Second, federal financing
institutions are under scrutiny of the international donors and NGOs in order to invest in
environmental protection, since they receive part of the financial resources from these
international institutions. These pressures are often imposed on state and municipal
governments when these receive loans from the federal government.
For example, two regional tools were recently strengthened to manage environmental
issues related to tourism in the Bahia: the creation of Environmentally Protected Areas
(APAs) and the implementation of the Coastal Management Program (CMP). 13 2 These tools
were created as alternative mechanisms for environmental protection to possibly guarantee
the financial support for tourism development from the financial institutions (IDB and BN).
Their implementation was intensified in the same period as tourism development received
large sums of the government funds. APAs and the CMP were introduced by different
m In the last few years, the Brazilian Ministry of Environment have coordinated the Coast Management
Program (CMP), a huge effort to map, zone and monitor the development of all activities on the Brazilian coast,
including tourism, industry and urban settlements. This effort is implemented by state environmental agencies
with financial and technical support from the Ministry. Part of the financial resources comes from World Bank
loans. Most of the states in the Northeast have received funds and advanced in the implementation of the CMP
after large investments in tourism were announced.
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institutional mechanisms in the agenda of the environmental agencies. However, both of
them were influenced by the appearance of potential investments in tourism development.
The creation of APAs appeared as the result of the pressure from groups within the
government and financial institutions (BN and IDB). In many states, especially in the states
of Bahia, Ceara' and Pernambuco, Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) have been created
and demarcated in areas with potential for tourism development. CMP has been implemented
as a long-time initiative from the federal government, through the leadership of the Brazilian
Ministry of Environment. Although CMP is not recent, states accelerated its implementation
and received financial resources after the federal government announced huge investments to
foment tourism development.
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APPENDIX 5 - LEGISLATION ON ENVIRONMENTALLY
PROTECTED AREAS (APAS) IN BRAZIL
There are three pieces of federal legislation regulating the creation and administration of
APAs (Governo do Estado da Bahia, 1998):
The Federal Law Number 6,902 of April 27, 1981
The National Environmental Council's Resolution Number 10, December 14, 1988
The Federal Decree Number 99,274 of June 6, 1990
The relevant parts of these three legislation bodies are translated below.
Federal Law Number 6,902 of April 27, 1981
The President acknowledges the National Congress decree, and I sanction the following law:
Article 9 - According to the principles that establish property rights, the public power will
define rules limiting the following activities within any Environmentally Protected Area
(APA):
the establishment or operation of any industries that could pollute waterstreams or reservoirs;
land clearing or the opening of canals or ditches whenever they potentially cause any
significant change in the local ecological conditions;
activities that may cause erosion or an accentuated siltation of waterstreams; and
activities that threaten any endangered species within any APA.
Paragraph 1 -- The Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA) or the equivalent agency at the
state level - together, unilaterally or under agreement with other institutions - will be in
charge of the enforcement of APA guidelines.
Paragraph 2 - The disregard for the rules stated in this article will subject the responsible
agents to the attachment of their activities, to a legal action to expropriate tools and machines
used in their activities and to the payment of daily fines ranging from Cr$ 200.00 (two
hundred cruzeiros) and Cr$ 2,000.00. Fines will be readjusted to an inflation index (ORTNs)
when they occur through long periods.
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Paragraph 3 - IBAMA, or other public institution, will be in charge of applying the sanctions
described in the previous paragraph. If fines are applied, the amount should constitute
revenues to the federal or state government.
Paragraph 4 - The fines in this law are regulated by the rules in the legislation for tributes and
for fiscal administration.
Article 10 - This resolution starts to be enforced at the date of its publication.
Article 11 - Any dispositions contradicting this law are revoked.
Joao Figueiredo
Mario David Andreazza
Conama's Resolution Number 10, December 14, 1988
The National Environmental Council (Conama) decides the following based on its attributions
stated in the eighth article of the law number 6,938 of August 31, 1981133 and the seventh
article in the federal decree number 88,351 of June 1, 1983:
Article 1 - Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) are conservation units for protecting and
conserving the environmental quality and the existent ecosystem, aiming at the improvement
of the quality of life of the local population and the protection of the regional ecosystems;
Article 2 - In order to achieve the above objectives, APAs need a ecological-economic
zoning.
Sole Paragraph - The referred zoning will establish rules according to the biotic, geological,
urban, agricultural, extractivist, cultural and other conditions.
Article 3 - Regardless of the system of ownership, any area could be part of an APA.
Paragraph 1 - Any other conservation unit or other areas under especial environmental
protection administered by the public power in the limit of the APA will be considered zones
for special uses.
m Law that states the Brazilian environmental policy.
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Paragraph 2 - Regarding the anthropic activities going on in the zones for special uses, the
APA will have supplemental objectives in order to ensure the achievements of the objectives
of the law number 6,902/813.
Article 4 - All APAs should have zonesfor the preservation of wildife protection, in which
the use of the natural systems will be regulated or forbidden.
Paragraph 1 - Within APAs, public or private Ecological Reserves, defined in the Federal
decree number 89336 of January 31 of 1984, and other areas with equivalent legal protection
will be considered zones for the preservation of wildlife protection. In these areas, any
anthropic activities that change the biota will be prohibited.
Paragraph 2 - Zonesfor the conservation of wildhfe protection will be those areas where a
long and self-sustaining use of the biota is permitted; this use should be regulated in order to
ensure the conservation of the natural ecosystems.
Article 5 - Any agricultural activities within APAs will be under zonesfor agricultural use
where any activity causing potential environmental degradation will be prohibited or
regulated.
Paragraph 1 - Under this resolution, chemicals and other environmentally degrading biocides
that produce risks to human health will not be allowed in the zones for agricultural use. The
Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA) will determine which kind of chemicals will be
allowed in the APAs.
Paragraph 2 - Agricultural methods will follow the soil conservation practices determined by
the official agriculture extension institutions.
Paragraph 3 - Overgrazing methods will be prohibited within any APA.
Article 6 - Land clearing, mining, dredging and excavating activities that cause harm to the
environment or endanger people and the biota will not be allowed in any APA.
134 Law that creates and defines APAs.
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Sole Paragraph - Any of the above mentioned activity will need the approval of an
environmental impact statement and special license by the APA administrator if they are
occurring within 1,000 meters from caves, streams, waterfalls, natural monuments, geological
monuments and similar situations.
Article 7 -- Any industrial activity that potentially pollutes the environment will need an
special license from the APA administrator, besides the environmental permit stated in the
law number 6,938 of August 31, 1981.
Article 8 - Any urbanization project within any APA will need the license from the APA
administrator, who will demand the following items:
compatibility with the ecological-economic zoning in place,
implementation of a system for sewage collection and treatment,
a system of public roads, whenever possible, with adequate design and rainwater sewer,
land plots sufficiently large to have trees planted on 20% of the surface,
a program for tree planting using native species, and
commercialized land plots and roads only in areas with less than 10% declivity.
Article 9 -- Rural settlements must be previously approved by the National Institute for
Agrarian Reform (Incra) and the APA administrator.
Sole paragraph -- The APA administrator can ask that the legal reserve13 5 for the preservation
of the native forest for all land plots be concentrated in one single area under a cooperative
formed by all the landowners.
Article 10 - The enforcement of the APA guidelines can be performed under an agreement
between the APA administrator and non-governmental organizations, which should be able to
collaborate, and be technically fit and financially credible for the tasks involved.
Article 11 - This resolution starts to be enforced at the date of its publication
Fernando Cesar Mesquita
Joao Alves Filho
m Rural properties in areas covered by native forest should leave a certain percentage (varying according to the
kind of ecosystem) of the native forest under a "legal reserve" registered in the land registration office and the
environmental protection agency (IBAMA).
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Federal Decree Number 99,274 of June 6, 1990
The President... decrees:
Chapter II - On Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs)
Article 28 - At the federal level, the Secretary for the Environment is in charge of proposing
to the President the establishment of Environmentally Protected Areas (APAs) based on the
assessment of the Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA).
Article 29 - The decree creating an APA will determine its name, geographical limits, main
objectives and the restrictions over the use of the natural resources.
Article 30 - The APA administrator will assist landowners in order to achieve the objectives
of the APA.
Sole Paragraph - Landowners affected by the APA can mention the APA name in their
properties in the promotion of tourism activities and on the label of products obtained from
the APA.
Article 31 - Any relevant conservation initiatives within the APA will be praised publicly.
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APPENDIX 6 - EXAMPLE OF LEGISLATION CREATING AN APA
In general, a state APA is created by a short state decree issued by the governor.
Later, a resolution from the State Environmental Council (CEPRAM) legally backs the
guidelines in the management plan. This resolution is the longest piece of legislation for the
legal backing of an APA (it can run over several pages), containing the description of all the
zones and the environmental guidelines for land use, and all the responsibilities for the
enforcement of APA guidelines. In addition, municipal laws can legally complement the
establishment of an APA in order to provide municipal institutional support to the
enforcement of the APA guidelines. For example, Itacare is backed by four pieces of
legislation:
* the state decree number 2,186/93
* the state environmental council's resolution number 1,334/96
e the municipal law number 175/97 of the municipality of Uruguca
* the municipal law number 118/97 of the municipality of Itacare
As an example, the state decree for Itacare APA is described below.
State Decree Number 2,186 of June 7, 1993
Creates the Environmentally Protected Area of Coast of Itacare/Serra Grande (Itacare APA)
in the municipalities of Itacare and Uruguca, and provides other determinations.
According to the attributions determined in the law number 3,858 of November 3, 1980 and
based on the federal law number 6,902 of April 27, 1981 and the Conama's resolution number
10 of December 14, 1988,
Because of the importance for environmental preservation of the rocky cliffs, the pieces of
Atlantic Forest, the coastal plains and other important ecosystems existent in the coastal zone
between the delta of the Contas River and Sergi Creek in the municipalities of Itacare and
Uruguca,
Because the region at stake presents scenic natural characteristics that permit the development
of ecological tourism compatible with the conditions for sustainable development of the
region, and
189
Because APAs constitute the most suited form of conservation unit available for the
management of the social, economic and human activities in the area at stake, according to
the actual legislation,
the Governor of the State of Bahia decrees:
Article 1 - The creation of the Itacare APA in the municipalities of Itacare and Uruguca
limited by Contas River in the north, Sergi Creek in the south (the administrative limit
between the municipalities of Uruguca and Ilheus), the Atlantic Ocean in the east and a line
6km away from the high tide line westward.
Article 2 - The Bahia Tourism Authority (Bahiatursa) 136 will be in charge of the
administration of the APA . Bahiatursa will have the following responsibilities based on
proper legislation and the Conama's resolution number 10 of December 14, 1998:
I - Develop a management plan within 18 months, taking into account the legislation,
autonomy and peculiarities in the referred municipalities,
II - Analyze and issue technical assessments for the license of developments in the area, and
III - Exercise supervision over the activities within the APA, taking into account municipal
jurisdiction.
Article 3 - Property rights within Itacare APA are restricted under the conditions stated in the
federal law number 6, 902 of April 27, 1981.
Article 4 - This decree starts to be enforced at the day of its publication. Any dispositions
contradicting this decree are revoked.
Antonio Carlos Magalhaes (Governor)
Waldeck Vieira Omelas (State Secretary for Planning, Science and Technology)
Paulo Ganen Souto (State Secretary of Tourism, Culture and Commerce).
136 The administration was changed later to the State Secretariat of Culture and Tourism (Sectur).
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APPENDIX 7 - TOURISM IN THE BRAZILIAN NORTHEAST AND IN
BAHIA
Tourism decision-making in the Northeast, and in Brazil in general, is handled by
different structures at the local, state and federal levels. At the federal level, coordination of
tourism development is mainly managed by the Brazilian Institute of Tourism
(EMBRATUR).m1 7 Basically, EMBRATUR determines the main policies and sets
mechanisms for promotion and financing of tourism all over Brazil. At the state level,
different structures exist. Some states have a secretariat of tourism. In others, tourism is
under a secretariat with diverse functions (e.g., in Bahia, there is the Secretariat of Culture
and Tourism). Also, there are independent agencies for tourism development formed by a
public-private partnership at the state level (e.g., Bahiatursa in Bahia). These state institutions
promote tourism and coordinate state actions concerning the financing and locating private
investment and public investments in tourism (infrastructure and marketing). At the
municipal level, public structures for tourism development have appeared in the last decades
in similar forms of those existed at the state level. Some municipalities have secretariat of
tourism or put tourism with other activities (e.g., Icapui in Ceari created a secretariat of
tourism and the environment, and Porto Seguro in Bahia has a secretariat of tourism).
Besides public agencies, there are developers, entrepeneurs, employees' unions and NGOs
who interfere in the system of decision-making in tourism. In the last decade, there have been
created many tourism councils at the state, regional or municipal level to define tourism
regional policies. These councils are formed by representatives from the government,
employees unions, business people, developers and NGOs (e.g., in Porto Seguro region,
which include three municipalities, there is a tourism council to coordinate state and
municipal actions concerning tourism promotion and investments). More recently, tourism
coordination and decision-making has involved actors in the environmental and cultural arena
such as environmental NGOs, government secretariats for the environment and culture and
cultural associations. Also, international organizations, such as international donors and
NGOs, have increasingly influenced the process of tourism and environmental decision-
making.
However, only recently, the importance of the "industry" of tourism has sharply called
attention in the Northeast of Brazil (Rodrigues, 1996). Although this region has an enormous
potential for tourism development, especially on its coastal areas, this activity was not a
priority for government action. In the efforts to draw the Northeast out of economic
backwardness, through bringing industries to the region using economic incentives, the focus
had always been on the "real" industries, such as chemicals, metal-mechanics, textiles and
food processing (Soares & Rocha, 1994; and SUDENE & BN, 1988). This "low" status of
the economic potential of tourism in the past was not a characteristic of the Brazilian
Northeast solely. Researchers and practitioners of economic development had tardily realized
and given attention to tourism as a tool for regional economic development (loannides, 1995).
Nowadays, however, tourism is said to be one of the fastest growing economic
activities in the world (U.S. Department of Commerce, quoted by Filion et al., 1994). In
137 EMBRATUR is an agency under the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism.
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Brazil, tourism has represented an important part of the Brazilian economy. It provided 4.7%
of exports revenue between 1987 and 1990. In 1990, the participation of tourism was even
greater than that of traditional products, such as orange juice and coffee (Becker, B. 1995).
Domestic tourism also represents a significant economic activity. In 1986, approximately 42
million trips occurred within Brazil for tourist purposes (Becker, B. 1995). Construction of
lodges had grown steadily, despite the slowdown of the Brazilian economy in the 1980s and
1990s (see Table A.6). Moreover, as the middle class has grown and road access has
improved, ownership of second houses becomes common among many urban Brazilians,
increasing the pressure on the environment.13 8
Furthermore, planners in Brazil suggested that there was still a tremendous growth
potential for tourism activity, especially international tourism, as Brazil attracted only 0.24%
of the total worldwide number of international tourists in 1990 (EMBRATUR, 1992).
Authorities in the Brazilian Northeast believed that tourism is expected to become the most
important economic activity in the 21st century (Banco do Nordeste, 1997; p. 12). In this
context, tourism had increasingly come to be a key economic activity for the economy of the
Northeast. This region possesses a significant potential for the development of tourism: warm
climate year round, cultural diversity and over 2.5 thousand kilometers of seashore with
attractive beaches. In this context, policy makers believe that tourism can impel the regional
economy, attracting investments, creating jobs and generating income to diminish poverty
(Paiva, 1989; Banco do Nordeste, 1997).
Table A. 6 - Number of rooms classified by The Brazilian Institute of Tourism
(EMBRA TUR)
State/Region 1980 1994 Chan2e 1994/1980
Ceari State 1,884 3,151 67.3%
Pernambuco State 3,092 5,687 84.0%
Bahia State 5,111 7,338 43.6%
Northeastern 14,429 24,498 69.8%
Region
Brazil 99,854 140,563 40.8%
Source: Melo & Souza, 1995 (Based on EMBRATUR 1981, 1991 and 1995).
The belief that tourism can increase its importance in the economy of the Northeast
had been translated into the amount of investments in the tourism sector. Between 1980 and
1990, the private sector received financing of over US$ 350 million for projects related to
tourism (Melo & Souza, 1996). In the public sector, over US$ 1.5 billion is planned to be
invested in infrastructure projects in ten years through a government sponsored program
138 The number of second houses in Brazil has grown from 350 thousands in 1980 to 562 thousands in 1996
according to the Brazilian Association of Sanitary Engineering (Veja, 1999).
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called Prodetur-NE created in 1991 (Ministry of Economy, Treasury and Planning; Bank of
The Northeast (BNB) and InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), 1992). This plan is
coordinated by the Bank of the Northeast (BN, Banco do Nordeste) and state governments
with loans from Inter-American Development Bank - IDB. As a result of all these
investments, tourism had grown faster in the Northeast compared to the Brazilian average
growth (Table A.6).
Tourism has become an important economic activity in Bahia (Gottschall, 1994; Bahia
State Government, 1997). Authorities in Bahia expect that as many as 78 thousands lodging
beds be created on the coast by the private sector in the following decade (Bahia State
Government, 1997). Tourism in some regions outside the state capital (Salvador) grew
tremendously (Table A.7). For example, in the southern part of the state, Porto Seguro grew
as one of the main tourist destinations in Brazil. In 1995, it was the fifth in Brazil and second
in the Northeast in number of hotel beds (Governo da Bahia, 1997); and some analysts
preview that Porto Seguro would surpass Salvador in number of hotel beds by the end of last
decade (Table A.8, Mello e Silva, 1996). The growth in tourist demand had been so intense
that the capacity of Porto Seguro's airport had to be increased, only three years after it had
been expanded in 1993.
Table A.7 - Hosting capacity in the different coastal zones in Bahia
Region Number of Number of Annual Growth
Beds in 1980 Beds in 1993 Rate (%)
Salvador Metropolitan 9,600 15,170 4.46
Region
Northern Coast 800 5,760 47.69
Southern Coast 3,300 29,929 62.07
Source: Bahia State Government (n.d.)
Table A.8 - Number of Hotel Beds in Salvador and Porto Seguro in Bahia (1995)
1 f\CV~\
Source: Mello e Silva (1996), based on Quatro Rodas (1989 an ) 1J)
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Locality 1989 1995 Change 1995/1989
Salvador 8,165 10,285 26.0%
Porto Seguro 2,897 9,184 217.0%
Within tourism, ecotourism has probably grown even faster. In number of tourists
from industrialized countries who visit Latin America, between 50% and 79% are potential
ecotourists (Boo, 1990). In Brazil, it does not look different. In Porto Seguro, Bahia, natural
attractions were quoted as the main purpose of the trip by 84% of the tourists in a survey
(Bahiatursa, 1997). Also, government authorities emphasize the importance of preservation
of the environment in official documents in order to attract ecotourism investments and
ecotourists (Bahia State Government, 1997).
Therefore, ecotourism can create one more economic justification for biodiversity
conservation and preservation of natural areas. In some cases, financial resources from
ecotourism (taxes or entrance fees) can even be a form of increasing the budget for paying the
costs of creating and maintaining public services for environmental protection. This is
important especially for developing countries where budgets for environmental management
are very tight (or non-existent). However, ecotourism per se does not mean tourism without
environmental impacts. Ecotourists need the same sort of tourism infrastructure as other kind
of tourists, such as lodging, road access and telecommunication services (Filion, 1994).
Governments need to control and prevent these impacts through environmental management
initiatives. Thus, nowadays, it is common to find governments in developing countries
dedicating part of their investments in the tourism sector to environmental protection.
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